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Abstract 
 
This thesis topic arises out of the tension between, on the one hand, attempts to de-centre 
the power of state and, on the other, internal state territorialisation where state increases its 
control over communities by controlling the space in which they operate. It aims to 
describe how state through territorial resource governance exercises power over the 
society. Power is conceptualised beyond the physical manifestation of force to include 
coercion and dominance. This thesis uses resource governance as a lens through which 
power is looked at. Thus a state project to demarcate conservation and agricultural zones in 
Tonle Sap areas was selected. 
 This thesis finds that the Cambodian state depends on the international discourse of 
environmental protection, and the expansion of a modernist state in resource governance, 
in order to legitimise its interventions in resource governance. Once the need for 
intervention is justified, the neo-patrimonial state exercises power over the society into two 
ways. First, through not bureaucratic expertise but a system of personal power and patronic 
network, the state formulates a hasty national policy of environmental governance. Second, 
at implementation level, the agents representing the central state subdue the logic of 
rational resource governance under their own street level logic in pursuit of their rent-
seeking interests. 
 This thesis concludes that the nature of state power over society as expressed 
through territorialised resource governance is not based on an absence of laws and 
regulations, but on personal power exercised in an outwardly rationalistic framework of 
conservation, resource regulations and state modernisation. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 
This thesis topic arises out of the observation of the tensions between, on the one hand, 
attempts to bring good governance practices to Cambodia, and on the other hand the nature 
of the Cambodian state. The past 20 years have seen many internationally driven 
governance reforms aimed at strengthening democracy in Cambodia. These reforms 
include: the shift from a one- party state to a multi-party democracy in 1993, the 
empowerment of the local state through Siela program launched in 1996, and the full 
swing nation-wide decentralisation and deconcentration (D&D) reforms program launched 
in 2001. Together, these reforms ambitiously aim to produce a more accountable 
government and a greater role for citizens in the conduct of the state. 
 But Cambodian state has a deeply-engrained un-democratic nature. For the most 
part of Cambodian history, particularly contemporary history, the state has been a source 
of fear and insecurity. Cambodian society, in different periods of time, has been torn apart 
by invasions from neighboring countries, successive civil wars and violent repressions. 
This signifies the complexities and difficulties of relations between the state and society, 
and the failure of the state to fulfill its duties. Bit (1991) argues that the Cambodian state 
has a history of wide scale militaristic conflicts as well as imposing physical violence on 
its citizens. Observations of contemporary Cambodian history point towards such problems 
of the state. The most extreme form of state intrusion occurred when the Khmer Rouge 
(KR) regime was in power. It was responsible for forced labor, torture and executions that 
claimed the lives of over 1.7 million people during its reign from 1975 to 1979 (Chandler, 
1983, 1993; Kiernan, 2008; Peou, 2001; Tyner, 2008). Ojendal and Kim (2011: 2) argue 
that when the KR regime was toppled in 1979, Cambodia was under the management of 
another form of state that was generally regarded as ‘authoritarian, power-oriented, 
centralised and based on fear and coercion’. Although this regime may have seemed 
comparatively benign in comparison to its predecessor, the state ruled by coercion, fear 
and insecurity (Gottesman, 2004; Mabbett & Chandler, 1995). For many Cambodians, the 
local state has been an oppressive force and cause of insecurity and other problems 
(Ojendal & Kim, 2011).   
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 Two decades on, evidence of improved state-society relations is limited. The effect 
of governance reform, particularly the (D&D) has been observed to be limited to producing 
a perception of democracy and the feeling of accountability, rather than significant and 
substantial changes (Ojendal & Kim, 2011). Evidence of persistent and prevailing state 
domination over society, continues to come up through publications in the NGO and 
academic fields (Global Witness, 2007, 2009; Hughes, 2003; Peou, 2000; Rusten et al., 
2004; Un, 2005, 2006, 2009; Un & So, 2009). This leads to a general understanding that 
the state is still far from being responsive and accountable to society (Un, 2005). The 
pursuit of political and economic reforms over the last two decades has resulted in a hybrid 
political system where elements of a liberal democracy coexist with that of the traditional 
client patronage system (Roberts, 2008). The governance reform that aims at promoting 
democratic development has not fully transformed Cambodia into a fully democratic state, 
but rather a procedural democracy where elements of democratic process such as elections 
mainly give the appearance of a democracy but have no significant democratising effects 
(Hughes, 2009; Un, 2005, 2006, 2011) . Un (2006) argues that Cambodian political elites 
employ patronage and corruption to advance their interests and further strengthen their 
position by providing benefits to members and patronage networks in ways that weaken 
vertical and horizontal accountability. This leads Global Witness (2009) to label the state 
as a kleptocracy. What is interesting to note is that the Cambodian democracy has not 
wholly matured over the past two decades, and old elements of the state do not come to be 
replaced by democratic practices, but rather elite capture of democratic institutions has 
increasingly occurred (Slocomb, 2011). In this sense the hybrid political system in 
Cambodia seems to have mutated. In his article ‘Cambodia moving away from 
democracy?’ Un (2011) argues that the Cambodian political system is becoming a 
hegemonic party system where power largely rests in the hands of the ruling party and the 
Prime Minister (PM). How this development affects the nature of state power over society 
is the subject interest for this thesis. 
 This thesis aims to show the extent to which the state retains its power over the 
society. To this end, this thesis uses an example of resource governance to provide a lens 
through which the exercise of power is looked at. The thesis combines the disciplines of 
political science and political geography to give insights into these complex relations. 
While political science concerns the nature of the state, political geography is concerned 
with the study of how politics informs geography, and at the same time how geography 
3 
 
informs politics (Agnew, 2002). Political geography looks at how state power gets 
translated over space, particularly how this power is discursively and practically produced 
and spatially operationalised in both territorial and non territorial forms (Cox & Low, 
2003) . One area of focuses in this discipline has been the study of the role of the state in 
everyday life (Marston, 2003). Political geography also looks at how the concept of 
territory confines, or defines the power of the state. Bakker and Bridge (2008) argue that 
the production of nature involves the exercise of power which can be reflected in the 
geographical networks of knowledge and control. Thus, resource governance offers an 
excellent example for the study of state society power-relations. States claim a 
responsibility to manage resources in order to extend their active control over both human 
and non-human nature within their territorial control (Huxley, 2008). The control of space 
within the territorial boundary of the state is referred to as internal state territorialisation, 
where the state actively controls the space in which society or communities operate 
(Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995). The state has sovereign authority over a bounded territorial 
space.  
 The two disciplines provide important conceptual understandings of the nature of 
state power over society, as they provoke an examination of the territorial strategies of 
states. In particular they point towards the way in which a state decentralises while 
simultaneously extending bureaucratic control over an extended territory. In time of war, 
the state may mobilise resources to defend its national sovereignty and protect its territorial 
boundaries. In time of peace the state employs internal territorial strategies to intensify its 
control over space within its territorial boundary (Lanegran, 2007). The state uses modern 
science as the basis for its claim over the governance of both human and non-human 
nature. For example, Menzies (2007), In his book, Our forest, Our eco-system, Their 
timber, looks at local community struggles to protect  village-managed natural resources 
from the invading presence of state agents (Menzies, 2007). Another such scholar is Scott 
(1998), who in his book, Seeing like a State, describes how the central state imposes its 
technical vision over nature with often disastrous impacts for local ecology. Nguiffo 
(1998) describes two broad manners in which the state affects the everyday livelihoods of 
its citizens. On a broad scale, at the level of state planning and management, the state 
actively claims forested areas which used to be under the management of local people. 
This is done under the rubric of natural resource management which the state promotes as 
necessary to save forest from local degradation and destruction. The state forces people out 
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of forested areas on which they had lived and often depended for livelihood. However, this 
strategy of territorialisation is not in the service of nature but resembles what Harvey 
(2003:147) terms ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Here, the state creates laws that legalise 
the sale of timber to create revenue. But regardless of the reasoning and agendas behind 
these acts, the result is the intrusion of the state into community level management of 
natural resources.  
Research Problem 
This thesis looks at the issues of state-society relations in Cambodia. It asks how the 
Cambodian state exercises power over society. Unlike other studies on the Cambodian 
state, this thesis takes an ethnographic approach to look at the exercise of state power 
which, as Lukes (1974) argues, can be present without being exercised. Unlike the natural 
sciences with their dependence on positivism which treats reality as objectively existing 
outside of meaning and human experience, this thesis treats reality as constitutive of 
human experience and existing within the area of meaning. As Tedlock (2000:471) argues, 
social experience cannot be singular but is ‘dependent on a multiplicity of locations and 
positions that are socially constructed’. The essence of ethnography is to put words or 
action in their context. Thus, ethnographic data is collected in the context of its 
surroundings, which can be achieved only when the researchers are immersed in close and 
relatively prolonged interaction with people in their everyday lives (Manen,1988). Such an 
approach enables this thesis to more closely look at the concept of power and the state as it 
is embedded in a particular context. 
 Sack (1983:19) argues, ‘territory is socially and geographically rooted’. It is an 
‘attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and 
relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’. Understanding 
state territorialisation is understanding the nature of power relations between the state and 
society. Territorialisation involves inclusion and exclusion of certain groups. Thus, this 
thesis seeks to understand the connection, or interaction, between territoriality and power 
in Cambodia. To this end, the thesis is divided into three sub-questions.  
1. How does the state engage territorialisation? 
2. How does power work in a neo-patrimonial state? 
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3. What mechanism does society have to demand accountability from the 
state?  
Through the case study of a state-managed project to demarcate the Tonle Sap protected 
area, this thesis aims to advance understandings of the Cambodian state in three ways. 
First, by way of description, this thesis aims to show how the state retains its power over 
society. The thesis will give a detailed account of how the state, under the influence of neo-
liberal theory, managed to design and implement an environmental protection project 
which has had profound impacts on the lives of hundreds of thousands of floating rice 
farmers in Cambodia. Secondly, it aims to explore the internal complexity of the neo-
patrimonial state in order to account for the differences between the intentions of state 
policy, and the effect of state action on the ground. In this line of thinking, this thesis 
proceeds to give a full account of how power works within a neo-patrimonial state. The 
third aim focuses on the mechanisms that society can or cannot employ to demand 
accountability from the state. This is based on Gramsci’s (1971) idea that power is the 
result of a constant war of positions between the dominant and the oppressed. But the 
possibility of resistance depends on many factors, and attention will be given to both 
formal and informal attempts by the society to counter the power of the state. 
Thesis Layout 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter I forms the introduction. Chapter II is a review 
of related literature. It covers political geography concepts such as space, place and 
territory, which are essential for an understanding of power. Some of the key concepts in 
political science are discussed in this chapter. The three concepts of power are discussed in 
detail to provide a framework for understanding its mechanisms. The concept of the state is 
also examined, and the different types of state and political regimes are brought into the 
discussion in order to improve understandings of the operation of state power. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the structure of power in a neo-patrimonial state. This discussion serves 
to provide an analytical framework for the study of state power in Cambodia; a state that is 
generally characterised as a hybrid, or neo-patrimonial state. To provide a complete 
discussion of the concept of power, the chapter finishes off with a discussion of the 
literature written around the theme of resistance. In this section of the chapter, attention is 
given to the end point of power flows by examining the potentials and limitations of social 
movements. 
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 Chapter III provides the context of the study. It first gives a brief review of the 
historical and contemporary development of the state in Cambodia. It then describes the 
various changes that have been crucial to the structure and nature of state power in 
Cambodia. Some of the specific topics are: the adoption of a free market economy in the 
1980s, the end of the civil war, and the introduction of a liberal democracy in the early 
1990s along with subsequent governance reforms. This chapter also discusses the 
limitations of those reforms, and the emergence of a hybrid, neo-patrimonial political 
regime. The rest of this chapter aims to provide background information on the governance 
of the Tonle Sap Lake in central Cambodia. It covers the geography of the area, the 
existence of human and non-human nature, and the different regimes of resource 
governance that have been applied to the lake. It also provides a discussion of 
contemporary development in resource governance and extraction practices that gives rise 
to state intervention. 
 Chapter IV is dedicated to methodological discussions and explanations of how the 
research problems have been addressed. Detailed explanations are given as to how 
empirical data essential for understanding state power, was collected. Also discussed are 
the challenges and difficulties in collecting and verifying data that concern such 
controversial issues such as corruption, interpersonal tension and informal politics.  
 Chapter V presents the findings derived from the case study. By way of description, 
this chapter attempts to provide an answer to the first research question of how the state 
employs its territorial strategies. It offers a detailed account of what factors led the state to 
demarcation in the first instance, and the project’s impacts in terms of encroachment on 
village farmland. Also covered here are accounts of how the central state justified the 
project, and how state agents took charge of the affairs in ways that override and 
delegitimise local claims to resources.  
 Chapter VI provides an answer to the second research question of how power 
works in a neo-patrimonial state. Based on an ethnographic account of the encounter 
between the state and citizens in the process of territorial demarcation, this chapter 
describes how the state is represented by its field agents, and how central state policy intent 
is subverted by the street level logics and agendas of field agents. It also describes how the 
implementing agents advance their interest, and how they dominate local levels state, and 
non-state, agents. 
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 Chapter VII is structured around the third research question which asks what 
mechanisms are available to members of society to demand accountability from the state. 
Based on local attempts to reverse the effects of the state project, this chapter describes the 
problems and difficulties of going through a formal appeal processes, and how the 
likelihood of success was at the whim of central agents. This chapter also describes the 
ways in which local citizens explore different avenues for resolving their grievances, and 
the restrictions they come across within a neo-patrimonial state system.  
 Chapter VIII discusses the case study material in reference to the conceptual 
framework. It brings all of the empirical data together to form a comprehensive account of 
the everyday exercise of state power over society. It aims to show how territorial strategies 
are adopted, adapted and applied in a neo- patrimonial state, and when that happens, what 
mechanisms society can or cannot employ to demand accountability from the state. This 
chapter also discusses the empirical data in light of the existing body of literature on 
decentralisation and neo-patrimonialism within Cambodia. Finally, the thesis concludes, in 
chapter IX, that territoriality, as a strategy or attempt to influence and control others, 
becomes a dangerous form of domination when employed by a neo-patrimonial state. Due 
to the arrangement of duties and structure of power in a neo-patrimonial state such as that 
of Cambodia, territorial strategy does not follow the process as postulated by Sack (1986). 
According to Sack, such a strategy involves changing the logic of  resource governance, 
communication of the intention to control, demarcation, and enforcement. Instead, within 
Cambodia, territorial strategy flows through hierarchical patronage networks encountering 
transformations and resistance along the way. Without reviewing debates surrounding state 
territorialisation in detail, it can be said that territorial strategy is prone to inaccuracy and 
inefficiency, as well as facilitating the imposition of elite interests over society. In the 
absence of a system of accountability, members of society are denied a position as 
recipients of state services. Therefore, the combined effects of territorial strategy and neo-
patrimonialism place contemporary members of society in a position of severe 
vulnerability.  
 It is hoped that this thesis can serve to remind us that neo-patrimonial states such as 
Cambodia are not willing to relinquish their strong grip on social relations, as scholars of 
neo-liberalism would often have it (Harvey, 2005). Instead, using the power of 
environmental discourses, in combination with their neo-patrimonial power, states 
continue to play an active role in resource governance in ways that gravely undermine the 
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needs and wants of communities. The implication is that scholars and practitioners need to 
pay more attention to the presence, and the role of the state in the management of natural 
resources. The state continues to employ powerful police technologies to facilitate violent 
repression and control of populations.  
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Chapter II: Theoretical Discussion on Territoriality and State Power 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical understanding of the nature of state power. It 
combines concepts from political geography such as space, place and territory, with 
political science theories of state and power. The chapter is divided into two main parts. 
First, it looks at key concepts in political geography. Secondly, it discusses the political 
science concepts of state and power and their application to the neo-patrimonial state. 
These concepts from the two disciplines are important for the framing of this thesis seen in 
Chapter III.  
Key Concepts in Political Geography 
Political geography is the study of how politics informs geography, and at the same time 
how geography informs politics (Agnew, 2002). One area of focus in this discipline has 
been the study of the role of the state in everyday life (Marston, 2003). Central concepts 
within this discipline are space, place and territory. An understanding of these concepts is 
essential for an understanding of how politics works, and how states expand their power 
over society.  
 Space 
The concept of space is very important for the discussion of power. Penrose (2002) argues 
that space relates to power in two ways. Space has material power to sustain life, and it has 
the power to provoke certain emotions. Penrose (2002) argues that the material power of 
space comes from the fact that within space there are material resources such as land and 
water on which lives depend. The emotional power of space comes from human 
experiences in space. This experience shapes the human understanding of space beyond the 
seeming image of emptiness of space, and it creates sense of attachment and provokes a 
certain kind of feeling and reaction when the sense of space is altered or evaded.  
 For its two dimensions of power, the concept of space is important for the 
discussion of how states exercise power. The understanding that space holds special 
emotional power for humans allows for an understanding of how the control of space is the 
exercise of power. In this line of thought, Allen (1999) argues that the control of space is 
the exercise of power. 
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 To understand how space is controlled in service of power, it is important to 
understand how space is conceptualised. Lefebvre (1991) divides the concept of space into 
lived space and representational space. Lived space is space of meanings and attachment 
which connects different people who have relations and experience with a particular space. 
The quality of these experiences may by relational, situational and directional. This 
conceptualization of space corresponds to the argument that space holds special emotional 
power over the human lives. Human experience of space becomes meaningful and 
memorable when a familiar territory becomes linked to abstract thinking, knowledge and 
emotion. Penrose (2002) describes lived space as space whose meaning and significance 
are given by the human experience in those spaces. These meanings and feelings are not 
just based on imagination but on past experience of being in the space. In other words the 
meaning of space is socially produced. Penrose’s (2002) conceptualization of space 
supports Shields (1991) who argues that the meaning of a geographical space is 
constructed by those who experience it, and those meanings become guides for action, or 
constraints upon action. That is, space is a place of meaning influenced by human history 
which sets in motion certain feelings about it. Representational space, on the other hand, 
conceptualises space as abstract and empty of meanings. It consists of sameness and is 
devoid of human experiences (Staeheli 2003). Lefebvre (1991) argues that this way of 
conceptualising space allows for a geographical imagination where scientists, planners and 
conservationists subdivide space in particular ways to suit their purposes. The two 
conceptual understandings of space allow for an understanding of power relations and 
struggles arise in space. It suggests that the re-representation of a certain space is 
inherently an exercise of power over those for whom the space contains past engagement 
and experience that serve as a point of attachment. The view of space as abstract often 
allows for the representation and reclassification of space in ways that tend to displace the 
lived space, affecting the human connection to the space concerned and it creates a certain 
kind of emotional response. In resource governance, the tensions over how space is treated 
often arise between the state officials who tend to see space as abstract and those local 
commoners who have experience and emotional attachment to the space on top of their 
dependence on it for daily livelihood. This leads Sack (1986) to argue that the abstract 
space, as seen by the state, is often different from lived space, with great consequences for 
society.  
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 The two concepts of space are important for his thesis which attempt to understand 
the exercise of power through the control of space of Tonle Sap. Sack’s (1986) argument 
that space in its abstraction can be made and remade to create new territories in ways that 
displace the significance of lived space allows for the understanding of the state’s attempt 
to re-divide and re-classify Tonle Sap areas as a potential process of power over the local 
communities in the Tonle Sap catchment. This perspective is supported by Huxley (2008) 
who argues that through spatial planning the state can exercise effective control over social 
relations. Similarly, Lefebvre (1991:79) sees abstract space as ‘a site where socio-
technological practices of control are employed in the service of power’. Agents in power, 
mostly the state, engage what Lefebvre (1991:98) terms ‘spatial homogenization’ to 
reproduce space, by emptying the lived space of human presence and experience and 
transforming it into the abstract space of sameness. The abstractness of space can help the 
state achieve its purpose of imposing an abstract homogeneity over territory. Huxley 
(2008:164) terms this process ‘the silencing’ of lived space. This often results in social 
disruption and ecological loss (Scott, 1998), and it can also cause a lot of damage to the 
historical conditions that produce a certain space. To enhance the understanding of the 
process of power and control in the tension between the two conceptions of space, there is 
a need for a discussion on the elements of space which include the concept of place and 
territory, the discussion of which follows. 
 Place 
In space exists various places (Penrose, 2002). A place has the characteristics of both as a 
geographical point of reference and emotional attachment. As Entrikin (1991) argues, it 
has both the ontological status of objective existence as well as a subjective relational 
meaning and significance. Entrikin’s perspective of place is based on Agnew (1987) who 
sees place as having three important aspects: location, locale and sense of place. For 
Agnew, the locational aspect of a place refers to its geographical location as can be 
represented by the grid line or Global Positioning System (GPS). That is, it is a point of 
existence on the earth’s surface. The locale of a place is the material setting of the place 
which makes it a site of social interaction, such as market place. Sense of place refers to 
the set of feelings, emotions and attachments that a place holds to people who inhabit it. 
This third aspect of place is created out of human experience in a place, connecting vivid 
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memories and emotions to it, and it relates place to the understanding of the concept of 
lived space. Jones et al. (2004) write   
 Places are socially constructed by individuals and groups who draw on their 
 experiences, beliefs and prejudices to imbue places with particular characteristics, 
 meanings and symbolism. (p.115) 
 
Places do not often stay the same, and there is nothing surprising about it. Cresswell (2004) 
and Jones et al. (2004) argue that a place is a particular point in space that is always in a 
process of being defined. It is in this process that sense of place is separated from human 
experience. But what is interesting is the question of who cause the changes, and this is a 
subject of a power analysis. As a place gets redefined, it can be voided of human 
experience and emotional attachment often in ways that suit the interests and purposes of 
those in control. This leads Tyner (2008) to argue that the dehumanization of place is often 
pursued by those in power to achieve a certain political or economic purpose.  
 The understanding of the three different aspects of place and the power embedded 
in the process of place making and remaking is of significant relevance for this thesis 
particularly as it guides the analysis of the demarcation of Tonle Sap areas. It serves to 
suggest that the reclassification of Tonle Sap areas, which could potentially cause some 
places, i.e. floating rice, grazing areas or a particular local tree or pond, in Tonle Sap areas, 
to be reclassified, is not simply an act of rational resource governance but a process in 
which power is exercised by one group of actors over others. Thus, this thesis will examine 
place making through the case study of the Tonle Sap demarcation project. This will be 
done as a means of identifying the power dynamics between state and society in rural 
Cambodia. However, a comprehensive discussion of power in the process of re-
representation of space and reclassification of place requires an understanding of another 
political geography concept of territory. 
 Territory 
Territory is a specific place in space with a clearly marked boundary, and it is often 
occupied by individuals, social groups or institutions for a particular purpose (Jones et al. 
2004). Broadly, territory concerns two distinct scales. The first scale, which is the 
predominant scale of analysis of political geography, is of the international. Here the 
primary problem to be addressed concerns how states claim territorial sovereignty. At this 
scale, Gottman (1973:75) talks about territory as ‘defensible space’, where one nation-state 
can set itself apart from another with the support of boundary demarcation. Secondly, 
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territory can be understood at a narrower scale where instead of looking at how nation-
states make efforts to expand or defend their national territorial demarcation, the focus is 
on how states attempt to increase control over space within their territories. This scale of 
territoriality bears important relevance to the concept of space and place, particularly the 
process of their representation and classification. It diverts the territorial attention away 
from how countries go to war with one another to look within the boundary of a nation-
state to understand how the state creates and recreates territory to legitimise its attempt to 
impose control over different space within the state boundary. 
 This leads to Sack’s (1986) concept of human territoriality. Sack (1986:19) argues 
that a ‘territory is socially and geographically rooted’. It is an attempt by an individual or 
group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting 
and asserting control over a geographic area’( Sack, 1986: 19). Territorial claims are 
backed by maps which depend on geographical points of references and the art of 
geographical representation to mark the divisions between different places.Vandergeest 
and Peluso (1995) argue that states are actively engaged in the making and remaking of 
territories within their national boundaries, and in the process of doing so, states control 
society by controlling the space in which it operates. This understanding of territory allows 
for an understanding of the connection between territory and the remaking of space and 
place, and the potential of power and control. For this thesis, this way of understanding 
territory is important for the analysis of power in the process of territorial demarcation. 
 Process of Territorialisation 
Sack (1986) argues that territorialisation is a process that involves a shifting of logic in the 
field of resource governance, mapping, communication, demarcation and law enforcement. 
The process of territorial demarcation often involves the state actively employing 
techniques and policies of classification, registration and mapping, and in the process, the 
state rearranges or re-orders the social-spatial ordering and representational space (Sikor & 
Lund, 2009).   
 Territorialisation is a process that involves both changing the theory and the logics 
underpinning resource governance. In forest protection in Thailand, for example, 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) discuss three types of territorialisation. The first is positive 
territorialisation which involves redefining the status of land area as protected forest. The 
second is negative territorialisation which involves defining land as protected forest in the 
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absence of an active cultivation regime. In the first type of territorialisation, land 
classification is done on the basic of the broad categorization of the zones, i.e. state forest 
land, protected areas and so on. In this line of thought, villagers’ cultivation land located 
within the area designated as protected state land is indiscriminately viewed as the property 
of the state. In the second type of classification, a certain area of land is designated as 
protected forest for forestry production simply on the basis of an absence of an active 
cultivation regime. Both types of land reclassification practices allow for what Lefebvre 
(1991:79) calls the ‘representations of space’ where space is treated as abstract and empty 
of meaning. This facilitates a certain geographical imagination which allows scientists, 
planners and conservationist to subdivide space in particular ways to suit their own 
purposes. Representations of space are central to the knowledge and claims of truth 
(Shields, 1991). In a similar line of thought, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argue that 
territories are often created and recreated to achieve certain purposes, be it the 
establishment of protected areas, or special economic zones. In doing so, social experience 
gets displaced by abstract space which meets the agendas of those in power (Lanegran, 
2007; Radcliffe, 1999). This is done with the assistance of a map, the power of which shall 
be discussed in the following section.  
 Territorialisation also involves demarcation of  boundary lines (Sack, 1986). Once 
new maps are produced to represent space, there is a need to demarcate the new boundary 
lines on the ground. This tends to occur either by way of locally recognised reference 
points (such as a tree or a pond) or through points provided by the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) (Peluso, 2005). 
 Territorialisation, as it creates and recreates new territory, results in new forms of 
authority and new sets of power relations (Sack, 1986). Delaney (2005) argues that 
territorialisation allows the state to engage processes of inclusion and exclusion in order to 
achieve various ends. Consequently, territorialisation is a process that inevitably results in 
enclosure of certain local spaces, and the exclusion of certain social groups (Peluso & Lun, 
2011; Vandergeestan & Peluso, 1995;Gottman, 1973). How an area becomes enclosed, and 
who becomes excluded are questions of political geography. Lund (2011) suggests that the 
exercise of authority can be observed in the process of territorial demarcation. This 
authority may be partial but it is of crucial  significance to political geographers trying to 
understand power relations (Sassen, 2005).  
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 In Powers of Exclusion, Hall et al. (2011) describe four forms of exclusion. They 
argue that exclusion can occur as a result of regulation, legitimation, the market, and 
through force. Their discussion of these forms of power is particularly useful for this thesis 
which attempts to investigate how the state, through territorial resource governance, 
exercises power over society especially in the context of resource governance, land 
management and market integration. It suggests that physical manifestations of power are 
only part of the different forms of power that processes of territorialisation and exclusion 
depend upon. The idea that power is derived from regulation, legitimation and force, 
directs attention to other forms of power that are not based on force. I will use the 
understanding of these forms of power, in combination with Sack’s (1986) concept of 
territoriality as the framework for my investigation of state territorialisation of the Tonle 
Sap lake.  
 Maps and Power of the State 
From a general level of understanding, maps, a product of cartography, are graphic 
representations of a certain territory, either geographic or administrative. It provides 
evidence of existence and documentation, as it serves to delineate the territory. However, 
the use of maps has evolved from serving to document the existence of a territory to 
projecting it. Baudrillard (1988:1) argues that ‘The territory no longer precedes the map, 
nor does it survive it… the map precedes the territory…’. Baudrillard’s point here is 
similar to a Cambodian concept of ‘cutting the head to fit the hat, instead of making the hat 
to fit the head.’ It suggests that mapping can hold great potential power of representing 
space, remaking places and shaping territories, and in the process it can alter the ecological 
and social landscapes in significant ways. Harley (1988:278) argues that maps are an 
essential element in geographical representations of space, and are constructed 
purposefully, and thus are to be regarded as ‘refracted images contributing to a dialogue in 
a socially constructed world’. With this kind of hidden power of maps, the state, which 
claims legitimacy over resource governance, can employ maps to exercise control over 
society (Radcliffe, 1999). This leads Lanegran (2007) to argue that mapping is a tool that 
states use to gain control over space. Tyner (2008:121) argues that maps are ‘graphic and 
material representations of a geographical imagination’, and they are not ‘primarily inert 
records of morphological landscapes or passive reflections of the world of objects’. Within 
its territory, the state employs maps for the purpose of economic and regional planning 
16 
 
where maps are tools for the powerful (Harley, 1988; Wood, 1992). They are used as a tool 
for the justification of a certain policy or practice (Harley, 1989). Thus, maps are at the 
heart of knowledge and power relations. Harley’s (1988) and Wood’s (1992) points on 
maps being a tool of power by the powerful is relevant for this thesis which concerns the 
process of demarcation. However, the concept of the powerful needs to be further 
examined particularly with reference to a political context of weak state where the sphere 
of state operation is captured by the private interest of both the state officials and powerful 
private actors (see Global Witness, 2007, 2009). This kind of understanding of the complex 
elements of the powerful allows for a further conceptualization of the power of maps and 
the danger they can pose to the common interest and that of the weak and powerless 
segments of the population.   
 Technically, Map makers are engaged in a process of selecting, translating, 
organizing and shaping the world being constructed. Monmonier (2007), in his chapter on 
‘How to lie with maps’, argues that the art of map making inevitably involves some degree 
of simplification and distortion in order to meet the  cartographer’s goal of highlighting 
certain features. The more serious issue is that maps tend to be made in ways that miss-
represent reality beyond the point of necessary simplification in order to achieve a certain 
intention (Monmonier, 2007). Because of this, maps are seen to have facilitated the 
possibility of state reclassification of agricultural land, a process that often changes local 
property regime in ways that displace local customary rights, reclassify agricultural land as 
state protected forest or communal land as economic concession areas, and in doing so it 
alters the human landscape as well as causing inclusion and exclusion of certain social 
groups. This leads Harley (1992) to argue that maps omit and depict social reality in ways 
that create new types of power relations. This is possible because, as Cosgrove (2005:29) 
argues, map making allows ‘the distanciation between the observers and the space 
observed.’ 
These aspects of map making and the power it holds bear great significance for this thesis. 
It provides the necessary conceptual understanding to look at maps beyond what they 
represent and to question their ontological status, by looking at how they are made. This 
discussion on map making also points to the potential consequences certain maps post for 
the local community and the society at large. For this thesis, this discussion leads to a focus 
on not only what territories the new map of Tonle Sap delineates but also the process of its 
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making. This discussion also raises the needs for an understanding of some important 
concepts in political science, the discussion of which is presented as follows 
Political Science Theories of State and Power 
 The Concept of the State 
So much has been written about the state and from so many different perspectives and 
disciplines that the concept is in danger of not having a clear and coherent meaning. 
Dunleavy and O’leary (1987:1) argue that the state is ‘not a material object but a 
conceptual abstraction’. As a concept, the meaning of the term varies according to what 
perspective one uses to view it (Hay & Lister, 2006).The concept tends to involve an 
assumption that the state is the source and centre from which power is transmitted intact 
across a territory. However, Marston (2003) argues that the state is not the source but the 
effect of power. This suggests that a state has no ontological status apart from the process 
that constructs it. Thus its form and nature vary in accordance with the social process that 
shapes it. 
 In terms of the physical manifestation of state, Swanton (1942) argues that a state is 
not a single entity. Swanton’s perspective falls in line with Weber (1978[1922])who argues 
that a state consists of different layers of institutions run by a network of bureaucrats. 
Those who work in the state may not even share a common understanding of what the state 
is (Robinson, 2008).Jessop (1982)  argues that the state consists of different agents and 
apparatuses which act in their own right, and according to different or even opposing 
strategies. This leads Robinson (2008) to argues that 
The state has to be understood as a tension between being a relatively   
 unified actor across a clearly defined territory with a strong narrative and   
 means for intervention, and a porous, fractured agent that has to actively   
 engage with a local environment and people. (p.186) 
 
Robinson’s point of view is linked to Allen’s (1999) discussion of the structure of the state 
under the plural view of power; the state is not unitary, and the actions of its agents at each 
layer can mitigate or amplify its effect as they act on the basis of their belief and value 
system.  State officials act in their own right (Jessop, 1990). This suggests that different 
parts of the state operate according to different or even opposing strategies. Huxley (2008) 
seems to confirm this view when he writes:  
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The state is a heterogeneous, contingent and unstable, conflicting and 
converging assemblages of institutions, regulations, practices and techniques 
of rule and the exercise of power is neither automatic nor uniform nor 
carried out in the furtherance of a particular or general interest group. 
(p.132) 
 
On resource regulation issues, Robinson (2008) suggests that state agents often hold 
different and even contradictory views about the environment. The result is the emergence 
of a state system which is susceptible to being captured by powerful interest groups who 
attempt to shape state policy according to their own needs. In a similar manner, Tew 
(2002) argues that social agents have dual identities. An agent has to be understood as 
acting on the basis of their own values and beliefs. At the same time, they have to operate 
in compliance with the prevailing economic, discursive and emotional regimes of the 
society in which they live. The two identities are seen to be at war with each other  
(Wartenberg, 1990).  
 Wartenberg (1990) argues that when agents realise that power is being exercised 
over them, they would first look towards available alternatives that can resist the 
dominating force. Wartenberg’s argument here reinforces the non-unitary perception of the 
state, by emphasizing the effects of individual actions. It also suggests that one must go 
beyond categorizations of state agents as simply power abusing individuals. 
 However, Wartenberg goes on to acknowledge that in various cases, state agents 
are, by force or deception, made to believe that no other alternative is possible. In a similar 
line of argument,  Corbridge (2008)writes: 
 The state has effectively produced and reproduced agents who are not 
bureaucratically independent but who see themselves as regimented, and their 
actions as being closely watched by a super-system of control. They thus become 
isolated and self-policing subjects of the state’s control. (p.52) 
 
Corbridge’s point on state agents as being the subject of state power contrasts with 
Weber’s (1978 [1922]) concept of the ‘state’ as an ideal type to be used as a basis for 
analyzing actual states. In this ideal type, the state is seen as a corporatist type of entity 
functioning like a bureaucracy of different layers of institutions with dedicated personnel. 
This suggests that state agents act according to their institutional mission and independent 
of any interference. Corbridge’s point, on the other hand, suggests that state agents cannot 
act independently as prescribed by their bureaucratic position.  
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The discussion of these aspects of state is highly relevant for this thesis. The view that state 
is an abstract entity allows for the conceptualization of state as not based in any place, and 
the argument that it is not a single entity leads thesis project to view state action not 
uniform across different level of state. That is, one cannot speak of one state. Moreover, 
the discuss above suggests that instance of power struggle in the relation between the state 
and the society does not just happen between them, but also within the state, thus any 
attempt to analyse state power must first begin with what happen within the state which, in 
the real world, is different from Weber’s heuristic model of state due to the differences in 
the types of political regimes in operation. This will be discussed in the section that 
follows. 
 Types of Political Regimes 
Three concepts are essential for any discussion of the evolution of the Cambodian state. 
These are: the legal-rational bureaucracy; patrimonialism, and their hybrid, neo-
patrimonialism. First, the legal-rational bureaucracy is a political system that places 
emphasis on impersonal power, rule of law, and meritocracy. According to Weber (1978 
[1922]), an ideal type of bureaucracy has the followings distinctive characteristics: power 
is not based on the individual, but on administrative office; the individual holding office 
has to have the desired capacity to perform, and this capacity is obtained through detailed 
training in the field of specialisation. Weber (1978: 957 [1922]) argues that the term office 
refers to a ‘body of officials working in an agency, along with the respective apparatus of 
material implements and the files’. The file is the established rule encoded in writing 
which specifies the jurisdiction of a particular office. The rules are in the form of written 
documents and are stable, exhaustive and can be learnt. The office jurisdiction is marked 
clearly with a system of hierarchy of offices, in which the higher office supervises the 
lower one, but the higher office does not have official jurisdiction to take over the duty of 
the lower one.  
As it evolves, a complex legal bureaucratic system develops, so does a type of 
political system characterised by free, fair and frequent elections, respect for human rights, 
political participation, independent media, and separation between the three branches of 
state (executive, legislative and judicial). Most importantly the system requires that 
subjects internalise the duties of liberal citizenship and accept the judicial mechanism. 
However, Erdman and Engel (2007) argue, and as Weber (1978 [1922]) acknowledges, 
20 
 
such a pure type of legal-rational bureaucracy does not exist in the real world. According 
to Weber, the use of this pure form of the legal-rational bureaucracy is that it provides a 
comparative framework for governance reform to aspire to. 
 The second form of political regime is the patrimonial state. Patrimonialism is a 
political system based on the concept and practice of patriarchy. Weber (1978 [1922]) 
argues that patrimonialism is a political system where power is personalised. The power of 
a leader is not derived from his or her political legitimacy or ideology, but on the basis of 
kinship and patron-client relations. In this kind of political system, the rule of law is 
replaced by a system of reciprocity between the patron and the political clients (Laruelle, 
2012; Roth, 1968). Bratton and Van De Walle (1994) argue that in patrimonialism 
 The chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than 
through ideology or law... Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a 
formal political and administrative system… Leaders occupy bureaucratic offices 
less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. (p. 458) 
 
In a patrimonial state, public positions are not based on merit but on the system of personal 
connections, favours, promises and privileges. The informal operation of political practices 
is so widespread that one can speak of institutionalised informality (Erdmann & Engel, 
2006). 
 Roth (1968) argues that there are two kinds of patrimonialism. The first is 
traditionalist patrimonialism, where power resides within semi-divine persons such as 
kings and princes. The second is patrimonialism where personal rule is built on the basis of 
loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualities. Rather they 
are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards (Laruelle, 2012; Roth, 1968).  
Both types of patrimonialism often face crises of legitimacy. Thus, regimes of these kinds 
over time seek to legitimise their mandate by incorporating legal-rational bureaucratic 
features offered by a good governance reform agenda, such as elections, participation, 
freedom of speech and accountability mechanisms. 
 However, most of these reforms are not demand-driven but are initiated by the 
ruling elite themselves, and they are often designed and carried out in ways that ensure the 
survival of their political interests. Good governance reforms could also be externally 
imposed. Countries under patrimonial regimes are often dependent on a partially 
subsistence-oriented agricultural economy, and frequently depend on international 
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development assistance. The imported reforms often fail, as the recipient countries do not 
have the necessary historical, social and political conditions for meaningful reforms to take 
place (Bratton & Walle, 1992). Fukuyama (2004) also argues that ruling elites are not 
likely to allow reforms to happen if they see their interests being at risk. Fukuyama (2004) 
writes 
Holding on to a certain structure of political power is often a life and death issue for 
leaders of poor countries, and no degree of external public goods financing …will 
be sufficient to offset losses of power and prestige… (p. 49) 
 
For that reason, most governance reforms do not succeed in establishing a legal-rational 
bureaucratic regime to replace the patrimonial one, but instead the development of a hybrid 
regime of neo-patrimonialism.   
 The third concept is then neo-patrimonialism, which has the appearance of a legal-
rational bureaucracy, but with the characteristics of a patrimonial regime (Bratton & Walle, 
1992; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; Erdmann & Engel, 2006, 2007). Medard (1982) 
argues that within the neo-patrimonial system, political power is transferred from the office 
and the bureaucrats to the patron and his kinship networks. Synder (1992:379) argues that 
despite the appearance of a legal rational bureaucracy the neo-patrimonial regime is a 
regime that contains ‘an extensive network of personal patronage, rather than ruling 
through ideology or impersonal law’.  
 In this type of political regime, a leaders’ authority is based on personal patronage 
networks not ideology or law. Drawing from the experience of African countries, Bratton 
and Walle (1992) argue that there are no formal governing coalitions between the state and 
social interests. The state is a private instrument of the powerful. Personal relationships 
displace the rule of law, and takes over the bureaucratic system at all levels of government 
from the top to the bottom (Bratton & Walle, 1992).  Simultaneously, the line between the 
party and state becomes blurred (Rakner & Svasand, 2005). 
 There are two distinct elements of neo-patrimonialism; clientelism and patronage 
(Bratton & Walle, 1992; Eisenstadt, 1973; Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Clientelism is the 
exchange or facilitation of exchange of specific services and resources for political support 
(Erdman and Engel 2007). It involves relations of unequal power between the patron – the 
‘big people’, and the client – the ‘small people’. Patronage, on the other hand, refers to a 
politically-motivated distribution of favours. Erdman and Engel (2006) suggest that 
patronage is the relation between powerful individuals and the larger group.  
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For this thesis, I am interested in the neo-patrimonial state. Thus, I will further discuss the 
power structure found in such a state system, and later come back to the role of 
territorialisation within the neo-patrimonial system of governance in Cambodia.  
 Neo-patrimonialism and Structure of Power 
Allen (1999) makes a crucial contribution to the understanding of state power by 
discussing the difference between a centred view of power, a plural view of power, and 
power as mobilised resources. Two of these views of power are worth mentioning here. 
The centred view of power treats power as able to be possessed and being located within 
the hands of a specific group of people or particular state institution. Power in this centred 
view is transmitted from the central state intact, and the society is contained within the 
state’s territorial space. This perspective sees the state as a single entity with no 
discrepancies in the way power is exercised between different levels of state. The plural 
view of power, on the other hand, sees power as not located in any specific place. Even if it 
is, power is transferred (not transmitted) and it often deviates from its original form. Under 
this view, the state is seen as consisting of different layers of apparatuses which form the 
chain through which power is transferred. Each link is capable of affecting or modifying 
power from the central state (Allen, 1999).   
 The two views of power are important for an understanding of the structure of state 
power. From the existing writing on neo-patrimonialism, the structure of power seems to 
have an un-compromising momentum of upward accountability to the top person. This is 
based on a few prominent studies. Bratton and Van de Walle (1992) characterise the neo-
patrimonial regime as presidentialism, which does not necessarily refer to a presidential 
political system, but a system where political power is concentrated in one leader. Bratton 
and Van De Walle (1992: 458) argue that the leader maintains authority through ‘personal 
patronage, rather than though ideology or law’. In a similar manner, Soest (2006) argues 
that a neo-patrimonial political system always features the concentration of political power 
in the hands of a single leader where personal favours and the mis-use of state resources 
are common occurrences. In this system, the right to rule is given to a person rather than 
coming from the capabilities of someone occupying an office (Hale, 2005; Theobold, 
1982). Political power is personalised (Clapham, 1985; Medard, 1982), and positions in 
office are not based on meritocracy, rather they are based on personal connections which 
are essential in securing a public position of office (Bratton & Walle, 1992). Top leaders 
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can award public positions to those with close connections to them (and equally retract 
people from these positions at will). In this kind of political system, the leader also uses the 
tactic of removing key government figures from office as a way of protecting political 
power (Soest, 2006).  
 In addition to the fact that the political machinery is built around the hierarchical 
kinship networks of the leadership, the top leader also employs a range of mechanisms to 
maintain power. Firstly, the leader prevents any possible political challenges by way of 
reducing the length of term of those in high ranking positions. Snyder and Mahoney (1999) 
suggest that the leader often rotates the positions of the political elite to prevent them from 
establishing their own independent power base that can challenge the tenure of the leader. 
At the same time, the leader also uses tactics of removing any key government figures 
from office as a way of protecting political power (Soest, 2006). 
 Secondly, the leader uses state apparatuses to monitor officials. Darden (2001), in 
his article, ‘Blackmail as a tool of state domination’, argues that there are three 
mechanisms of state control: (1) state leaders’ firstly accept and even encourage 
corruption, (2) leaders then use state surveillance to document wrongdoings of 
officeholders and private actors and (3) this information is used to blackmail relevant 
political, economic or social actors with payment in obedience. In addition, Darden (2003) 
argues that those neo-patrimonial systems which have evolved from former communist 
states,  generally have a strong surveillance capacity. Top leaders use corruption as a 
means to ensure compliance from their subordinate officials. Due to low state salaries, 
those officials are allowed to engage in rent-seeking activities. But the state, through active 
surveillance, documents corrupt activities of bureaucrats. The top leaders, through the 
surveillance organ, can then use documentation to ensure continued compliance from 
subordinates. The bureaucrats under this type of state have a strong incentive to maintain 
loyalty, as a failure do so not only risks the loss of position, but also personal assets and the 
livelihood of the officials and their family. This leads Laruelle (2012) to argue that 
everyone in the neo-patrimonialism system is directly subordinate to the leader. Thus, the 
use of state machinery as personal property, the short-term tenure of key state positions, 
and continual compliance-ensuring surveillance operations leads to the concentration of 
power in the hands of the top leaders.  
 Such a description matches the centred-view of power relations previously 
described, where power is transmitted intact from the centre to the peripheries of society. 
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Together with the concept of presidentialism or strongman politics, this view of state 
power suggests that the structure of power in a neo-patrimonialist state consists of a linear 
and straightforward flow of power from the leader to the lowest levels of society without 
any distortion. However, this perception of political power in a neo-patrimonialism is 
problematic, and it is inconsistent with the reality of political conducts in neo-
patrimonialism at large. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that informal institutions 
consist of a set of implicit rules and norms that are not written but are based on common 
understandings of socio-cultural norms, routines and traditions. The coexistence of formal 
and informal institutions often leads to major inconsistencies in the practice of government 
where public officials must be adept at knowing when to apply formal rules and when to 
apply informal ones, leading to situations of insecurity, inconsistency and unpredictability. 
Erdmann and Engel (2006) argue that neo-patrimonial rule is characterised by insecurity. 
They write: 
All actors strive to overcome their insecurity, and they do so by operating on both 
the formal as well as the informal logics of neo-patrimonialism… Within such a 
pattern of social and political relations formal state institutions cannot fulfill the 
universalistic purposes of public welfare. (p.19) 
 
This gives rise to the concept of the plural view of power, and it is supported by the 
observation that power and rules can be bent, and sometimes the implementation of a top 
leader’s order is not consistent. What explains this inconsistency will be explored in this 
thesis.  
 The Concept of Power  
Allen (2003) defines power as not a thing that can be owned, but as a relation between 
unequal groups. Weber (1978:1111 [1922]) defines power as the ability to affect outcomes, 
or ‘the capacity of an individual to realise his will, even against the opposition of others’. 
Three concepts of power are worth discussing here. First is ‘power to’. This concept of 
power refers to the ability to do things, or to make things happen (Morriss, 2006). Beetham 
(1991) argues this kind of power is derived from the possession of physical assets, or 
derived from means of coercion such as the armed forces. Wartenberg (1990) argues that 
this kind of power is only present at the time of its exercise, and it is more associated with 
the ability to prevent things from happening.  An example of this is when police power is 
used to prevent a public demonstration from taking place. Without the presence and actions 
of the police, there is no such kind of power to stop the demonstration from taking place.   
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 The second concept of power is ‘power over’. In this concept, power is defined as 
the ability to affect outcomes even against the will of others (Weber, 1978[1922]). 
Similarly, Lukes (1974) describes this power as making others do things that they would 
not do otherwise. The oppressed realise that they are being subjected to this kind of power, 
but are unable to resist it (Lukes, 1974). This aspect of power amounts to coercion which 
involves the threat of force and deprivation. 
 The third concept of power is power as dominance. Lukes (1974) argues that this 
form of power is more subtle and widespread than the concept of ‘power to’ or ‘power 
over’ in that the oppressed do not even realise that they are being subjected to instances of 
power. He writes 
… power is real and effective in a remarkable variety of ways, some of them 
indirect and some hidden, and that, indeed, it is at its most effective when least 
accessible to observation, to actors and observers alike. (p. 64) 
 
What is meant here is that even in the absence of a physical power imposition, power 
relations are still present. When this kind of power is exercised, the dominated are not even 
aware that they are being subject to it. Lukes (1974) argues that dominant groups can 
subvert the power of subordinates in a way in which they don’t even realise.   
 The understanding of the three concepts of power is important for this thesis which 
attempts to look at how state exercises power over the society through territorial resource 
governance where the representation of Tonle Sap space entails the exercise of power. At 
one level, it suggests that the absence of the physical manifestation of power, force, is not 
the absence of power. Thus the demarcation of Tonle Sap and the potential effects on the 
local human landscape might not be done by force, yet a lot of instances of power, 
particularly the second and third dimension of power can be observed. This leads to an 
argument advanced by Foucault (1978) who argues that power works through an indirect 
technique of self regulation in what he calls the normalising process of subjectification. In 
this process, one submerges others in his power sphere through, not violence, but indirect 
methods of suggestion, prescription and guidance of behavior (Foucault, 1978). Similarly, 
Allen (2003:28) argues that domination can be achieved by means of ‘close discipline, 
continuous control and supervision’. This kind of power is more pervasive and at the same 
time, more elusive. 
 At another level, it suggests that the analysis of power needs not be confined to the 
exercising end of power but also the receiving end of it. Deacon (2002) argues that:  
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Power relations become more effective the more they infiltrate into everyday life, 
as they shift from being externally imposed to being internally invoked, from being 
authoritarian to being participatory and from acting primarily upon bodies to acting 
in addition and more particularly upon souls and actions. (p. 106) 
 
 In Luke’s (1974) language, this concept of power is referred to as the third dimension of 
power. According to Lukes (1974), this kind of power is even more radical in its 
conception. This way conceptualizing power positions the oppressed in the analytical 
frame in which their action and behavior become important subject of observation. In this 
line of thinking, power is exercised through  the control of the mind, which, as Beck 
(1976) argues, is more influential in shaping people’s response to social phenomenon. This 
is done through the control of belief, desire and value. A person’s belief system is 
controlled, making oppression seems normal. In this process, Spinoza (1958[1677]) argues 
that a person’s mind is duped by the reason of other agents. That is, how he sees the world 
is shaped by the dominant. The individual can also be trained to possess a certain desire. 
As Tilly (1990:701) writes ‘compliance draws multiple advantages of money, goods, 
defense, and access to pleasure which is denied to less powerful people’. Social agents are 
conditioned to desire the social materials offered by the powerful, effectively turning them 
to support the system that is set up to oppress them. Meanwhile, the dominated individual’s 
value system can be controlled by the dominant. Dowding (2006) defines value as a 
complex mixture of belief and desire. Here desire is internal to actors, and cannot be 
externally rationalised. This statement suggests, for one thing, that value is subjective and 
there is nothing rational about a set of values. To understand one’s value is thus to look at 
what belief system one holds and the accompanying structure of desire. Dowding (2006) 
uses the example of a group of Indian women who are thought to be subject to power and 
domination by their husbands as they insist on feeding their husbands before themselves. 
He argues that their values are justified by their belief that if they do not take care of their 
husbands, he will become sick, and the whole family’s livelihood would be at risk. Her 
value is based on the desire to be an ideal woman, whose role and image is constructed 
socially around the woman’s role and responsibility to take care of her husband. 
Overall, these conceptual understandings of power allow this thesis to view power 
as being present beyond the instance of state and local community interaction especially at 
times of encounter. It suggests that one needs to pay attention to preceding historical, 
social and political events that shape the beliefs, desires and value systems of those who 
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are affected by the process of Tonle Sap demarcation. This view of power finds support in 
Foucault’s (1978) work where he argues that the question of power concerns the tension 
between the technology of domination, and the technology of the self. This statement is 
significant in that it suggests that force and coercion may be essential elements of power, 
but production of the oppressed is not to be overlooked. As Lukes (1974) writes: 
It [power] takes many forms… from straightforward censorship and disinformation 
to the various institutionalised and personal ways there are of infantilising 
judgment, and the promotion and sustenance of all kinds of failures of rationality 
and illusory thinking, among them the naturalisation of what could be otherwise the 
miss-recognition of the sources of desire and belief. (p. 149) 
  
In sum, these three concepts of power are crucial for an understanding of how power 
works. They suggest that the study of power cannot only be based on obvious 
manifestations of power, such as violence and coercion. The exercise of power does not 
have to involve the use of force, and by the same token, the absence of the employment of 
force cannot be taken to mean the absence of the exercise of power. Foucault (1980)refers 
to this aspect of power as the knowledge production of power. The technology of the self 
as Foucault puts it, involves what Camilleri and Falk (1992:30) call ‘the capacity of 
institutions to manage and manipulate information’. This ability to control perception is 
more effective in preventing resistance than simply using the technology of coercion.  
These concepts of power serve as a useful analytical framework for understanding how 
power should be studied. Power not only manifests itself physically and materially, but 
also mentally, and this leads to the need to discuss how other non-physical forms of power 
work. This brings to light the relevance of knowledge and its relation to power, for Tew 
(2002) argues that those in charge of knowledge production are also in control of power. 
The following section looks at how knowledge is used as a technology of power. 
 Knowledge as Power 
Knowledge has important role in resource governance particularly as it serves to provide 
legitimacy to the state’s claims of control over nature governance. The relation between 
knowledge, power and legitimate authority can be seen in the field of resource governance 
where states actively claim authority over nature, through the production of knowledge. 
Bakker and Bridge (2008) argue that natural resource regulation is a field of governance 
that has progressively expanded since the 1950’s. Through the project of state 
modernization, non-human nature increasingly comes under the jurisdiction and 
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dominance of the state (Tew, 2002). Within this process clashes between scientific and 
traditional knowledge, and the expert and the local, inevitably lead to unequal power 
relations.  
 The state generates science-based knowledge of the world, and in the process, 
establishes itself as the legitimate manager of nature through the creation of modernist 
state institutions, such as forest departments and catchment authorities (Bakker & Bridge, 
2008). Partly made possible by the appeal to scientific reason which began to rapidly 
displace the traditional authority of religion and kings, these institutions, on the basis of 
their alignment with scientific rationalities, have legitimised the state’s claim as the central 
manager of natural resources. Society, with its lack of expert scientific knowledge, is 
invited to take the role of a passive follower. Bakker and Bridge (2008) write 
 The modernist project has seen the role of professional practice and discourses in 
 maintaining and inserting people into their appropriate slots in the social order. 
 Practices, discourses situated the professional as the experts who are socially 
 established as the rational subject who are to do unto the patient, criminal, client 
 and service user who are invited to take on a role of passive recipient. (p. 25) 
 
The categorization of society into experts and non-experts has meant that only the 
knowledge of state experts has been seen as important for resource management regimes, 
thus rejecting local knowledge as lacking scientific rigor. This effectively creates a 
systematic and un-reciprocal transfer of knowledge between state bureaucrats and citizens, 
giving the bureaucrats what Foucault (1977:184) calls ‘the ability to give a normalising 
gaze, a surveillance that make it possible to qualify, to classify’ nature.  
 However, knowledge has no ontological status. Its existence is subject to a process 
of production to which power relation is a part. Tew (2002: 85) argues that knowledge is 
not value free; rather it is ‘guaranteed by the principle of scientific objectivities or rational 
enquiry. Such principles may themselves be seen as parts of the very ideological structures 
that may underpin the position of elites, or function as a mechanism of social control. Tew 
(2002) goes on to argue that   
Those in power are also in control of the process of accrediting or, 
accrediting the knowledge in ways to suit their social and political 
interests. (p. 86) 
 
In a similar manner, Lowe (1999) argues that knowledge only occurs in the ‘validating 
material framework of other larger patterns of discourse’. For Lowe (1999: 78) discourse 
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‘locates the potential identities and speaking position of subjects’. This conception of 
discourse is advanced further by Tew (2002) who describes discourses as constructing 
certain ways of thinking or seeing as right and others as wrong, vesting authority in the 
hands of experts, or forcing certain groups to take on specific positions of subordination. 
The state can use its position as the legitimate producer of knowledge to erase, displace 
and replace other discourses for its own purpose. In the process, Robinson (2008) argues, 
local knowledge of ecology and people are subdued.  
 Robinson (2008) argues that the state establishes itself as a resource actor through 
an institutionalisation of its own epistemology which simultaneously erases and produces 
environmental knowledge. This ability allows the state to retain what Robinson (2008:212) 
calls ‘a near monopoly on responsibility over what is broadly accepted as non-human 
nature’. The state can create a discourse of environmental crisis in order to justify the 
reproduction of a hierarchical ordering of knowledge which further legitimises its control 
over resources. For instance, Menzies’s (2007) description of the Ugandan state’s project 
to modernise a rural logging village, or Scott’s (1998) description of the commercialization 
and homogenization of forest in Russia, and Nguiffo’s (1998)  analysis of forest 
concessions in Cameroon,  are all examples of the state’s ability to actively control society 
through territorialised natural resource projects suggesting that there is nothing neutral 
about knowledge, and that knowledge can serve as a tool for elites. 
 The connection between knowledge and power provides a crucial conceptual 
understanding of how the state might utilise its control over knowledge production to 
justify action in the field of natural resource management. The understanding of the nature 
of existence of knowledge suggests that it can be used as a tool of power in the interest of 
those in charge of producing it. In the context of territorial resource governance, for 
instance, knowledge of nature can be produced to justify the representation of space and 
reclassification of local resource systems in ways that displace customary knowledge with 
grave consequences for the ecology and human community. Within this framework of 
understanding, this thesis pays attention to the process in which knowledge of Tonle Sap 
governance is produced. Instead of taking knowledge at its face value, this thesis will pay 
attention beyond the mere statement of knowledge but to the questions of who produces 
knowledge about nature, and for what purposes it is produced. That is, careful attention is 
given to the epistemological issue of environmental knowledge production.  
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 Resistance 
In line with the conceptualization of power as involving both the exercising and receiving 
ends of power, resistance seems to be an appropriate topic of discussion to conclude the 
theoretical chapter on how state exercises power over the society. This is because, as 
Gramsci (1971) argues, power is the result of a constant war of position between the forces 
of oppression and the forces of resistance. Thus, any discussion on power would be 
deemed incomplete unless both ends of power are examined. 
 Gramsci’s point also suggest that that oppression is not the work of the dominant 
alone, but also the result of an inability on the part of the oppressed to defend themselves. 
In a similar line of argument, Foucault (1978) writes  
 He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he inscribes in himself the power 
relations in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principal of his own subjection. (P. 202-3) 
 
Writing from an idealist perspective, Medina (1990) argues that citizens of a country do 
not have a moral obligation to obey all commands state puts forward. They should reject 
unjust laws (Medina, 1990). Generally, resistance can take the form of physical acts of 
defiance such as demonstration or a subtle form of ideological challenge or ever total 
avoidance (Scott, 1990b, 2009). In the literature of resource governance, there are some 
examples of subtle physical acts of defiance against the state. The local citizens employ 
counter-mapping as a way of resisting the power of the central state which attempts to 
impose a new territorial control over their local communities (Peluso, 2005). However, the 
instances of successful resistance are scarce in number, and it is not common to resource 
communities. At large, the possibility of resistance and the likelihood of its success have to 
be viewed in relation to the concept of power, particularly the one which suggests that the 
oppressed might not always realise that they are being dominated (Lukes, 1974). As seen 
in the discussion earlier, dominant groups control the production of knowledge in order to  
give them the ability to make what is not normal seem normal – to ‘normalise’.  
 On this particular matter of state-society relation, the likelihood of resistance has to 
be understood as originating from beyond just the self-awareness of individuals within a 
system of oppression, but from a collective sense of oppression, which can potentially 
form social movements or mass actions. Mass mobilisation is a mechanism through which 
the oppressed can collectively express their grievances against an oppressive state. It 
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represents what Allen (2003) calls ‘mobilised power’ which occurs where individuals or 
groups collectively pool their resources for the sake of pursuing collective grievances 
agendas. The strength of this kind of power depends not only on the amount and size of 
resource but also on the strength of links between disparate groups and individuals 
(Arendt, 1970). This depends on a sense of collective oppression which can be derived 
either from a personal experience of oppression, or an objective sense of social justice. But 
as important as it is to the possibility of social movement, a sense of collective oppression 
can be an important tool of control the powerful can exploit.  
 In addition, Marshall (1991) argues that two conditions must exist for a social 
movement to take place. Firstly, the social movement has to be initiated by a discourse 
which refers to the existence of the social movement itself1
Tew, 2002
. Secondly, social movements 
depend on a collective ability to mobilise resources which will allow for the movement to 
continue beyond a moment of collective action. This understanding is important for the 
study of social movement as it brings attention to the role of discourse and resources. 
Discourse consists of various narratives, the stories by which individual or collective 
experiences may be organised (Tew, 2002). These narratives are constitutive of experience 
which is crucial for the emergence of social movements as they both open up or close 
down the possibilities for perception, action and making sense of oppression ( ). 
 Meanwhile, resistance has to be viewed in relation to the specific cultural, social 
and political context. For the specific context of neo-patrimonial Cambodia, resistance can 
be seen in the form of seeking assistance from patrons. A study on how the poor represent 
themselves in Cambodia argues that the Cambodian poor tend to approach key political 
figures to seek interventions and solutions into their local problems (Center for Advanced 
Study & World Bank, 2006). However, this option is often unsuccessful as the literature on 
neo-patrimonialism suggests that access to key political figures is strictly guarded. Szeftel 
(2000) argues that access to state officials is controlled, and only at the offering of material 
incentives, can one gain access to such officials. This leads to the realisation that the 
challenges to social movements do not come just from the intrinsic problem of social 
collective action, but also from external constraints imposed by the state. 
                                                     
1Lowe (1999:78) defines discourse as locating ‘the potential identities and speaking position of subject’ and 
as a way of telling narratives or a way through which the speakers expresses their understanding of their 
world.  Marshall (1990) argues that discourses contain stories of collective exploitation, stories of local 
heroism and sacrifice and stories of great success or failure. 
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 The understanding of this aspect of resistance, i.e. social movements, is very 
important for this thesis, particularly for its analysis of state-society relations of power in 
the process of demarcation of Tonle Sap areas. The discussion on the role of discourse on 
social movements serves to provide a frame of understanding of the likelihood of social 
movements of Cambodia. It guides the research attention to the issue of how both the state 
and the local citizens talk about the demarcation, and how it constrains a collective sense 
of being oppressed which is essential for social movement to take place. On this basis, it 
also is important to examine the question of who controls discourse, and how it encourages 
or constrains the formation of social movements. It also suggests that the analysis of the 
local ability to mobilise resources collectively can provide insights into the relations of 
power between the state and the local community of resource users.  
 This leads to the need to understand the role of local leaders in resistance/social 
movement. Local leaders or local opinion leaders can play an important role in resistance 
for they are more likely to understand instances of oppression and able to lead public 
opinion in a certain way. In the context of rural Cambodia, there are four broad types of 
leaders, leaders based on administrative positions, customary leaders, economic-political 
leaders and leaders based on knowledge in development. The administrative leaders consist 
of village chiefs, commune chief and commune councilors, while customary leaders are 
those who are elders and or who are religious figures. Economic-political leaders are those 
wealthy local business persons and those who have political connections to patrons. Often 
this group is viewed with negative connotations of illegal business or corrupt practices. 
The last group of leaders is viewed by villagers as leaders out of respect for their 
knowledge of, and role in, development (Thon et al., 2009). 
 This knowledge of the composition of local leadership in Cambodia is important 
for the analysis of power struggle in the process of Tonle Sap demarcation. It guides the 
analytical attention to who might serve to actively promote local resistance.  
  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed, in the first part, the concepts of space, place and territory, and 
related them to the concept of power. Lefebvre’s (1991) conceptualisation of space as lived 
space and representational space allows for an understanding of space as being made and 
remade in certain ways. Together with Penrose (2002) who sees space as being imbued 
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with both material and emotional power, this chapter has showed that the control of space 
is the exercise of power.  
 The process in which space is made and remade is called territorialisation. Sack 
(1986) argues that territorialisation is the attempt to influence or control others. But 
territorialisation is often employed by states as a way of controlling society, as states use 
their responsibility over resource management to extend their control over societies.  
 In the second part, this chapter looked at the concept of the state and the concept of 
power. It showed that the state is not a single entity, but consists of different agents whose 
behaviour has to be understood in relation to the type of political regime in operation. The 
chapter showed that there are three different types of political regimes: legal-rational, 
patrimonial, and neo-patrimonial. Understanding the different types of regime is essential 
for understanding the relationship between state and society, as the nature of power differs 
significantly amongst different regimes. 
 Finally, this chapter discussed the concept of power. It showed that there are three 
important concepts of power; power to, power over, and power as dominance. Based on 
these concepts of power, this chapter showed that the exercise of power occurs even when 
it cannot be observed. Thus the study of power must pay attention to more than just the use 
of physical force. Power has to be also understood as an unequal relation between social 
groups. This conceptual understanding calls for the study of power relations to look 
beyond the modality of domination. This chapter has also discussed different aspects of 
social movements and how they function.  
 All of these concepts however need to be contextualised within the scope of this 
study. Thus the next chapter will give background information to the Cambodian state, and 
the characteristics of resource governance within Cambodia, which will help to better 
contextualise the case study.  
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Chapter III: Context of State and Resources in Cambodia 
 
 
This chapter aims to provide a context to the case study. It is divided into two major parts. 
The first is allocated to providing contextual information essential for an understanding of 
the nature of the current Cambodian state. This part discusses the historical development of 
the Cambodian state, covering the period between the reign of King Norodom in the early 
1880s and the State of Cambodia in the late 1980s. It then describes the changes that have 
occurred from the 1990s to the present, with a consideration of how these changes shape 
the characteristics of the contemporary Cambodian state. The second part provides the 
context to an analysis of governance in the Tonle Sap lake. It gives details of the 
geography of the Tonle Sap, its uses, and an account of the conditions of increased 
resource extraction and contestations that led to the establishment of the Tonle Sap flood 
plain demarcation project. Finally, this chapter provides a brief background to the specific 
study site within the Tonle Sap flood plain.  
Historical Development of the State and its Relations with Society  
 The Colonial Period  
In his book, Colonial Cambodia’s bad Frenchmen, Muller (2006) offers an in-depth 
account of the nature of patrimonialism under the reign of King Norodom. As in some 
other monarchies, the king’s power was derived from his perceived divine status and 
occupation of the throne. Muller (2006) describes the personal characteristics of King 
Norodom as carefree, easy-going and un-interested in state affairs. His power is set above 
the state public bureaucracy, and everything within the state territory is his personal 
property. For example, Muller writes that land was legally considered as the personal 
property of the King who gave his subjects a temporary right to occupy and use the land.  
In describing the justice system at the time, Muller (2006) cites Boulangier’s a description 
which is worth reciting in whole here:   
 There is political life, because the regime is despotic; public life is 
rudimentary, for half of the people are slaves and the other half live in 
fear of the courts; personal security is a myth, because it depends on the 
venality of a judge or the fantasy of a tyrant. (p. 109) 
35 
 
This description, although subject to the authors own hyperbole, reflects the relationship 
between the state and society in Cambodia at that time. Moreover, Vickery (1986) argues 
that the kings ruled and treated everything within the country as their own personal 
property. The kings owned all land and decided on the careers of state officials. 
 Even in the contemporary period, state-societal relations remain more or less 
unchanged where society is continually subsumed within the sphere of the state. Between 
1863 and 1953, Cambodia was under the protectorate of the French, and during those 90 
years of colonial rule, Cambodia experienced what is described in the state’s text books in 
the 1980s as an era of oppression and exploitation by the French-led government. This may 
appear as propaganda of the then government of Cambodia, and the text books themselves 
have been removed from the national curriculum, but scholars of Cambodian history seem 
to generally support this reading of the French colonial era (Kiernan, 2010; Vickery, 1986). 
One of the biggest sources of tension to arise between the state and society then was over 
the issue of personal income tax. The French administration was condemned for imposing 
a heavily exploitative tax regime on the local citizenry (Tyner, 2008; Vickery, 1986). 
Agricultural taxes were set at an extremely high level, which, in many cases, farmers could 
not meet. In some cases, the administration showed no considerations for the realities of 
farmers. For instance, in bad years where crops were destroyed, the administration still 
demanded the full tax payment.  
 Such extreme repression led to many instances of local protests against the 
administration. One well-known case was the violent uprising in Kampong Chhnang 
Province, where Cambodian villagers killed one French official and his Cambodian staff in 
1925(Vickery, 1986). The killing prompted the French administration to violently retaliate. 
Meanwhile, taxes were maintained at the same level, and those who protested ended up in 
jail. The anger of the local people and the ensuing violent retaliations of the French further 
created a feeling of frustration and resentment against the state.  
 There was also a notable form of distrust, and tension, between regular citizens and 
those Cambodians serving in the administration (Vickery, 1986). The French set up an 
administrative system in which their own personnel occupied all positions of decision-
making power. Then, the administration was run, at the lower levels, by Cambodians who 
were more interested in securing their position in the system than representing the public 
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interest (Muller, 2006; Vickery, 1986). The behaviour of those Cambodian officials further 
added to the tensions between the state and society. Vickery (1986) argues that when local 
protestors were joined by local Cambodian elites, their real objective was not to oppose 
French rule but to demand access to state positions that provided privilege and wealth. 
That led to the feeling of mistrust and betrayal, where the local population saw those 
officials as putting their own personal interests above the emancipation of their own 
people. These experiences led to an antagonistic relationship between the state and society. 
The state was seen as unaccountable, distant from the interests of the citizens, and violent 
in its efforts to ensure compliance.  
 Sihanouk and the Lon Nol Regimes 
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 thanks largely to King Sihanouk’s 
endeavor and struggle against the French (Schier & Schier-Oum, 1985). Soon after 
independence, he created his own royalist party - the SangkumReasNiyum, which the king 
and his supporters propagated as a populist party with serious interest in granting citizens 
full freedom and prosperity. Sangkumliterally means society. Reas means people or citizen, 
and Niyum is an adjective, which means popular. SangkumReasNiyum means a people-
oriented society or people-centred society. However, its existence was not an indication 
that Cambodia was moving away from patrimonial rule. Instead the king exercised tight 
personal control over the management of state affairs (Osborne, 1994). For example, any 
criticism of the king or his Sangkum was often met with brutal repression where many 
dissidents were punished or killed. Within the bureaucracy those who failed to demonstrate 
absolute loyalty were quietly demoted or dismissed (Osborne, 1994). At the same time the 
patron-client system became entrenched. State officials, who were willing to compromise 
their bureaucratic duties for personalised relations with the political elite, would find 
themselves in positions of power and be rewarded with material gifts. 
 King Sihanouk was also associated with the act of royal gift-giving, which 
reinforced the tradition of gift-giving created by past kings. This act is, in a way, the key 
feature of patrimonialism, in which loyalty and obedience are rewarded through gifts. This 
procedure effectively deflected people’s attention away from the inability of the state to 
provide secure welfare to its citizens. State officials often visited economically depressed 
areas or those that were stricken by flood or drought. State-sponsored media would then 
present the king as sharing his heart and soul with the unfortunate and relieving their 
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suffering through gift giving (Kiernan, 2008).  In this process, people were taught to 
refrain from blaming the state for failure to ensure livelihood security, but rather to be 
thankful for the supposed acts of generosity on the part of the state.  
 A worsening economic situation together with growing discontent with the Prince’s 
personal style of politics resulted in a coup on March 18, 1970 in which General Lon Nol 
came to replace Sihanouk as the head of state (Schier & Schier-Oum, 1985). Under Lon 
Nol, the country continued to be plagued with civil war, with Lon Nol’s troops, backed by 
the U.S, fighting the rebel communists. This resulted in major disruptions to everyday life 
for Cambodian  people including death and suffering (Kiernan, 2008). The Lon Nol regime 
ended on April 17, 1975, when the Khmer Rouge (KR) took over the management of 
Cambodia.  
 Democratic Kampuchea/ Khmer Rouge 
Originating from a revolutionary movement founded in 1953, one of the goals of the KR 
regime was to provide a better standard of living for all Cambodians (Vickery, 1986). But 
once in control of Cambodia, the KR did exactly the opposite. Intending to use Cambodia 
as an experiment for a non- monetary-based peasant society of total economic equality, the 
regime forcibly relocated populations to the countryside (Becker, 1998). Private property 
was abolished, and a system of forced communal work was established. In that system, the 
state owned everything from farmland to farming tools. Citizens had to live in shared 
houses, and work collectively on communal farms. In the process, people were subject to 
forced labour, torture and execution.  By the end of the regime in 1979, it is estimated that 
1.7 million people had lost their lives (Gottesman, 2004).  
 It is hard, if not impossible, to place the Pol Pot regime within any pre-existing 
categorizations of government.  What the regime does represent was an unprecedented 
level of state domination over society.  During this time the state could decide on the life 
and death of its citizens (see Kiernan 2008). The state decided how much people had to 
work, and to how much food they were entitled. The state could persecute, without the 
need to even prosecute. In sum, the regime delivered what Tew (2002:89) terms ‘the 
totality of the people’s experience of oppression’, a systematic process of diminishing, 
injuring or holding back members of oppressed groups from even contemplating the 
possibility of challenging the oppressor. That is, citizens knew that they were being 
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oppressed, but they could not do anything to deal with this as they were stripped of the 
means to defend themselves.  
 People’s Republic of Kampuchea  
In 1978, a group of former KR soldiers backed by Vietnamese troops launched an 
offensive against the KR, and on January 7, 1979 the group declared victory over the 
genocidal KR regime. A Vietnamese-backed government known as the People’s Republic 
of Kampuchea (PRK) was established to manage the country. From a comparative 
perspective, Gottesman (2004) argues that people who lived under the PRK regime 
regained some sense of normality to their lives. People could return to their homes, and 
were allowed to trade in the markets. PRK, at the same time, tried to overcome food 
insecurity by organizing the population into a shared work arrangement knows as 
KromSamakei.   
 However, the state-society relation at large remained problematic, and the hope of a 
fully accountable government to serve the interests of the society remained far from a 
reality. The development of a new government and the consolidation of power within the 
PRK in the 1980s was a defining time in terms of state-society relations in Cambodia. One 
aspect of this was the consolidation and entrenchment of patron-client relationships. When 
the PRK came to power in 1979, it faced a number of immediate tasks, one of which was 
rebuilding a basic bureaucracy. The KR had effectively eliminated all state institutions, and 
the government was under immense pressure to urgently rebuild them (Gottesman, 2004). 
One particularly daunting challenge was  to overcome a complete shortage of staff, as the 
previous regime had killed most of the country’s intellectuals and bureaucrats (Chandler, 
1983; Gottesman, 2004). The newly established Cambodian leaders dealt with this 
situation by altering the criteria for recruitment to simply being based on a willingness to 
work, rather than having specific qualifications (Gottesman, 2004). Anybody, regardless of 
their gender, educational background, or work experience was allowed to apply for any 
position they wished. In addition, Gottesman (2004) notes that positions were announced 
by words of mouth through friends and family members.  
 This procedure of recruitment, stemming from the early years of the regime, had a 
significant influence on the characteristics of the emerging state institutions in Cambodia, 
especially in regard to its patrimonial nature. The fact that people were recruited into 
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positions based on their willingness, not capacity, plays a large role in explaining the 
general weakness of the state bureaucracy. There is a general understanding that state 
bureaucrats could not be expected to effectively perform their bureaucratic tasks, as they 
did not have proper training for their positions (Pijpers, 1989). Meanwhile, the recruitment 
system effectively gave rise to what is currently known as a system of Ksaeknong, patron-
client relationship. This resulted in groups of related individuals, whether by blood or 
friendship working in the same institutions (Gottesman, 2004; Lambert, 2012). 
Patrimonialism in Cambodia was further strengthened by the role of the Vietnamese 
advisers, whose jobs were to assist the newly-established government in Cambodia, but 
whose service helped the Vietnamese government to continue a strong influence in the 
Cambodian politics in the early 1980s. During those times, Vietnamese personnel served as 
senior advisers to Cambodian officials (Gottesman, 2004). Yet in many cases they played a 
more significant role than merely acting as advisers but direct supervisers. The Cambodian 
officials had to be fully accountable to Vietnamese advisors, who held power to promote, 
demote or dismiss Cambodian officials. The criteria for performance assessments were not 
based solely on ideology, but submission and compliance to the Vietnamese government in 
Hanoi. Two high profile figures give contrasting examples of how the Vietnamese 
government strengthened patrimonialism in Cambodia in the 1980s. The first post-KR 
Cambodian PM was Chan Si. He was educated in Vietnam, and appointed by the 
Vietnamese government into his position as the Cambodian PM. But he was opposed to a 
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. He was arrested and jailed in Vietnam on 2 December 
1981for offending a chief Vietnamese advisor to the PRK. Rumor had it that while under 
Vietnamese detention he was injected with poison that resulted in his death. Although it is 
most likely, merely a rumor, it had significant effects on the psyche of Cambodian 
bureaucrats. Inside Cambodia, there was a common understanding that Vietnamese 
capacity to maintain strict control over Cambodian bureaucrats was not to be under 
estimated, as the case of Chan Si demonstrated.  
 The second example comes from Hun Sen who strategically maneuvered 
Vietnamese imposed constraints with great success. Gottesman (2004) argues that the 
Vietnamese were under pressure to withdraw from Cambodia, but rapid withdrawal was 
not an option. Vietnam needed to first ensure that the PRK could stand on its own feet. 
Losing trust in the Hanoi-trained veterans, Vietnam saw their interests as being best served 
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by Hun Sen, who had built himself up as a loyal and powerful politician. While serving as 
the foreign minister under Pen Sovan’s premiership, Hun Sen, as a pragmatist, did not 
openly oppose the presence of the Vietnamese government (Gottesman, 2004). In addition, 
he was willing to conclude border deals in ways that favoured Vietnam, which earned him 
trust. He also had other qualities that Vietnam saw as necessary to lead Cambodia. 
Gottesman (2004) writes    
He [Hun Sen] has the ability to accumulate power, the willingness to wield it in 
ways that supported the regime's military and diplomatic campaigns and the 
capacity to construct a power base that could withstand a partial or complete 
Vietnamese withdrawal. (p. 206)   
In addition, Hun Sen also had a close alliance with high ranking Vietnamese officials, who 
had influence in shaping the attitudes of the Vietnamese government and its course of 
action in Cambodia. In 1985, Hun Sen became the PM of Cambodia.  
 In terms of state-society relations, the PRK may have put an end to the atrocities 
committed under the murderous reign of Pol Pot, but it was also a highly oppressive 
regime in itself. Forced military conscription in the early and mid-1980’s represented a 
major assault on the ability of young men and unmarried women to live dignified lives. A 
high proportion of this demographic were forced to serve for a minimum period of five 
years in the military – where large losses of life were of little concern. Gottesman (2004) 
writes of the men and women who were sent to the western frontline to clear forest where 
the remaining KR army was based.  He details wide-spread accounts of soldiers being 
without sufficient food and equipment – sometimes to the point of starvation. Relatives of 
those recruited were not only miss-informed about the deployment of family members, but 
were often not informed in cases where family members were killed at the front line.    
 On the front line, the regime instilled fear and insecurity through excessive use and 
abuse of power. Gottesman cites a drafted report prepared by state bureaucrats for the 
central state meeting in 1985 as follows: 
Arbitrary searches, arrests, detentions, and imprisonments occur practically 
everywhere. Arrests, detentions, and imprisonments are getting more abusive. 
There are arrests without actual evidence, without a clear investigation, and without 
a file. Most arrests are followed by imprisonment based only on the report of a 
single person or merely on suspicion. ….there are hundreds of people detained for 
months or years. The arresting and detaining organizations have no intention of 
sending detainees to the organizations responsible for prosecution. Adjudications 
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don’t occur, because there are no files and no evidence at all, and yet detainees are 
not released… 
Officials abuse their power, frequently assaulting people over small matters… a 
cadre drew a pistol at a merchant in his house simply because the merchant refused 
to sell him a case of beer. After they argued face to face, the cadre beat him, 
breaking his face and his mouth and sending him to the hospital. That didn’t satisfy 
him: the cadre used his personal influence to get the Phnom Penh police to arrest 
the merchant in the hospital, while he was still receiving serum…. The chief of the 
provincial military beat a commerce cadre…and injured one of his eyes because he 
didn’t provide some goods on time…. A policeman used his own gun to shoot and 
kill a school teacher over a case involving the teaching of children. … police cadre 
shot and killed someone merely on suspicion of having connections to the enemy, 
and another police cadre in the province shot and killed another person while 
arresting four people drinking beer.  
Many searches of homes occurred without proper authorization or beyond the 
limits of what the law permits. And the confiscation of objects is not limited to the 
tools of offense or the fruits of the offense. There is also the confiscation of family 
property and the property of other people who are present. (Quoted in Gottestman 
p. 239-240)   
These accounts show that the then Cambodian state penetrated into the deepest levels of 
society. Its power over its citizens was raw and unchallenged. These accounts also show 
how state apparatuses were used to rob citizens of a dignified life.  
 State of Cambodia 
In 1989, Cambodia changed its name to the State of Cambodia, and it used this name until 
the first post-war general elections in 1993. The period between 1989 and 1993 saw an 
intensive consolidation of power in the hands of the Hun Sen regime, a process which 
Gottesman (2004:205) describes as ‘A masterful bureaucratic in-fighter, Hun Sen, was 
quietly taking charge of a country.’ Gottesman gives a comprehensive account of how Hun 
Sen acquired and consolidated power in Cambodia. First, he employed a tactic of 
weakening the party system by placing power in his own personal network of patron-
clientelism. Rather than assigning positions to the Hanoi veterans, he built up the state 
machinery with his former KR cadres. Gottesman (2004) argues that these people had 
more political experience and were less ideologically-oriented and more pragmatic. 
Gottesman (2004) writes 
The former Khmer Rouge cadres…had already survived political battles that were 
more treacherous and deadly than those they faced under the PRK. They had 
learned over the course of their revolutionary careers that whereas ideologies are 
42 
 
subject to unpredictable shifts, loyal patronage systems are the key to political 
survival. (p. 212)  
These qualities made them suitable elements in Hun Sen’s kinship based state machinery.  
 Secondly, he divided and took over the management of key state institutions and 
appointed his close allies to run them. One example was the control of the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance which was moved from the Ministry of Commerce to the Council 
of Ministers in 1985. 
 Gottesman (2004) describes Hun Sen as the right person the Vietnamese 
government was looking for to take over Cambodia. He not only had the ability to 
consolidate power but was willing to use it. By 1987, Hun Sen had managed to build a 
strong political network consisting of state officials who were close to him and who held 
key positions. This signified the emergence of the new Hun Sen regime which had 
distinctly predatory characteristics.  In this kind of regime, the state is run by a group of 
personally connected individuals who hold key state positions (Evens, 1989).   
 The discussion of the historical evolution of the Cambodia state provides important 
contextual information for understanding the character and nature of the contemporary 
Cambodian state. This is crucial to understanding the dynamics of governance reform 
programmes, which are discussed in the following section.   
 Regime Change 
The decade of the 1990s saw several fundamental changes to Cambodian politics. It 
marked the end of a long running civil war, and the signing of a peace deal between all 
Cambodian warring parties, which later came to be known as the 1991 Paris peace accords. 
The Paris peace agreement paved the way for the UN sponsored elections held in 1993, 
which signified an important change in the political landscape, which to that point had 
solely featured a one- party political system.  
 The 1993 elections introduced the concept and practice of multi-party democracy, 
where Cambodian citizens were able to cast their votes for a party of their choice from a lit 
of over 20 political parties. It also introduced the liberal democratic principle of one 
person, one vote. Over 96 percent of the country’s eligible population had registered to 
vote, and 90 percent of them actually voted. The election resulted in a coalition 
government of the two main parties; The National United Front for an Independent, 
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Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) (which won 45.47 percent of 
the vote), and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) (which won 38.23 percent of the vote). 
 However, elections proceeded with great irregularities. The dominant political 
party had been accused of employing a range of tactics including vote buying, violent and 
non-violent intimidation against other participating parties, and murders before, during and 
after the elections in a bid to secure electoral victory (Amnesty International, 2010; 
Hughes, 1999). Another important point is that the current lack of violence before elections 
is not due to democratization, but an entrenchment of patron-client relationships (and the 
domination of the major political party) right down to the local level. The multi party 
election was primarily a quantitative indicator of democracy and good governance, but it 
does not reflect the quality of democracy (Ojendal, 1996). Up until the time of the general 
elections in 1993, Cambodia was a communist, one party state, with all the state’s most 
senior bureaucrats being members of the central committee. There was no distinction 
between the state and the party. The 1993 elections that gave rise to a multi-party system 
came as a shock to the one-party state system. FUNCINPEC was set to take lead of the 
government, but the main political objective at the time was national reconciliation, rather 
than bureaucratic transformation. FUNCINPEC’s entry into the state system did not 
displace the previous power holders (the CPP), but instead resulted in the creation of a new 
shadow bureaucracy which sat beside the already existent one (Hughes, 2002, 2003).  
After the general elections in 1993, more political parties were created. One of the 
most notable ones was the National Party, which was created in 1995 and was renamed the 
Sam Rainsy Party in 1998. It was named after its leader, Sam Rainsy who received his 
tertiary education in France and remained living there for the time of the Cambodian civil 
war. In the period leading up to the elections, he presented his party as the new light of 
hope as symbolised by a candle on the party logo. It quickly gained popularity among the 
educated segment of the population (mainly in Phnom Penh), which gave the party 15 of 
the 123 national assembly seats in the 1998’s election  (Ear, 2012). For the next five years, 
the party continued to rise in popularity as evident in its ability to secure 24, and 26 out of 
the 123 seats in the national assembly in the 2003 and 2008 national elections respectively 
(Ear, 2012). 
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 Meanwhile, the CPP actively tried to maintain its dominance through what Un and 
So (2009:134) call ‘mass-based patronage politics’. During this time the CPP went on an 
aggressive party recruitment drive and managed to enlist almost all state bureaucrats as 
party members. The positions of key bureaucrats also became linked to their ability to 
secure seats in the electorates they were assigned to. For that reason, those officials would 
make frequent trips to visit their electorates in the name of CPP. Un (2011) writes 
Since 1998, the CPP has retooled the working group-known as the Party Working 
Groups (PWG)-transforming them into development agents hierarchically and 
systematically linked to the CPP's networks of patronage and the state structure. 
These working groups systematically permeate, supersede and in some cases 
operate parallel to state institutions to channel centrally controlled resources to 
local communities. (p. 556) 
Those CPP members bring with them cash and other gifts, essentially filling in the gap that 
has been left by the states abysmal attempts at service delivery. They build schools, 
temples, and road and irrigation networks in the name of the CPP. With the majority of the 
population living in poverty in rural areas, the CPP has successfully molded itself around 
the rural constituency, which has led to it becoming the dominant party (Un, 2001).    
 The CPP has also put in place strategies of harassment and intimidation in order to 
weaken opposition parties (Ojendal & Antlov, 1998; Un, 2011). One extreme example was 
the factional fighting of 1997. Since the establishment of the coalition government in 1993, 
the two partners in government had been at odds over political ideology, personal 
differences and most important of all, competition over the control of key state ministries. 
There was a military build-up between 1993 and 1997. The tension escalated to outbreaks 
of violence on July 5, 1997 that led to the ousting of the first PM, Prince Ranariddh, and 
the assassinations of many high level politicians from the FUNCINPEC party (United 
Nations, 1998). 
 The fighting in 1997 symbolised a major threat to the new multi-party system, in 
that both political parties depended on military power to solve their political conflicts. The 
international community described the event as a CPP-coup against FUNCINPEC (Peou, 
2000). Inside Cambodia, the fighting signified the end to political rivalries where CPP 
firmly held a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. With the head of the 
FUNCINPEC party out of the country, CPP resumed its supremacy in the Cambodian 
political arena once again. The CPP allowed FUNCINPEC to remain a coalition partner, 
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on the condition that it replaced its leader. Subsequently FUNCINPEC  chose one of its 
most liberal members, the then Minister of Education, to take the Prince’s place and be the 
first Prime Minister in partnership with the CPP.  
 In the aftermath of the fighting, FUNCINPEC went into steep decline. There were 
widespread allegations of corruption among the FUNCINPEC officials, which stood in 
stark contrast to the earlier expectations that the voting public had toward the party. In 
terms of performance, FUNCINPEC did not bring any significant changes in the way the 
government functioned. Un (2011) argues  
 Due to its inability to transform itself from an armed resistance movement 
to a political party, poor leadership and internal division, FUNCINPEC has 
disintegrated.  (p. 556) 
In the period that followed, the CPP was actively involved in the policy of divide- and-
conquer in its treatment of the opposition. Taking advantage of disillusionment 
surrounding  FUNCINPEC, the CPP aggressively tried to incorporate FUNCINPEC 
members into its own ranks (Peou, 2000). By the second general election in 1998, 
FUNCINPEC received only 31.71 percent of votes compared to 45. 47 percent in 1993 
(Gallup, 2002). Internal conflict and external pressure from the CPP led to further decline 
(Poole, 2009). FUNCINPEC was split into two, the old FUNCINPEC and the Norodom 
Ranariddh (NRD) party led by Prince Ranariddh. According to the Cambodian Information 
Centre, in 2008 FUNCINPEC received 5.05 percent and NRD 5.62 percent of votes where 
both parties were heading for further decline, passing the position of primary opposition 
party to SRP which received 21.91 percent of votes in the same election (Ear, 2012).   
 Once it had become the main opposition party, the SRP became the target of the 
CPP. SRP policies have been seen to directly confront those of the CPP. Sam Rainsy has 
been an outspoken critic of corruption and inefficiency which has occurred under CPP 
leadership. In 2005, Sam Rainsy was charged with defamation and was sentenced on 
December 22, 2005 to 18 months in jail, and was ordered to pay a fine of USD 14,000 
(Yun, 2005). He was only acquitted after Prime Minister Hun Sen requested the then King 
Sihanouk for a royal pardon. However, Sam Rainsy’s outspoken criticism of the 
government continued. Particularly, he strongly criticized Prime Minister Hun Sen for his 
attitude towards the Vietnamese government, accusing him of being a Vietnamese puppet. 
On October 25, 2009, Sam Rainsy was charged with racial incitement for his role in an 
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earlier protest that led to the removal of border poles alleged to be unilaterally placed by 
the Vietnamese government on Cambodian land (Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, 2010). There are now more new opposition parties in Cambodia, but it is not clear 
what affect their existence and operation will have on the Cambodian political system. 
What is clear now is that the Cambodia political system remains dominated by the CPP. 
This supremacy has been attained and sustained by its tactic of mass political rallying as 
well as tactics of intimidation and incorporation2 Amnesty International, 2010 ( ; Un, 2011).  
 The above detailed discussion of relation between the ruling and the opposition 
parties is essential for understanding the political processes that shapes the Cambodian 
state, and it is relevant for the understanding of the process and likelihood of success for 
political reforms to be discussed in the following section. Bratton and Walle (1997) argue 
that the existing political regime has negatively affected the likelihood of success of any 
governance reforms. Thus, knowing the political process and the behaviour of the state is 
important for understanding why certain governance reform programmes might succeed or 
fail to bring bureaucratic change to Cambodia.   
 Good Governance Reforms 
As Cambodia came to be accepted as a multi-party democracy, further reforms have been 
introduced in order to further strengthen newly created institutions. One of the most 
important of these reforms has been the decentralisation and deconcentration (D&D) of 
governance. D&D originated from a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
project. With the end of the civil wars, UNDP carried out the Cambodia Resettlement and 
Reintegration (CARERE) project to repatriate refugees and the internally displaced back 
into Cambodia. To facilitate their integration, the CARERE project created a food for work 
programme that focused on the restoration and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. 
Developed on this model, CARERE II (1993-1996) evolved into a pilot project to improve 
local institutions and local capacity for service delivery. CARERE was designed to 
promote decentralised systems of planning, financing and implementation, by directly 
involving provincial authorities in financial planning and the implementation of local 
development projects. 
                                                     
2 While acting against opposition parties, CPP, at the same time, has been openly accepting individuals from 
other parties who have defected to the CPP, welcoming them by rewarding them with better state 
positions. This has been seen as a effective strategy to CPP employs to weaken the opposition parties. 
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 In 1996, CARERE II was replaced by the Seila programme. Seila in Sanskrit means 
foundation stone, and as the name suggests, the Seila programme was an experimental 
governance reform program that aimed to achieve poverty alleviation by strengthening 
local government capacity, especially at the provincial and commune levels. In its first 
phase, from 1996-2000, Siela’s main achievement was the establishment of a nationwide 
network of Village Development Committees (VDCs).  This signified a shift from top-
down governance to local level ownership of development. 
 In 2001, the Commune/Sangkat3
Niazi, 
2011
 Law and the Law on Commune Elections were 
passed, marking the formal beginning of decentralisation reform in the country. The 
passing of the law was followed by the communal election in 2002, where commune 
authorities were directly elected by the local constituency. Meanwhile, the Seila program 
continued to assist in the strengthening of local capacity. In its second phase, from 2001-
2005, Seila was up-scaled from being a parallel system to administer development, to a 
national program of decentralisation and deconcentration (D&D). It operated at a national 
level, to mobilise and coordinate development assistance, and it also introduced a new 
system of development financing where local governments were given funds that allowed 
them to be fully responsible for the development plans of their own localities (
). Two important mechanisms here were the Commune-level Local Development 
Fund (LDF) and the Provincial Investment Fund (PIF). 
  D&D aimed to create a system of unified administration (Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 2005). In line with that, the government adopted the Strategic Framework for 
Decentralisation and Deconcentration Reform in 2005 that paved the way for the creation 
and adoption of the Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces 
Municipalities, District and Khans, in 2008. The law is known as the Organic Law, and it 
serves as the basis for the establishment of directly elected province/municipality and 
district/Khan4
Democratic representation: the reforms will strengthen the roles of councils at 
provincial/municipal, district/khan and commune/sangkat administrations to be 
 councils. The strategic goal of D&D was to strengthen and expand local 
democracy, promote local development and reduce poverty. These were to be achieved by 
a list of principles that are worth citing at length here. 
                                                     
3Sangkat is an administrative unit similar to commune, but this term is used specifically Phnom Penh area.  
4 Khan is an administrative unit similar to district, but this term is used specifically Phnom Penh area. 
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established in accordance with the principles of democracy by expanding the 
powers, duties, responsibilities and resources. 
Participation of the people: the reforms will introduce systems and procedures so as 
to ensure that people, especially women, vulnerable groups and indigenous 
minorities can participate in decision-making at provincial/municipal, district/khan 
and commune/sangkat levels. 
 Public sector accountability: reform will strengthen accountability at all levels of 
 administration and facilitate citizens’ oversight of the administrative and financial 
 affairs of those administrations.  
Effectiveness: reform will bring public services closer to users by allowing citizens 
to participate in planning and monitoring public services in order to meet local 
needs and priorities. The reform will also improve administration and coordination, 
strengthen the management capacity of provinces/municipalities, districts/khans 
and communes/sangkats in order to promote the quality of services and expand the 
delivery of public services. 
 Focusing on poverty reduction: the reforms will strengthen local capacity in using 
 resources to support poverty reduction activities, especially vulnerable groups, 
 indigenous minorities and women and children in order to achieve the Millennium 
 Development Goals of Cambodia (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2005: 5-6) 
In short, D&D reforms aim to achieve a system of democratic governance at the sub-
national and local government level through local representation by means of popular 
participation in decision-making processes, It also aims to close the gap between the state 
and society through the improvement of service delivery, and reduction of poverty. But as 
discussed earlier, governance reforms such as the D&D often face challenges from the 
ruling elites who see reforms as a threat to their position and livelihood. This could result 
in a situation where old and new elements of governance coexist.    
 Effects of Reforms on Governance Structure 
Bratton and Walle (1992) argue that externally imposed governance reforms are not often 
able to bring about substantial changes to the operation of host states. The experience of 
governance reform in Cambodia is no exception. It has been over two decades since 
attempts to bring democracy to Cambodia first began, and opinions are divided over the 
effects of those governance reforms. There seems to exist two camps of scholars of the 
Cambodian reforms studies. The first one makes up of those who tend to look at the effects 
of reforms from a comparative perspective with empirical evidence collected at local 
levels, while the second group comprises those who more or less adopt a normative 
perspective in their studies. Some of the most well-known and most recent work by 
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scholars of the first camp include Ojendal and Kim (2006, 2007, 2009, 2011), Heng et al 
(2011) and McAndrew (2004). Ojendal and Kim (2011), for example, argue that the effects 
of D&D are beginning to take place. They argue that in general, democracy is beginning in 
Cambodia, and the political space has opened up in ways that improve the relations 
between civil society and the local state. Commune councilors believe that the new 
decentralised governance system is different from the old one in that fear and anger are 
replaced by respect and trust. They argue that the improved relationship between the local 
state and society is evident by public perceptions that the authority of the commune level 
government was more respected by ordinary citizens in 2009, compared to the pre-
decentralisation period style of government of fear and distance. The local state's 
legitimacy is derived from its ability to deliver development, while simultaneously having 
an image of being non-authoritarian and non-corrupt. At the same time, commune 
councilors must feel that they are primarily accountable to the people. In regard to how 
much the D&D reforms have led to a democratic-deepening, the authors argue that there is 
a widespread public perception that commune councils are democratically elected. The 
public believe that they can hold the commune authority accountable for their actions 
through the mechanism of elections.  
 However, the basis on which these evaluations are made is debatable. The authors 
point out that these judgments are based on the perceptions and feelings of the public 
which can be entirely distinct from the actual practices of local government. While an 
increase in local awareness of democratic principle is undoubtedly occurring, it remains 
unclear how deep democratic reforms are penetrating. This leads to the argument of the 
second camp, which is comprised of such work done by Hughes, (2009); Un (2005, 2006, 
2009, 2011) and Blunt and Turner (2005). Blunt and Turner (2005) argue that Cambodia 
does not have the necessary social and political conditions for good governance reforms to 
take place meaningfully. Historically, popular legitimacy had never been the source of 
power in Cambodia. The state rules by creating fear among the citizenry and distance 
between the ruled and ruler (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995). Cambodian society is a 
hierarchical society, with social and political relations categorised by a practice of patron-
clientelism (Blunt & Turner, 2005; Chandler, 1993; Ojendal, 2005). Similarly, Smoke and 
Morrision (2008) argue that the process of decentralization in Cambodia is challenged by 
the country’s history of centralization and its institutional structure non-characteristic of 
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decentralised governance. As a result, D&D reforms have failed to introduce fundamental 
liberal democratic practices into Cambodian politics (Ashley, 1998; Heder, 2005; Rusten et 
al., 2004). Instead, the level of success was limited to what some would term procedural 
democracy (Diamond, 1999). Since the launching of governance reforms in 1993, 
elections, both communal and national ones, have been held at a regular interval to allow 
the citizens to select their representatives. However, Hughes (2003) argues that the actual 
conduct of elections does not entail the deepening of democracy, and elections themselves 
generally have no real impacts on policy formation and implementation. In an essay 
discussing the conduct of elections in Cambodia, Hughes (2009) argues that elections in 
Cambodia serve to legitimise political authority but this authority is not necessarily 
legitimate in the sense of a pluralist democracy. This is because, electoral victory in 
Cambodia depends not on personal quality of the candidates but on their ability to mobilise 
voter support through the inspiration of fear and the promise of security.  
 Attempts to limit the power of the central state have also failed. In terms of 
decentralisation, the 2002 and 2007 commune elections did not succeed in creating an 
accountable local government. Blunt and Turner (2005) argue that central government 
agencies retain control over communes in a complex and overlapping system, ensuring that 
political interests are safeguarded while the communes remain ineffective. Rusten et al. 
(2004) argue that local authorities have been unable to achieve meaningful autonomy. 
They categorise Cambodia as a centralised democracy, where orders still largely flow from 
the top to the bottom. The most import change that has occurred from these reforms, is that 
Cambodia now has the appearanceof a democratic regime, without making substantial 
changes to the way power flows (Ashley, 1998; Heder, 2005; Hughes, 2009; Kim & 
Ojendal, 2009; Un, 2011). In the wake of reform, the system of up-ward accountability 
remains strong. State  institutions are appropriated by powerful individuals (Un & So, 
2009), where recruitment of civil servants is still governed by loyalty and personal ties to 
the leadership as well as  pre-entry payments and monthly loyalty payments (Eng & Craig, 
2009). 
 Un (2006) argues that Cambodian political elites use their networks to further 
strengthen their position by providing benefits to clients in ways that weaken vertical and 
horizontal accountability. In addition, Un (2011:555) argues that the Cambodian state is 
‘becoming an authoritarian state with a stable hegemonic party system dominated by the 
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CPP’. That is, party affairs take priority above all other affairs. At one level, Un’s (2011) 
argument emphasises the problems that arise from the fusion of state and party. At another 
level, Un’s (2011) inclusion of the term ‘hegemonic’ in the description of the Cambodian 
party system suggests that the dominant political party does not just coexist alongside the 
state, but is a key institution where power is held which supersedes the state. Lemarch and 
Legg (1972:176) argue that in this system, modernization could not take place as a result of 
an ‘excessive volume of demands imposed upon the system via party-directed patronage’. 
As a result, state institutional capacity is replaced by direct party interventions (Niazi, 
2011).   
 With all these developments, the D&D objective of improving local accountability, 
participation, representation and responsiveness are highly questionable if assessed from a 
normative perspective. A system of bottom-up democracy that reforms tried to get at is at 
best shallow, raising doubt over the societal group ability to demand accountability from 
the state. This entails serious complications for the relations of power between the state 
and the society, and it gives rise to instances of the exercise of illegitimate power. Together 
with territorial strategy, which, as seen in the earlier section, can serve as an effective tool 
of power, the hybrid nature of political power in Cambodia could potentially be dangerous.  
 In summary, the Cambodian state is a neo-patrimonial state. It has evolved through 
a variety of non-democratic regimes, from the French colonial period, to the monarchy, the 
genocidal KR regime, and the post-conflict regime. Attempts to introduce democratic 
reforms to ease the transition from a centralised one-party state have not succeeded in 
bringing about a new democratic regime. Rather, what has emerged is a neo-patrimonial 
regime. The legacy of communism and the subsequent good governance reforms have 
shaped the development of the Cambodian political system in ways that give the 
contemporary regime distinctly neo-patrimonial characteristics.  
Research Framework   
The Cambodian state is characterised as a neo-patrimonial state which according to the 
literature of neo-patrimonialism has the following characteristics: 
• Power is derived from personal connections and relations of loyalty and 
dependence (Bratton & Walle, 1992) 
• Power is personal and it is based on a person not an office (Medard, 1982; 
Theobold, 1982) 
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• Public offices are used for personal wealth accumulation (Bratton & Walle, 
1992) 
• Insecurity of state agents and weak state institution (Erdmann & Engel, 2006) 
• Behaviour of state agents and institutions is unpredictable with combined 
elements of formal and informal logics (Erdmann & Engel, 2006) 
• There is no distinction between the dominant political party and the state 
(Rakner & Svasand, 2005) 
This thesis seeks to further explore how this kind of state, through territorial strategies, 
exercises its power over society.  
 This thesis takes Bakker’s and Bridge’s (2008) argument that states use resource 
regulation as an arena for expanding control over society. Though modernization projects, 
states claim responsibility for natural resource governance and in doing so they manage 
both human and non-human nature (Bakker and Bridge 2008). Vandergeest and Peluso 
(1995) refer to this kind of control as internal/state territorialisation where states do not 
control societies directly, but through the control of space in which societies operate.  
 With this conceptual understanding of the relation between states and societies, this 
thesis employs Sack’s (1986) concept of territoriality as the framework of analysis for how 
states exercise power over societies. Sack (1986) argues that territorialisation processes 
involve:  
• a changing logic of resource governance 
• mapping 
• communication of the intention to control 
• demarcation, and 
• enforcement 
 
The thesis uses these concepts of territorialisation to understand how the state employs 
power over society. But ‘the state’ is not an unproblematic concept. This thesis also 
benefits from a discussion of different types of states and the nature of their power. Power 
in a legal rational state is more impersonal and based upon the rule of law, while power in 
a neo-patrimonial state is more personal and less predictable. The thesis incorporates this 
concept of neo-patrimonial power with an understanding of territorial strategy, to examine 
how a neo-patrimonial state engages these processes.    
 This thesis also benefits from a conceptual understanding of the connection 
between territoritoriality and power. Central to this conceptual understanding is Lefebvre’s 
53 
 
(1991) concept of space as lived space and representational space, and the process by 
which representational space takes over lived space. Also important is Penrose’s (2002) 
discussion of space as having the material power to sustain life, and the emotional power 
created out of a sense of connection. This allows for a conceptualisation of space that sees 
the control of space as the exercise of power.  
 In investigating power, this thesis benefits from a discussion of the concept of 
power as; power to, power over and power as dominance. This thesis conceptualises the 
exercise of power as not just the observable use of physical force, but also as more subtle 
non-tangible forms of power such as coercion and discourse.  
 Power is also conceptualised as an unequal relation between different social groups. 
This conceptualisation expands the framework of analysis to going beyond simple power-
exercising. Thus to make the study of power complete, this thesis also looks at the 
receiving end to find out how power affects those who it is aimed at. To this end, the thesis 
uses resource governance as a lens through which the exercise of power is examined, with 
a particular focus on a state project to demarcate the Tonle Sap area, which forms the case 
study of this thesis. The following section provides the context to this project. 
Tonle Sap Governance  
 Geography and Usage of Tonle Sap 
Locally known as Boeng Tonle Sap (Tonle Sap lake) and internationally known as the 
great lake of Tonle Sap, Tonle Sap is one of the biggest natural fresh water lakes in Asia. It 
covers an area of 3000 square kilometers in the dry season, and it expands between five to 
six times in the rainy seasons (Asian Development Bank, 2005b). It is situated in the 
middle of Cambodia, stretching across six of Cambodia’s 24 provinces. The Tonle Sap 
lake is also connected to the Mekong River by the Tonle Sap River. In the rainy season, 
when the Mekong’s water rises as a result of rain and the melting of ice in Tibet, the Tonle 
Sap lake swells, flooding much of the surrounding vegetation in those six provinces. 
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Figure 1: Map of Tonle Sap  
 
The Tonle Sap area is divided into three main areas. First, the core area consists of the lake 
itself. This area sees a high degree of fishing which has given the lake a reputation as one 
of the most significant sources of fresh water fish the region (Asian Development Bank, 
2005b). It has an estimate of annual fish harvest between 180,000-280,000 tones 
(Campbell et. al, 2006). It contributes 60 percent of Cambodian inland fish production to 
serve both the domestic and regional fish market (Matsui et al, 2006).  
 Secondly, surrounding the core area is a ring of seasonally flooded forest, also 
known as the inundated forest area. It covers an area of 795,000 hectares (Asian 
Development Bank, 2005). In this area, there are many different varieties of trees which 
are highly adaptive to flood and drought conditions. One variety, known locally as 
anchagn (Diospyroscambodiana), can grow up to 1.5 meters per year, and can withstand 
being submerged under flood waters for most of the wet-season, while surviving drought 
and even wild fire in the dry season. The flooding of the forest coincides with the fish 
hatching season, making the flooded forest a breeding, nursery and forage area for fish of 
the Mekong River basin. This makes it one of the most important environments in terms of 
fish productivity (Asian Development Bank, 2003a; Petr, 2000). This area also serves other 
purposes for local residents. In the dry season, this area serves as an important source of 
firewood and provides building materials for local residents (Asian Development Bank, 
2005b). 
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 The third area is referred to as the transition area or locally known as the floating 
rice area. This area is located between wet season rice paddy fields and the seasonally 
flooded forest area. In this area, Cambodian farmers cultivate floating rice crops, a local 
rice variety commonly known as, SrovVia (Oryzarufigpogon). Srov means rice, and via 
can be literally translated as crawling, which also connotes a notion of tying to keep up. 
This rice variety earns its name as Srov Via for its ability to keeps up with the rising level 
of water which can reach up to heights of three and a half meters.  
Figure 2: Sketch of concept of the three areas in Tonle Sap flood plain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Issues of Tonle Sap Governance 
Although there are three areas in the Tonle Sap flood plain, from a practical and ecological 
point of view, there is a need for only one line of boundary demarcation. This is due to the 
fact that flooded forest exists for the purpose of fish productivity, and from a land use 
perspective is indistinguishable from the core area. This is because both fall under a 
protected zone, and the expansion of one does not harm the other. The boundary line 
between the flooded forest and floating rice area is entirely different. The expansion of one 
results in an incursion into the other as both are of a limited amount of land and 
accompanied by different land use practices.  
Area of 
flooded 
 
Area of Floating rice 
Lake 
Village 
and wet 
rice area 
56 
 
 However, the division between the flooded forest and floating rice area has not 
been clearly marked on the ground. The earliest and perhaps only time, when any such 
boundary poles were placed was during the French colonial era. According to Zalinge et al 
(2000), the earliest legal document on territorial division between the three areas was the 
fishery law introduced by the French in 1911. Zalinge et al. (2000) suggest that the law 
was introduced not primarily for the purpose of flooded forest protection, but for fish 
harvest governance and taxation. The flooded forest became a topic of concern due to its 
significant role in fish production.   
 However, the boundary poles have since entirely disappeared on the ground due to 
war, negligence and vandalism. Historically, Cambodia has been endowed with abundant 
natural fish resources. In addition to the abundant fish resources in the Tonle Sap lake, 
Cambodians have freely been able to access and benefit from fish resources which are 
abundant in the nations many river systems, natural ponds, lakes and rice fields. Thus, for 
much of Cambodia’s history, the issue of fish scarcity has been irrelevant, with protection 
of fishery areas not arising as a significant issue. 
 Politically, Cambodia had gone through a series of regime changes which have paid 
little attention to the issue of boundary demarcation at the Tonle Sap. The KR regime, for 
example, emphasised farming intensification, but not environmental protection. During the 
three years and eight months under its reign, Cambodia saw expansion of farmland and the 
development of irrigation systems at great human and environmental cost (Pijpers, 1989). 
When the PRK came to power, the regime’s immediate priorities of the time were food 
security and defense. To feed the starving population, PRK gave rice production the 
highest priority. People were encouraged, in fact required, to work in collectivised groups 
known as Krom Samakei. In some areas where there was a land scarcity, the groups were 
encouraged to clear forest and flooded forest to increase rice cultivation. Meanwhile, the 
PRK was under constant attacks from the remaining troops of the KR who fled and hid in 
the forested area of the Tonle Sap flood plain. Thus, it was desirable for farmers to clear 
those forests for farmland.  
 Meanwhile, despite the absence of physical demarcation, the boundary line had 
been more or less respected by local floating rice farmers. Despite the fact that the poles 
had long disappeared, knowledge of the boundary had been passed on through local oral 
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histories, and local markers such as trees and ponds have played a role as boundary 
markers. This is not to suggest that local wisdom can substitute for a clear property regime. 
There have also been important economic disincentives to clearing flooded forest as it is 
forms an unproductive and unpredictable landscape for farming.  
  However, the situation in the Tonle Sap area has changed rapidly as a result of the 
country’s development. The 1980s and 1990s saw intensified extraction and exploitation of 
natural resources as Cambodia liberalised its economy (McKenney & Prom, 2002). In the 
same period, the Tonle Sap also experienced intense resource exploitation from powerful 
internal actors (Global Witness, 2009; Gum, 2000; Lopez, 2002). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2001) notes that the once public fishing 
space of the Tonle Sap Lake were sub-divided into private fishing lots, and in 2001, the 
number of large-scale private fishing lots reached 239. The intensified harvest of fish, 
together with the increased use of illegal fishing gear, resulted in a nationwide concern for 
the well-being of the Tonle Sap.  
 There are a numbers of studies which point out the negative consequences of the 
fall in annual fish harvest from the Tonle Sap lake. They point to a number of causative 
factors emerging from international to local scales; from the damming of the Mekong 
River to the increasing uses of illegal fishing tools in the lake itself. However, the 
reduction in annual fish catch from the lake is mainly linked to the disappearance of 
flooded forest (Asian Development Bank, 2005b). The Asian Development Bank (2005b) 
reports that flooded forest area fell from 795,000 hectares in 1985 to 370,000 hectares in 
1992, and then less than 20,000 hectares in 1997. Evans et al (2004) argue that 50 percent 
of the area of flooded forest around the Tonle Sap lake was destroyed between 1980 and 
1998.    
 The disappearance of the flooded forest has been blamed on the absence of a 
clearly marked boundary line on the ground. This has allowed for the expansion of rice 
cultivation at the cost of the flooded forest (Asian Development Bank, 2003a, 2005b). Due 
to the importance of rice cultivation within this story, I shall give a detailed account of 
floating rice cultivation in the following section.  
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 General Context of Floating Rice Agriculture 
Floating rice cultivation is a common agricultural practice in the flood plain of the Tonle 
Sap lake. Traditionally, local farmers would begin floating rice cultivation after they had 
planted and harvested their wet season crop. The reason for this arrangement is that the 
cultivation of floating rice is regarded as a secondary activity. Farmers depend on wet rice 
paddy for both food supply and as a cash crop, while treating the harvest from floating rice 
as an additional income source. Farmers, by tradition, started to plough their fields in 
March, using the traditional plow pulled by buffaloes. The ploughing is often labour 
intensive and time-consuming, lasting usually until early April, depending on the rainfall 
pattern for that particular year. Then later in April, or in some years in May, the farmers 
broadcast seeds onto the plowed field, which would later be harrowed,  so that the seeds 
become covered by soil and protected from wild birds. Once the rain starts to fall, the seeds 
absorb water and they begin to germinate, thus beginning the cycle of the rice plant.  
The practice of floating rice farming is totally dependent on the weather.  Farmers 
time the broadcasting to ensure that the saplings growing pattern matches the rainfall 
pattern in order to ensure a maximum chance of crop survival. The timing of the broadcast 
has to be selected very carefully, and is usually done in accordance with the prediction that 
takes place in Phnom Penh during the royal ploughing and rain prediction ceremony. If it is 
predicted that the rain fall would come late, the floating rice farmers will choose to delay 
their time of seed broadcasting. If the time is chosen correctly, the rice plants will grow 
rapidly and anticipate the arrival of flood waters that occurs in late August. In late April or 
early May, there is often minimal rain, thus there is barely enough water to sustain the 
young plants. Once they grow bigger and require more water, there is usually rain to assist 
the growth. The rice plants are then left to depend totally on rainfall for growth, generally 
until the beginning of September when the water from the expanding Tonle Sap lake 
reaches the area. By this time, the rice plants are mature enough to keep up with the rising 
level of flood water, which could, in some years, reach as high as three and a half meters. 
If the flood water is not too erratic, the rice plants will grow to keep up with the rising 
water levels. The whole area will remain flooded until the end of November, or in some 
years, the first or second week of December. By this time the rice plants are seven months 
old, and they already have panicles. When the flood water retreats, the rice plants subside, 
and under the weight of the grains, they all lie flat in the field. Then it takes another three 
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or four weeks for the panicles to mature and the grains to dry before the farmers begin 
harvesting. 
 Irregular rain fall patterns and the great variation in the level of Tonle Sap flood 
water makes floating rice cultivation highly vulnerable to variable climatic conditions. 
According to local accounts, in good years, the farmers can, at best, get only one and a half 
tonnes per hectare. In bad years, they could get as little as 100 kg of harvest per hectare. 
 However, according to recent local trends in farming, there are more bad years than 
good ones. Often the rain does not come soon enough, leaving the rice seed vulnerable to 
wild birds. In other years, the rainfall is not evenly spaced, making the young rice plants 
either too wet or too dry. In case of either too much water or too little, the rice plants do 
not grow properly, meaning they will be unable to cope with the arrival of the flood waters. 
Local farmers describe the likelihood of success of floating rice farming as: ‘for four total 
crop failures, there will be one decent harvest’. For this reason farmers do not attach a high 
level of importance to floating rice cultivation. As a result, most local farmers have a 
tendency to abandon floating rice cultivation land to other land uses. By the early 1990s, 
few local farmers could be found who consistently farmed floating rice. Then there came 
the big flood of 1996, when all floating rice crops in the area were damaged, which 
effectively brought an end to the floating rice cultivation in the area.  
 After this there was a steady decline in the amount of land dedicated to floating rice 
production. For the remaining area, although private property was still recognised, the 
floating rice area came to be used as common space for villagers. It is a space that serves 
many functions of the local community. It provides a space for subsistence fishing, a space 
for animal herding, and a space for the collection of building materials and firewood. In the 
dry season, particularly around early February, groups of local villagers, mostly women, go 
into the area to harvest a local grass which can be used as a roof thatch. Some would 
harvest roofing materials needed to fix their decaying roofs or those which were destroyed 
during the previous monsoon season. By late April or early May, the vegetation becomes 
very dry and the temperature reaches a high of almost 40 C, making wild fires a common 
occurrence. Groups of local men go into the area to collect firewood from tree branches 
broken off during high winds in the monsoon season, or those left over after wild fires, to 
stock up for use throughout the wet season. 
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 After decades of neglect, the area of floating rice received renewed interest once 
again when, at the beginning of the 2000s, a few farmers in Siem Reap, one of the six 
provinces around the Tonle Sap, stumbled upon a new possibility for farming in the area. It 
was, to start with, a simple idea. The floating rice area has many natural ponds and lakes 
which are filled by flood water from the expanding Tonle Sap lake. In the dry season, 
when the flood water retreats, a sizable volume of water remains trapped in those ponds 
and lakes, making them a potential source of irrigation water. Seeing the presence of water 
in those ponds and lakes, those farmers grew dry season rice by pumping water from those 
ponds to irrigate their fields. It proved to be a success. Unlike growing floating rice which 
is totally at the mercy of the rainfall and flooding pattern, dry season rice farming allows 
the local farmer a greater flexibility in the cultivation time and control over the 
management of water supply to the field, which is one of the most important factors for 
success in rice farming. Thus, the risk of crop failure is minimised, while the benefits of 
using a high yielding production system are capitalised upon. The new yield was reported 
to reach an impressive rate of four tonnes per hectare (some cases of up to eight tones) 
compared to an average of just under one tonne for floating rice and 2.3 tonnes for the 
national average for the wet season rice harvest.  
Figure 3: Sketch of dry season rice cultivation and natural pond 
A sketch of an early irrigation scheme in Siem Reap province. When Tonle Sap flood water retreats, some 
water is trapped in these natural ponds, and it can be pumped to irrigate dry season rice in the surrounding 
areas. But the amount of water is limited due to the size of the ponds. 
 However, there was a limitation. The innovation of dry season irrigation resulted in 
a higher crop yield, but it was inefficient in the sense that it required a proportionally larger 
area of water storage. Most of the natural ponds and lakes in the area are not big enough, 
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nor deep enough to store a significant amount of water. With an average size of less than 
one hectare, and depth of less than a meter, one pond can often supply enough irrigation 
water to only two hectares of rice field. Thus, the success is limited to small-scale farming. 
It was not until early 2000s, when farmers with greater access to capital, took up a new 
innovation in engineering. These people were not originally farmers but business people 
and government officials who reside in the provincial towns or the capital city of Phnom 
Penh, and who have been looking for investment opportunities. Instead of relying on 
natural ponds and lakes, they built retention reservoirs to trap the flood water and stored it 
to use for dry season rice farming. The reservoirs, instead of being dug in the ground, sit on 
the surface of the land area with earthen embankments made from piles of soil. When the 
area is flooded in the wet season, flood water is allowed to enter the reservoir through a 
series of strategically placed water gates, but as the flood retreats, those gates are closed, 
trapping the water.  
 This particular design offers two economic advantages. First, it costs much less to 
construct. To dig a conventional pond, one has to dig up and move all of the soil to make 
the pond. The innovative design of the retention reservoir in the area does not require 
digging the ground. The construction cost is minimised to only the cost of moving the soil 
to build the embankment, which is estimated to be one tenth the value of material required 
for a conventional one. Second, the design allows for a low cost irrigation system based on 
gravity. Unlike the original idea of pumping water from the ponds, the retention reservoir 
has its water storage area above the area to be irrigated, thus making it possible for the 
farmers to practice gravity irrigation and minimise or even eliminate the cost of pumping.  
Figure 4: Sketch of retention reservoir design  
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A sketch of a private irrigation scheme in Kampong Thom province. Unlike in the earlier model, an irrigation 
reservoir is built on the surface of land in the command area. it is made up of raised embankment. There are 
two distinct advantage of this design. It costs less to build and it costs less to operate as it depends on gravity.
  
These retention reservoirs resulted in significant changes to the floating rice area. Prior to 
the creation of the retention reservoirs, the floating rice area was of little productive value, 
as nothing can grow on it due to the extreme dry conditions in the dry season, and deep 
flood water in the wet5
                                                     
5This sentiment can be seen widely in the way the local farmers refer to their ownership of the land as “Just 
some floating rice land”. 
. But the innovation not only makes the area cultivatable, but also 
one of the best and most fertile types of land for cultivation. On top of the advantages of 
low construction and operational costs of irrigation, the area is strategically situated in the 
flood plain area, where soil fertility gets replenished every year by flood waters. According 
to a private irrigation scheme owner in Kampong Thom province, the presence of an 
irrigation system helps to achieve a high yield of up to five tonnes per hectares, with an 
average of four tonnes per hectare. These figures represent an increase in average yield of 
twenty times compared to that of floating rice, and also a significant increase in the 
certainty of a harvest. 
 However, these new innovations have not resulted in an even spread of dry season 
rice cultivation across the Tonle Sap flood plain. Among the six provinces that have a 
floating rice area situated in the Tonle Sap flood plain, only Siem Reap and Kampong 
Thom provinces, which are situated on the north side of the lake, witnessed this new dry 
season rice cultivation. By 2005, an estimated ninety percent of the floating rice area that 
had been abandoned since the late 1990s in the two provinces, was reclaimed and 
converted into dry season rice fields. The other provinces of BanteyMeanchay, 
Battambong, Pursat and Kampong Chhnang saw a much more gradual uptake of dry 
season rice cultivation. However, the potential of the new irrigation technique was hijacked 
by wealthy and powerful individuals, who indiscriminately cleared the flooded forest to 
make way for retention reservoir-building and dry-season rice farmingin Kampong Thom 
and Siem Reap. This prompted a national project to demarcate the area between the 
floating rice area and the flooded forest, which is the subject of investigation in this thesis. 
The next chapter will give a methodological explanation of how this study is conducted.    
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Chapter IV: Methodology 
 
 
This chapter will give a detailed account of how the researcher went about answering the 
research problem of how the state, through territorial resource governance, exercises power 
over society. It is divided into three main parts. First, this chapter will discuss the different 
research methods, and it will give an explanation of why a particular research method was 
used. Secondly, it will then continue to touch on the issue of data collection with regards to 
issue of validity and reliability. Given the fact that this thesis deals with abstract concepts 
of power and politics in resource governance, this chapter pays particular attention to how 
data on these social phenomena can be obtained, and with what degree of certainty. Some 
of the challenges to data collection, and validity, will also be discussed. Finally, this 
chapter will give an explanation of how the data will be interpreted and represented in the 
text. 
Research Method 
This thesis employs a qualitative case study approach to investigate the role of the state in 
resource governance. It specifically looks at the construction and representation of the state 
across time and space, and how its power is exercised over society. The choice of 
methodological approach is based on theoretical and philosophical debates in human 
geography.      
 The positivist perspective, as in the tradition of quantitative research methods, 
proposes that there is an objective and knowable reality accessible to humans. Truth is 
understood as being value-free and not subject to any personal or philosophical judgment. 
It sees or assumes a clear separation between phenomenon and context, and it employs 
experimentation in its theorizing of reality. Reality, under the positivist perspective, is 
assumed to objectively exist outside the area of meaning (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). That 
is, reality exists on its own terms independent of our perceptions, interpretations and 
representations. This research tradition treats the researchers as having no influence on the 
outcome of research. It is believed that with the right design, and the rigorous application 
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of the methodology, any researchers carrying out the work should come up with the same 
results.    
 The constructivist perspective, on the other hand, treats reality as constitutive of 
human experience and exists within the area of meaning. Tedlock (2000: 471) argues that 
social experience cannot be singular but ‘dependent on a multiplicity of locations and 
positions that are socially constructed’.  Under this perspective, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
argue that social phenomenon cannot be fully understood if taken out of its context. Here 
they see positivist perspective as ‘silencing too many voices’ (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:10). 
Researchers are thought to play a significant role in not just designing and carrying out the 
research project, but in potentially affecting the findings as a result of their philosophy, 
ideology and beliefs (Fielding, 1998).  
 In this thesis, the study of the state is treated as the study of meaning, perception 
and experience, for which there is no single reality as proposed by the positivist research 
tradition. Marston (2000) argues that the state has no ontological status and its existence is 
only possible under the justification for its purpose, which is socially constructed, making 
it more suitably studied by qualitative research methods. Such research methods are 
situated and locate the observer in the world, and involves an interpretive approach to the 
world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The study of power is the study of a very complicated 
concept of social relations that requires more than quantitative measurement in order to be 
understood. Lukes (1974) suggests  
 That power is real and effective in a remarkable variety of ways, some of them 
 indirect and some hidden, and that, indeed, it is at its most effective when least 
 accessible to observation, to actors and observers alike.  (p. 64) 
Within the tradition of qualitative research methodology, this very question of how the 
state is constructed across time and space, and how its power is derived and exercised over 
the society requires a case study approach. Yin (2003) argues  
 A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
 within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
 and context are not clearly evident. (p. 13)  
The choice of a case study methodology is the most appropriate choice of method for this 
thesis, as the intention is to understand the nature in which the state intervenes in resource 
governance. A qualitative case study is the most suitable method for understanding the 
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many interconnected phenomena and contexts in which resource governance takes place. It 
investigates the process involved in a state project, and how certain outcomes are shaped 
by power relations between different actors. It allows the researcher to understand the 
wholeness of one phenomena in relation to, or as shaped by other phenomenon. As 
Schramm (1971) states, in discussing the strength of a case study as an approach to 
studying decision making processes ‘a case study approach tries to illuminate a decision or 
set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result’. 
(quoted in Yin 2003) 
 Yin (1984) proposes four types of case study designs: a single case with a single 
unit of analysis, a single case study with embedded units of analysis, multiple case studies 
of single units of analysis, and multiple cases with embedded units of analysis. A single 
case study with embedded units of analysis is used in this thesis, and a detailed explanation 
of the choice is as follows. 
Research Design 
To seek answer to the question of how the state exercises power over the society, this 
thesis depends on a single case with embedded units of analysis. The case is about a state 
project to demarcate Tonle Sap areas, and the units of analysis include the policy process 
of the demarcation, the process of demarcation itself, and the process of appeal. Analyses 
of the three processes are essential for an understanding of the phenomena of power.  
 Yin (2003) presents fives rationales for a single case design. First, a case study is 
employed when it is crucial in testing a well-formulated theory. The main objective of 
research under this rationale is to confirm, challenge or extend the theory.  Secondly, a 
single case study is employed as a method when the case being studied represents an 
extreme case or a unique case. That is, when the case is so rare, that there has been little or 
no literature written about it. Third, a single case is employed for what is believed to be an 
everyday or commonplace situation. In this instance, what is known about this one case is 
thought to reveal the general characteristics of other everyday phenomenon of the same 
nature. Fourth, a single case option is suitable when the goal of the research is revelatory of 
a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. The goal of this type of 
method is to reveal the general nature of social problems that may be common, but that are 
inaccessible to the research community. Thus, it is justified when the researcher stumbles 
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upon the possibility of collecting data and insights of a case of a similar nature. Finally, the 
fifth rationale for a single case study design is for research projects that require 
longitudinal study.     
 This thesis chose to employ a single case study method design for reasons closely 
associated with Yin’s third and fourth rationales. The case of the state’s role in natural 
resource governance is common everywhere in the world, and the phenomenon of states 
exercising their power over civil society is an everyday reality in developing countries. It is 
a well-known reality that the state, such as that of Cambodia, dominates civil society 
(Hughes, 2003). But the question is how and how it is possible. This thesis picks a single 
case of a state project in order to gain insights into how state power is exercised. The case 
chosen for study is a state’s project to demarcate the protected area around the Tonle Sap 
lake. This project was designed and implemented in ways that marginalise local farmers. 
Thus the sub-processes within this project serve as a crucial unit of analysis that could 
yield important insights into the structure and processes of state power.    
 The observations, and analysis of state power captured in this case study will serve 
as revelatory of other instances of state power in society. Stake (1994) refers to this kind of 
case as an instrumental case study; one on which choice is made to advance the 
understanding of something else others than the case itself. Stake (1994) writes 
 A particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a 
 generalisation. The case is of secondary interest. It plays a supporting role and it 
 facilitates our understanding of something else. (p. 437) 
This particular case of the state’s project to demarcate the boundary between the protected 
area and the floating rice area is chosen as the case study for the researcher has what Yin 
(2003: 42) calls, a researcher’s ‘opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon 
previously inaccessible to scientific investigation’.  
 The researcher has a great amount of familiarity with the local landscape as it is in 
his own home town where he was born and raised. The familiarity gives him the privilege 
of knowledge of the history and background to the case being studied. This familiarity 
includes the lived knowledge of the geography of the protected area, the history of the 
floating rice area, and serves as background knowledge which is instrumental for 
understanding the nature of the state demarcation project.  
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 In addition, the researcher also has access to the case beyond his capacity as just an 
outside researcher. Due to his prior connections with people in the study site, the 
researcher can obtain a level of trust and acceptance, which makes it possible for the 
researcher to create rapport with the people being studied. This gives the researcher 
privileged access to participants’ knowledge of the issues under study. It also allows the 
researcher to enter into the lived space of the participants, which would often be denied to 
outsiders.  As a result, the researcher can engage in conversations with participants in a 
natural setting, which is crucial for gaining insights into power relations. This facilitates 
not only an understanding of people’s attitudes towards the state, but also provides insights 
into the decision making processes of participants in the context of resistance to the state. 
 The other advantage of this methodological approach is that the researcher has the 
privilege of close familiarity with those affected by the state demarcation program. The 
researcher is able to genuinely sympathise with participants as he has a shared memory of 
living in the village, and will also be personally affected by the actions of outsiders who 
take village lands. With his prior knowledge of the area and on-going engagement with the 
local farmers, especially in their effort to challenge the authority and save their farmland, 
the researcher can secure a strategic position to witness power relations between the 
dominating state agents and the dominated local farmers. This position allows the 
researcher to observe and analyze the interaction between state officials and local farmers 
in the context where they most occur.  
 Unlike the quantitative research approach, this qualitative case study approach 
requires the researcher to consider all events as data; from the day to day conversations that 
take place between resource users, to interactions between villagers and local state agents. 
The strength of this research approach is that the researcher can understand social 
phenomena in the setting in which they occur. This allows the researcher to treat 
conversations and events not as isolated phenomena, but as part of a much wider context 
surrounding social actors. What is being said at one point in time cannot be taken at its face 
value, but it has to be analyzed against the background of what was said before, and by 
whom and with what speaking position. The same is true of social action or inaction. The 
fact that a local resource user community chooses not to react to a certain state behaviour, 
cannot be taken as a sign of passivity on their part. Rather effort needs to be made to 
understand what Wartenberg (1990) calls ‘their action environment.’ In his work on 
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different forms of power, Wartenberge (1990) argues that when power is exercised on a 
social agent, the agent would look at their action environment in search for any alternative 
set of actions available to them before they decide whether to comply or resist. 
Wartenberge goes on to argues that the agent does not just choose any action, but only 
action that make sense to them. Thus this research pays attention to the set of actions 
available to social agents, to understand their decision to comply or resist power that is 
exercised over them.  
Site Selection 
Pursat province is chosen as the study site for this thesis project.  Located some 200 km 
west of Phnom Penh, Pursat is situated on the south side of the Tonle Sap lake. The 
province covers a land area of 12,692 square kilometers. It has a population of 426,758. 
According to the Pursat Investment Profile, 85 percent of the province’s total population is 
directly or indirectly dependant on agriculture. The province is classified as one of the 
poorest provinces in Cambodia (Asian Development Bank, 2006a). The majority of the 
population in the province is highly dependent on natural resources of the Tonle Sap lake.   
Figure 5:  Map of Pursat Province 
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There are no official statistics on the size of floating rice area in the province, but based on 
an informal source close to the provincial governor, the province has an estimated 8000 
hectares of floating rice land. Pursat province consists of five districts, three of which are 
located in the flood plain of Tonle Sap. Those district are Krakor, Kandieng and Bakan.  
 SrieSdok commune of Kandieng district in Pursat province was chosen as a study 
sites. The commune has a total land area of 19, 234 hectares. For its location in the flood 
plain of Tonle Sap, the commune has an interesting landscape consisting of three main 
areas: the residential and wet season rice area, floating rice area, and flooded forest area.  
Figure 6: Map of the case study commune
 
This commune was chosen for three strategic reasons. First, the arrival of the Tonle Sap 
Demarcation project in the commune, which is the main focus of the study, coincided with 
the timing of the thesis fieldwork.  Secondly, the commune was chosen due to the 
researcher’s familiarity with it. The commune is located in the researcher’s home province, 
which means that he is familiar with its history, geography and natural resource usage 
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history. This provided an important opportunity to match theoretical and comparative 
insights with the details afforded by familiarity. Third, perhaps more importantly, the 
commune was selected due to the researcher having access to key people involved in the 
Tonle Sap Demarcation project. As this thesis examines the sensitive topic of power and 
dominance of the state, obtaining access to, and gaining the trust of the larger community 
of respondents was crucial. This meant spending large amounts of time with the local 
community and building up trust with key participants. This allowed the researcher to gain 
insights into behaviours, perceptions and attitudes toward the topic under study. 
Data Collection Methods 
After deciding to employ the case study approach, the next step in the research process was 
to choose a data collection method suitable for the research problem. Data was categorised 
into two main types.  First, the researcher collected historical data on the rationale 
underpinning the state’s demarcation project. This kind of data can be obtained from the 
collection and analysis of documents and archival records pertaining to the case being 
studied. These documents and records can include project documents collected from state 
departments, and other literature obtained from non- governmental organizations as well as 
donor agencies. This source of data can provide precise information on which particular 
state agencies are involved in the project, dates of key events, and other important details 
of events (such as the size and scope of sub projects). However, this kind of data source 
presents its own set of problems. These documents and records are often written by state 
agencies with their own biases and subjectivities. Gallaher et.al (2009:7) argue that 
‘knowledge production is not neutral but political, and all truth claims are constitutive of 
political orders of which they are apart’.  
This problem is probably more serious in countries where the state bureaucratic 
system is dominated by a neo-patrimonial political regime which tends to control the 
knowledge production processes. These formal documents are not sufficient for a detailed 
understanding of what actually happens as part of such a program, as they only give 
records of formal meetings and dates, and only record what officials want the public to 
know. In other words, they contain the official truth, and the official truth as it is known is 
only an account of success stories and the achievements of the government (Scott, 1990a). 
Even then, the researcher is not always given access to those materials. Foucault (2002) 
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argues that in reconstructing historical knowledge, what is important is not just what is 
being said or already said, but also what is un-said. Foucault (2002)writes,  
 all manifest discourse is secretly based on an ‘already-said’; and that this ‘already-
 said’ is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already 
 been written, but a ‘never-said’, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a 
 breath, a writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark. (p. 27) 
Limitations with these kinds of data require the researcher to depend on other methods, 
such as ethnographic data collection. This is because, states are argued to be a social 
phenomenon and hence to understand their inner workings requires an in depth 
understanding of the social context they operate in. As Redman (2001) shows in his book, 
The Dance of Legislation, behind every state project, there is a long process of negotiation, 
coordination and facilitation, and in those processes, state actors are heavily involved 
within informal politics, and personal networks which are behind the formation of any state 
policy. An understanding of these largely hidden aspects of state processes can be 
accomplished by means of ethnographic data (Manen, 1988).    
 This discursive aspect of power emphasises the importance of symbolic exchange 
and communication which occurs as part of the day to day work of state agents. Manen 
(1988) argues that social realities can be represented by an ethnographic account of how 
actions and words are understood within their context. This method is believed to be 
capable of representing the wholeness of social experience as it emphasises both 
phenomenon and context. Thus, ethnographic data is data collected within a context, which 
can only be achieved when the researcher is immersed in close and relatively prolonged 
interactions with participants. In terms of this study, the researcher attempted to 
complement information already on the state demarcation project, by using interviews, 
direct observations and participant-observations. This is based on Geertz’s (1963) study of 
social and economic changes in two Indonesian towns. Writing from both an outsider’s 
perspective of a social scientist and an insider’s perspective resulting from his 
submergence in those towns, Geertz (1963) gives detailed descriptions of the everyday 
social interactions and the economic activities in the local market of specific places 
involving specific people and communities. 
 The advantage of ethnography is that it allows the research to capture the depth and 
richness of the problems being studied, especially from the viewpoint of ordinary people at 
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the village level. This study will focus on three categories of data:  data surrounding events 
and literature which preceded the actual implementation of the demarcation, descriptions 
of events that occurred during the project, and what happened after the demarcation.  
 Interviews 
Yin (2003) describes interviews as guided conversation where the researcher can pursue a 
line of inquiry on how things happened the way they did in an unbiased manner. Here 
people being studied become not respondents but informants who reveal their insights of 
the subject matter in a natural conversational style. Yin (2003:90) also argues that those 
informants can ‘suggest sources of corroboratory or contrary evidence and also initiate 
access to such sources’. 
 In the course of this study, informants were divided into three broad categories, 
local farmers, state officials and outsiders who are not involved in the benefits and costs 
associated with the outcomes. Their positions may be more or less sympathetic to one side 
or another, but they are in a position to express expert knowledge of the case being studied. 
Firstly, for the farmer informants, the researcher took great care in making sure they feel 
comfortable in participating in the research. The researcher understand that the culture and 
value of the people recruited as participants, was to be respected, and more importantly, 
their situation be taken seriously. In the context of Cambodia, politics can rarely be 
discussed in public, and asking questions that are politically sensitive is extremely difficult. 
Thus, interviews were loosely structured to ensure a friendly, comfortable and safe 
environment for the participants. No fixed interview guides were employed. Instead, the 
researcher let the interviewees take control over the direction of the interview, only 
steering conversations in the directions of key issues such as the politics of the demarcation 
project. 
 The data from farmer informants was crucial for the construction of historical 
accounts of the place being studied. Farmer accounts constitute the local reality, the lived 
experience of that space, and the meaning of their farmland. However, the researcher 
discovered that most farmer informants had little or no knowledge of state demarcation 
projects. This led to further interviews with state agents. 
  For the second group of participants – state agents, difficulties were also 
encountered. Although state agents involved in the demarcation project would agree to an 
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interview, it was often difficult, if not impossible, to actually secure an interview. What is 
more, even when interviews were possible, the researcher found that accounts given by 
these agents were confined to official version of the truth, which can only be used to 
understand the official position of the state agents on the matter of boundary demarcation. 
This revealed the manner in which environmental crisis was engineered by state agent in 
order to expand their territorial and political control over society. However, this data could 
not be independently verified. Thus, the researcher depended on other sources of data, 
which came from a third category of informants. 
 This third group of participants comprised of expert groups who are not formally in 
charge of the demarcation project, but who were involved in the preparation of the project.  
Also included in this group are those who have access to high ranking state officials who 
have been involved in the project. Their insights are crucial in the verification of 
information, and for understanding the dynamics of power both within and between the 
state and society.  
 To ensure the highest possible data quality, the researcher cannot just depend on a 
one time encounter with participants. People only start to open up and reveal their 
perspectives when they feel they can trust the researcher, and trust takes time to build. 
Thus, the researcher maintained contact with most of those key informants throughout the 
course of the thesis project. This strategy pays off. Some important pieces of data came out 
of simple telephone conversations and at the least expected times.       
 Direct Observation 
To understand state’s power requires more than just data from policy documents and 
interviews, but also the researcher’s direct observation of how power is unfolded. Lofland 
et al. (2006) argue that only direct observations can result in the researcher being able to 
get close to fully understanding the lives and social worlds of the respondents. They write: 
The central reason for observing and/or participating in the lives of others is that a 
great many aspects of social life can be seen, felt, and analytically articulated only 
in this manner... The researcher seeks to witness how those studied perceive, feel 
and act in order to understand their perceptions, feelings and behaviour more fully 
and intimately. (p. 3)    
The researcher becomes what Tedlock (2000:458) calls a ‘doubled-agent who, although 
they also may be induced into full group membership, do so with the sole intention of 
74 
 
describing the setting and then departing’. Yin (2003) argues that this technique of data 
collection is advantageous for two reasons. First, it allows the researcher to witness social 
phenomenon as they occur. Because the researcher directly observes the social 
phenomenon, all data are the result of a first-hand experience in which the researcher sees 
the event, hears the actual words of the people being studied, and captures all other 
important sensory data himself. This avoids the potential problem of data being mis-
represented by intermediary agents.  Secondly, the researcher, through direct observation, 
not only witnesses the reality being unfolded but also captures the context in with it takes 
place. This allows the researcher to treat social data as not isolated phenomenon, but as 
connected to a particular setting. This is deemed essential for the analysis of power in 
resource governance, especially in the context of a theoretical frame in which power is not 
seen merely as power to do things,  but as ability to influence outcomes (Wartenberg, 
1990). The close familiarity makes it possible for the researcher to be able to meticulously 
follow the tedious and mundane aspects of the demarcation project in a way that allows 
him a position to better understand the phenomenon of power. 
 Participant Observation 
In the context of understanding power and control, there are times when interviews or 
discussions with participants, are not sufficient to yield an understanding of the 
phenomenon of power. Resource governance is the governance of wealth extraction and 
distribution, and it involves practices that are best kept away from the knowledge of the 
public, and especially researchers. Thus, the researcher had to employ participant 
observation as a technique of collecting data on sensitive issues. Participant observations 
allows the researcher to achieve a human understanding by learning to see, think, feel and 
sometimes even behave, as an insider (Tedlock, 2000). During the course of data 
collection, the researcher spent a lot of time in people’s rice fields, transecting the floating 
rice area, participating in rice cultivation activities, and taking part in discussions among 
the affected local farmers. This technique allowed the researcher to understand local 
attachment to the floating rice area, and how it is related to their life histories and 
experiences. As Brewer (2000:74) writes: ‘language and setting are so closely tied that it is 
sometimes possible to reconstruct from a fragment of conversation the whole social world 
that produced it. 
75 
 
 Observation allowed the researcher to understand the reasoning behind local 
reactions to the enclosure of their floating rice area. Altheide and Johnson (1998) argue  
  … capturing members words alone is not enough for ethnography. .. Good 
 ethnography reflects tacit knowledge, the largely unarticulated, contextual 
 understanding that is manifested in nobs, silences, humour and naughty nuances. 
 (p.297)  
However, during the course of data collection, the researcher found himself more than just 
being a pure observer, but an activist. First, as Fine et al (2000) argue, when researching 
such topics as poverty and inequality, the researcher has a social responsibility to seek out 
and suggest what is possible in the hope of improving the position of the marginalised 
people under study. On the issue of enclosure, those friends and relatives had contacted the 
researcher for ideas on how to deal with the matter. For that reason, the researcher could 
not always pretend to be a pure outsider observing the phenomenon, and leave the farmers 
to struggle in a sea of confusion and disorientation. The researcher became deeply involved 
in the process of seeking information about the project, facilitating local meetings, and 
participating in local discussions to find solutions to their enclosure problems.  
 Fine et al. (2000) argue that this can pose the danger of researchers going native, 
where they become too involved in the process and forget the role of observing and 
making sense of what happens. To deal with this problem, in some instances it was 
necessary to step back from certain social situations in order to make sense of farmers’ 
actions. This allowed an appreciation of the social realities of the farmers, while 
maintaining at least some degree of objectivity. Tedlock (2000) argues that the researcher 
has to be passionately involved, but objectively neutral. In addition, great efforts were 
made to ensure that those involved would not, and could not be exposed, or implicated in 
anything that could harm them personally.  
 The advantage was that data was collected as events transpired which allowed for 
the observations of the actual words of officials, and the gestures of local farmers. Access 
to this kind of detailed data is considered crucial in order to make sense of state domination 
and local resistance in all the subtle forms that it takes. It allowed the researcher to observe 
the nature of interaction between state officials and local citizens in the setting in which 
they occur, and gain insights into corrupt behaviours of state agents, which one would not 
otherwise be exposed to.  
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Challenges to Data Collection 
During data collection, challenges were encountered. The first one concerns collecting 
historical data. To fully understand the politics and power of the state requires a full 
understanding of demarcation projects from inception to implementation. But the project 
was already underway by the time of thesis conception, resulting in a reliance on 
documents and archives for information on rationales and methodologies.  These data 
sources were deemed important to understand the politics of resource governance and 
especially in relation to the way in which power was exercised leading up to the 
demarcation. But the problem encountered was that public documents by nature, and 
especially within Cambodia, tend to follow their own logic, which is not always linked to 
the reality of the issue on the ground. The prime goal of many of these documents is 
simply to record the achievements of the state, while leaving out controversies over power 
and politics, which is the core interest of this thesis.  
 Bakker and Bridge (2008) argue that the researcher has to go beyond the officially-
provided truths of policy documents. To complement data found in formal state project 
documents, the researcher had to rely on interviews with state agents currently in positions 
of authority. However, many such agents were new to their jobs, and despite the 
researchers best efforts to conduct interviews with them, he found that the information 
gathered through formal interviews was very superficial. Those stake-holders tend to give 
only the officially-provided version of the truth, and what they say during interviews tends 
to strictly follow a political culture that places more attention on the appearance of 
formality, uniformity, progress and achievement of the state.  
 The researcher solved this problem by resorting to outside information sources. For 
information on the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA), which was one of the main actors 
in the demarcation project, the researcher had to consult with external actors who were not 
at the time employed by TSBA, but who had had in-depth insights derived either from past 
or on-going engagement with it. For information on the origin and nature of the TSBA, the 
researcher had to depend on information obtained from those serving in the Tonle Sap 
Management Organization (TSMO), an organization that was replaced by the TSBA. 
Interviews, with them yielded an insiders’ account of what happened inside this state 
agency in the period leading up to the demarcation. This knowledge was crucial for an 
understanding of internal politics, patronage- systems and the politics behind the 
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appointment of staff members. It also shed light on the performance, and more importantly, 
on the lines of accountability of those state agents who were assigned the task of boundary 
demarcation. 
 The second challenge concerns the researcher’s access to information, particularly 
official meetings concerning the demarcation project. This limited any chance of directly 
observing the interactions between different state agencies of various levels. To cope with 
this, the researcher had to depend on accounts from people present in such meetings. In 
some cases where direct data could not be obtained, the researcher had to depend on a 
method of drawing inference from the known. This technique involves the role of plausible 
inference in research (Christians, 2000). For example, during the course of data collection, 
it was not possible to ask the district chief directly why he acted in ways that hampered 
local attempts at appealing the demarcation project. But it was possible to arrive at a 
conclusion that the district chief had an economic incentive to block these appeals, based 
on certain pieces of information. It was discovered that he was part of a team that had 
earlier shown an intention to acquire part of the contested land. During project 
implementation, one of the team members claimed that the team to which the district chief 
belonged had influenced decisions to transfer the enclosed land from being public 
protected land, to an economic land concession. This then allowed him, along with other 
investors, to acquire the land. Whether the district chief could do it as he claimed or not 
was unimportant, but the claim reflected the attitude of the district chief and his inclination 
to represent the local interest, and this was an important piece of data for this study. 
 One might argue that this method of data collection can lend itself to potential 
validity problems. Firstly, the research could easily become opinionated. Depending on 
third parties for information means that the researcher does not get direct access to the 
original source of information. The risk is that the data is being filtered by the perceptions, 
values and agendas of the third party informants. But Christians (2000) argues that a 
degree of certainty can be ensured by employing a number of methods. Careful measures 
were taken to ensure that personal perceptions were not shaped by the judgments of the 
informants. The information that participants gave was carefully assessed on the basis of 
the circumstance in which they spoke and their relative speaking position. Then, the 
researcher triangulated this information with information collected from other sources, and 
any point of inconsistency was carefully followed by further inquiries. Then, the researcher 
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followed up links to the persons most able to reliably provide information. Informants 
selected in this manner, were usually those who were not officially part of the demarcation 
project, but those who had had direct experience with the TSBMA. These people are not 
likely to have any hidden agendas when commenting on the matter.  
 In relation to sensitive questions on power abuses and corruption, the researcher 
had to take great care to ensure that no participants were in any way implicated in saying 
or doing anything which may later negatively impact them. The challenge here was that 
due to the nature of the research, it would be difficult to cover any of the main topics 
without the risk of participants saying something which may potentially place them in a 
difficult situation. A delicate decision had to be made as whether to reveal the true identity 
as a researcher, and risk being rejected by participants, or to conceal identity in order to 
obtain necessary access to the respondents. The guidance to get out of this ethical dilemma 
comes from Punch (1994) who argues that a strict application of research codes may 
restrain and restrict a great deal of innocuous and unproblematic research. In order to gain 
access to a wide variety of information, it was necessary to maneuver gate keepers and 
other barriers. For example, the map on which the Tonle Sap boundary line was based was 
not made available to the public. As Huxley (2008) argues, a map is a tool used by the state 
to exercise its control over  society. It is made to achieve a certain purpose and does not 
always represent local realities. Judging how representative a particular map is, requires a 
combination of technical GIS competency together with knowledge of local land 
characteristics. But it seems that few people involved in the map making process possess 
both of these competencies. State agents have technical GIS knowledge, but have no 
knowledge of local land conditions. This prevents them from making sense of how farmers 
demarcate land and how state produced maps interact with the lived experience of people 
at the village level. Local farmers on the other hand, have local knowledge of the land, but 
have no technical knowledge on map making, or map interpretation. This deprives them of 
the ability to judge whether a technical map represents their interests as they are largely 
unable to interpret and access it.  
To fill in this gap, GPS locations of boundary poles were recorded that had been 
placed as part of the demarcation project. An intelligible and accurate map that farmers 
could relate to was then produced. This ability to superimpose the rationality contained 
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within the state map, onto the realities of local lived space gave farmers the ability to better 
interpret the logic and impacts of the demarcation project. 
  This approach of data collection can both compliment and provide a means of 
triangulating information obtained from state agencies. The combination of official 
versions of truth, and the complementary insights collected over an extended period of 
time, allowed for what can best be described as a composite truth; a body of truth whose 
epistemological status rests in  Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of lived space and 
representational space.  
Challenges to Validity and Reliability 
Bakker and Bridge (2008) argue that the process of knowledge production is not a neutral 
or value-free process. It is influenced by, among other things, the researchers own 
perceptions, attitudes and philosophy. In qualitative research methods,  Lofland et al. 
(2006) argue that the researcher becomes the main instrument of research. The researcher 
is the lens through which the social reality of the respondents is looked upon, interpreted 
and represented. This is significant for a research project such as this one which employs 
an ethnographic method as the primary data collection method. For this reason, 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that the researcher needs to be reflexive, and 
identify the contingencies that lead to the creation of data. 
 Social science researchers also have obligations and responsibilities to the people 
under study. Fine et al. (2000) argue that researchers need to take care to ensure that the 
interventions into the lives of others are accompanied with careful attention to the 
connections between our ‘self’ and ‘others’. They argue that the self of the researchers has 
to be seen as a potential source of contaminant. They are the co-producer of the narrative 
they are supposed to collect, thus there is a need for them to reflect their position which 
may have a significant effect on the knowledge produced in the research process (Fine et 
al., 2000). In the interest of this matter, the researcher wishes to state a few things about 
himself.  
 The researcher was born and raised in Pursat province, a province known as one of 
the largest rice producing provinces in Cambodia. He grew up in a rice growing 
community located just outside the provincial town. Being brought up in this community, 
the researcher has the privilege of having already acquired a practical knowledge of 
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farming that allows him to comprehend farmer life experiences beyond the mere 
description. For him, the joy of harvesting in a good year has a deep meaning which goes 
beyond income. Bad years of drought and flood, on the other hand, connote food 
insecurity, inability to afford other basic commodities, and more dauntingly the possibility 
of losing farmland.  
 From personal experience in rice growing-communities, the researcher came to be 
very passionate about rice growing, and this passion extends into his choice of education. 
Prior to his higher education, the researcher held the belief that the failure in farming in 
Cambodia was largely due to the inability of the farmers to adopt new farming techniques 
and technologies. He believed that farmers needed to revolutionise their farming 
techniques, but the problem was they were not willing to change their traditional farming 
practices. Thus, when the researcher did his Master’s Degree in the U.S.A, he focused his 
interest on mass communication theory, with special attention to how farmers 
communicate development and technological innovations in farming.  
 The researcher also enrolled in another master’s degree, international economics, 
where he learnt the theory of international trade and financial banking. It was this academic 
training that instilled the idea that agriculture, although a low profit sector is also the most 
stable sector of all. Agricultural development should take priority not just due to its 
stability, but for the sheer number of people it employs. The sector employs an estimated 
85 percent of the population who depend both directly and indirectly on it. 
 The combination of childhood experience and academic training has cultivated a 
strong passion for rice farming. He believes that in the context of Cambodia where an 
estimated 80% of the population is employed in agriculture, in which rice production 
dominates, the development of the rice sector should take first priority. Currently, the yield 
rate is low compared to what is achievable in neighboring countries and other countries in 
the region (Asian Development Bank, 2003b). In 2008, the average yield was reported to 
be at 2.75 tons per hectare compared to 4.4 in the world(Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). 
Improving yield meant expanding production and thus economic growth. For local 
farmers, a higher yield rate means more food security and the greater affordability of other 
basis commodities as agricultural crops serve as both food and cash crops. 
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 Production land, in the meantime, is plentiful, but it is not being used to its full 
potential. According to the ADB, in, 2003, Cambodia had 2.6 million hectares of farmland, 
with only 19 % of farmland with access to irrigation  (Asian Development Bank, 2005a). 
By 2010, the ration of farmland to irrigation had changed little (Yu & Diao, 2011). Yet 
these figures speak only of patterns at the national scale. At the local level, access to 
irrigation varies widely depending on how politically important the area is. Fukuyama 
(2004) refers to this phenomenon as neo-patrimonialism, where officials tailor state duties 
to serve the needs of their clients. Close personal connections result in favourable state 
interventions, and areas with little or no connections see few public services (Horn & 
Craig, 2008). This applies to the distribution of irrigation infrastructure. 
 The solution to these deficiencies came from international aid donors who proposed 
the rolling out of Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s). This initiative was at first applied to 
road building, especially in Phnom Penh, where local residents had to contribute up to 50 
% of the cost of  road construction (Pak, 2011; Pak & Craig, 2008). But such initiatives are 
less common within the agricultural sector. Instead, private actors, or in some cases small 
land holders, take agricultural development into their own hands. Yet unlike a neo-liberal 
state that would support private initiatives through technical assistance and legal backing, 
the Cambodian state is often entirely absent from these schemes. The state seeks rent by 
charging the private sector for work that the state itself fails to do.     
 In addition, the researcher enters this thesis project with a profound political 
commitment to creating Cambodia as a just society with equality of opportunity under the 
law. He believes that state bureaucrats should live up to their description as civil servants – 
i.e. literally serving civilians. Currently civil servants in Cambodia are largely un-
accountable for their actions and are often able to unscrupulously exploit those below 
them. Poor rural farmers on the other hand are often at the mercy of patrons.  A farmer 
should enjoy protection, respect and dignity as a human being in a similar fashion to other 
members of society. 
 In sum, the researcher is passionate about rice farming. He sees it as the most 
appropriate solution to lifting poor Cambodians out of poverty, but the constraint, he 
believes, lies in the state. The state is not only inactive in serving the interests of its 
citizens, but its actions gravely hinder development and growth. This thesis is an 
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investigation of how the power of the state works to exclude those who are the most 
disadvantaged – rural farmers.  
Challenges of Achieving Textual Representation 
One of the biggest challenges to writing up case studies involves what Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) call the crisis of representation. An important aspect of writing up a rich case study 
is providing detailed descriptions of the social world. However, this often requires 
unintentionally revealing the identities of participants, which can potentially put them at 
risk. Representation is particularly important for this thesis as it touches on the topic of 
power and domination. The findings of this thesis may provide rare insights into the 
structure and processes of the Cambodian state and how it exercises power over society. It 
provides insights into the nature of state interventions in the field of natural resource 
governance, and gives descriptions of how crude power is experienced by the local 
farmers. The behaviour of state agents was witnessed as it happened and in its wholeness. 
As this thesis challenges official narratives over the nature of state power in Cambodia, the 
crisis of representation was an issue within the writing up (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  
 Soderstrom (2005:11)argues that representation is an extremely complex concept 
and ‘any discussion of the notion of representation is bound to be partial and incomplete’. 
The essential question is how to write up a research report which deals with sensitive 
topics, in a way that allows the text to fully represent the meaning of events being 
described. In addition, the burden of textual representation for this thesis project is heavier 
for the researcher as there is a strong need to protect the identities of the participants. The 
author of this thesis paid particular attention to the identity of participants to ensure 
maximum anonymity and personal safety. Thus, efforts were made to ensure that the 
writing and analyses were reflective of state behaviour and not about any particular 
individuals. The author also made an effort to avoid revealing particular names or locations 
that could serve as potential clues to finding out the identity of individuals.    
Chapter Summary 
This chapter explained how the researcher went about trying to answer the research 
problems. It argued that a case study is the most suitable approach for this thesis as it 
involves an analysis of relations between state and society. This chapter also described the 
way in which data was divided into two categories; historical and empirical data, and how 
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each category of data was collected. It explained in detail how the empirical data was 
collected through interviews, direct observations and participant observation. It also 
discussed the opportunities and challenges the researcher faced in using each of these 
techniques. Finally, the chapter discussed the issue of textual representation, showing how 
the researcher intends to present the findings in ways that contribute to an understanding of 
the wider issues of power and corruption in a state system. 
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Chapter V: Policy Making/Engaging Territorialisation 
 
 
This chapter describes the different processes that led to the creation of national policy on 
the demarcation of the Tonle Sap. It will start with an account of floating rice cultivation in 
the case study commune. It will then situate this local practice within the context of the 
growth of the neo-patrimonial state, as well as the growth of environmentalism. 
Interactions between these two processes will be considered with a particular focus on the 
way in which territorial strategies are employed by the state under the rubric of 
environmental protection.  This analysis will also describe the way in which state 
territorialisation unevenly affects local farming practice. One of the major conclusions of 
this chapter is that un-even implementation of state demarcation projects (territorialisation) 
results in environmental crisis that further prompts state intervention.   
Local Development of Floating Rice Cultivation 
Floating rice cultivation in the commune under study, shares a similar history with floating 
rice cultivation within the broader Tonle Sap flood plain, as described previously. Local 
farmers stated they have grown Srov Via, for several generations. In the early 1980s, when 
food security and rice expansion was the priority of the government, land dedicated to 
floating rice cultivation expanded at the cost of the flooded forest area. According to a map 
of land use in the commune, the floating rice area expanded into the flooded forest area by 
up to two kilometers in some part of the commune.   
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Figure 7: Map of land use in the commune
 
The researcher found this map hanging on the wall of the meeting hall of the commune office. The source of 
the map was unclear. According to the commune chief, it was made in 2006 by local farmers during a 
participatory mapping exercise facilitated by an NGO. Based on the amount of land under cultivation in the 
mid 1980s, this map shows that the floating rice area in the commune expanded beyond the French era 
boundary line.    
However, after years of abandonment, the floating rice area was covered by shrub and 
vegetation. By 2003, the flooded forest area had expanded into the area that was previously 
used for floating rice cultivation. The exact amount by which it expanded is unknown, as 
official data is not available. But based on accounts by the participants within this study, 
only an estimated 20 hectares of the 700 hectares of floating rice area in the commune was 
under active cultivation. This suggests that the remaining 680 hectares had been retaken by 
the flooded forest. 
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Figure 8: Sketch of land use in the study commune in early 2000 
 
 The mid 2000’s marked a turning point for floating rice cultivation in the 
commune. Attracted by the rising price of both farmland and rice grains, and encouraged 
by successive years of moderate natural flooding, floating rice farmers in the commune 
began re-cultivating their abandoned land. According to local accounts, by 2005 the area of 
land under floating rice cultivation had increased to 50hectares. The return to floating rice 
was further encouraged by the discovery of new irrigation techniques, and the successes of 
floating rice farmers in Kampong Thom and Siem Reap provinces. Starting from 2004, 
floating rice land in the commune began to be sold to both local farmers and to outsiders 
who were interested in cultivating rice, or land speculation.   
 But the return of floating rice faced two important problems. Firstly, from a 
technical point of view, local farmers did not have the capacity to work their land. After 
years of abandonment, the floating rice area was covered with a thick shrub (especially the 
fast-growing Anchagn). The presence of this vegetation had made it impossible for local 
farmers to plow using traditional animal-pulled methods. According to local accounts, 
farmers had to hire tractors in order to clear the land, yet the high cost of tractors against 
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the low return on floating rice cultivation, meant that few farmers would see profit from 
such efforts. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the floating rice farmers who 
intended to re-cultivate their land faced restrictions from state agents who a claimed duty 
to protect flooded forest. This problem is discussed in detail in the following section. 
The Expansion of Modernist State 
The early 1990s saw the creation of many state ministries. After the signing of the 1991 
peace agreement, which paved the way for multi-party elections in 1993, Cambodia saw 
the integration of previously warring parties into the formal state. To accommodate this 
expansion, new ministries were rapidly created. Such new ministries included the Ministry 
of Rural Development (MRD), the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM).  
 However, these state institutions did not have clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities. Their institutional mission statements tended to be broadly defined, which 
gave rise to the problem of institutional rivalry, and overlapping roles and responsibilities. 
For example, MRD has an institutional mission to ensure sustainable development in rural 
Cambodia. MoE has an institutional mission to protect and manage the nation’s 
environmental resources, while MOWRAM has a broad mission statement of managing the 
nation’s water resources. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry (MAFF) was 
also separated into two different administrations; the Fishery Administration (FiA) and the 
Forestry Administration (FA). FiA has an official responsibility for “all fisheries matters in 
Cambodia”. In many cases, a single geographic area would come under the jurisdiction of 
multiple departments. The Tonle Sap flood plain is a case in point where its management 
came under the joint jurisdiction of MRD, MoE, MOWRAM, MAFF and FiA.  
 At the local level, overlapping territorial claims have played out in a number of 
different ways. Interviews suggest that only agents from FiA and the Provincial 
Department of Environment (PDoE) were actually active in managing the floating rice 
area. Their presence however, was not solely aimed at protecting fishery resources and the 
environment, as per their ministerial mission statements.  They also sought to advance 
rent-seeking activities under the pretext of territorial enforcement. Initially, FiA declared 
that the entire Tonle Sap was a sensitive and nationally important fishing zone which came 
under its jurisdiction. That is, any area which the Tonle Sap flood waters reach during the 
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year is subject to its control. To reinforce this claim, the administration produced a map 
which delineated flooded forest from the surrounding areas.  
Figure 9: Map of floating rice area based on local customary knowledge 
 
Figure 10: Map of FiA representing the local space  
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Meanwhile, agents from PDoE claimed that they had a joint jurisdiction over the Tonle 
Sap flood plain due its status as protected forest. In the early 1990’s they began a 
nationwide forest protection campaign with the popular slogan ‘cutting down trees is 
destroying the environment’. They particularly focused the efforts of this campaign on the 
Tonle Sap basin. PDoE agents actively administered fines to all those who were found 
cutting trees within the area.  
 The territorial claims from these two agencies transformed the Tonle Sap flood 
plain from being a site of resource management and conservation, to a site of struggle 
between local floating rice farmers who wish to re-cultivate their land, and state agents 
from PDoE and FiA who wanted to expand rent seeking activities. With the creation of the 
map from FiA which delimited the flooded forest area, floating rice cultivation effectively 
lost its status as a legitimate land use, where it was incorporated into the fish spawning 
area of the lake which required strict protection. Parallel to the production of this map, a 
discourse emerged from state departments which portrayed local farmers as the destroyers 
of flooded forest. On the basis of these official maps, the FiA began to apprehend any rice 
farmers who cleared vegetation in the basin. Government agents began to refer to these 
farmers using derogatory titles such chun kel koch6and chun bam plang phrey lectek7
 Starting from 2006, FiA staff frequented the area, and armed with their map of the 
flooded forest, threatened to arrest anyone caught farming in the area. According to 
floating rice farmers in the case study area, farmers could not openly cultivate their land, as 
anyone caught clearing vegetation in the Tonle Sap flood plain, faced charges of 
destroying protected forest. In 2009, FiA, on two occasions, managed to seize two tractors 
which were involved in ploughing floating rice fields. The tractors were taken to FiA 
headquarter in Pursat, and the owners were fined 1500US dollars each. It was reported 
later that the tractors were released on receiving an additional payment of 1500 US dollars 
for each tractor. The threat of being arrested and having tractors impounded caused a 
. Such 
terms frame farmers as being guilty of destroying common resources, which has led the 
public to interpret those farmers as being responsible for the decreasing fish stocks in the 
Tonle Sap lake.   
                                                     
6 Chun kel koch is a Khmer term which literally means bad citizen.  The term comes to be used to refer to 
those who smuggle timber or those who steal state assets. Increasingly, the term now suggest involvement 
with criminal activities. 
7Chunbamplang phrey lectek literally means people, who encroach the flooded forest. 
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general fear among floating rice farmers in the province. The majority of them henceforth 
decided to leave their land uncultivated, which resulted in Pursat lagging behind other 
provinces in terms of the re-cultivation of floating rice areas.  
Based on field observations, only an estimated 250 hectares of floating rice in the 
commune was under cultivation in 2010. This left 550 hectares as vegetation. Meanwhile, 
local farmers struggled to escape from state produced narratives which portrayed them as 
forest destroyers. As will be further described below, these narratives fit neatly into the 
state’s new found environmental concerns.  
The Rise of Environmentalism 
A distinct discourse on environmental protection, which centres around the Tonle Sap lake, 
can be seen to have emerged within Cambodia over the last decade. By the late 1990’s it 
was widely recognised within government circles that the Tonle Sap lake holds important 
bio-diversity values, and that it was under serious threat. In October 1997, the government 
nominated the lake as a biosphere reserve under the UNESCO program of Man and 
Biosphere, which recognises the interconnection between ecology, society and the 
economy. The nomination paved the way for the establishment, in 2001, of a new 
government body which would provide advice on the lake - the Tonle Sap Biosphere 
Reserve Secretariat. In line with UNESCOs efforts, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
launched an environmental project known as the Tonle Sap Initiative. It provided technical 
assistance to determine the state of the Tonle Sap environment which resulted in awareness 
for the need to establish a basin-wide management organization. In 2002, the ADB 
provided technical assistance for the Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project 
(TSEMP), which was to be carried out by the Cambodia National Mekong Committee 
(CNMC). The first stage of the program was to carry out an environmental and social 
assessment of the lake’s ecological health and management. The project findings suggested 
that the main challenges to the lake’s sustainable management was over exploitation of the 
lake’s resources and a lack of coordination among the different concerned agencies. The 
report led to the conclusion that sustainable management of the lake could only be 
achieved through a basin-wide approach.  
 Meanwhile, according to a report by ADB, CNMC faced severe coordination 
problems (Sokhem & Sunada, 2006). In carrying out the TSEMP, CNMC had recruited 10 
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ministries as members. But it was not possible to foster collaboration among them due to 
problems of institutional rigidity and rivalry. In 2003 the ADB introduced the Tonle Sap 
Basin Strategy, a project which attempted to ameliorate some of these issues. The first 
project report led to the realisation that there needed to be greater coordination in 
development planning, and in the extraction of resources in the basin. The report 
recommended an “integrated, cross-sector, cross-boundary, and multi-disciplinary 
institutional framework that operates at the basin level” (Asian Development Bank, 
2003:2).  The report called for a basin organization to be established to serve as a forum for 
concerned state agencies to meet, plan and coordinate their activities. In 2006, with 
funding from ADB, an organization called the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization 
(TSBMO) was established (Asian Development Bank, 2006). TSBMO was set to be 
chaired by MOWRAM with MAFF, MOE, Ministry of Industry Mines and Energy 
(MIME) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) as members.  
 It appeared as if the ADB has successfully engineered a solution to the previously 
mentioned problems by recommending a basin-wide management approach. The concept 
of basin-wide management implies integration of all interests, including conservation and 
development. As Mitchell (2005) writes, the concept of a biosphere reserve emphasises 
both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. In line with this thinking, 
local human activities and material development cannot be separated spatially and 
economically from underlying conservation ideals.  
 However, the rise of environmental concerns emanating from the state resulted in 
an awareness of the lake’s important biodiversity values, yet without any substantial efforts 
to address the factors which were negatively impacting the lakes biodiversity. The ADB 
project stalled as the newly created basin organization was paralyzed due to institutional 
rivalry as different ministries and line departments were fighting to maintain control over 
their jurisdictions and the benefits that flowed from them (Middleton, 2005; Sokhem & 
Sunada, 2006). In addition, as Middleton (2005) argues, the TSMO faced tough challenges 
from line departments and local authorities who saw an integrated approach as a threat to 
their ability to extract revenues. Within the Tonle Sap flood plain itself, the destruction of 
flooded forest in Kampong Thom and Siem Reap Continued unabated. This produced a 
nationwide discourse that saw the Tonle Sap in environmental crisis.  
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The Discourse of Environmental Crisis in Tonle Sap Areas 
The territorial claims of the PDoE and the FiA did not evenly affect rice farmers in the 
Tonle Sap area. While their presence prevented floating rice farmers from re-claiming and 
re-cultivating their land in the study commune in Pursat, PDoE and FiA agents in 
Kampong Thom and Siem Reap province were less active, making it possible for local 
farmers to reclaim their floating rice land. By 2006, all floating rice land in Kampong 
Thom and Siem Reap had been reclaimed and was under dry season rice cultivation, which 
was made possible by the development of retention reservoirs.   
 In addition, local farmers in these two provinces discovered that the retention 
reservoirs did not just provide water to irrigate dry season rice, but also to trap fish. At the 
end of the cultivation season, the water level in the reservoirs runs low, and the owners 
discovered that the reservoirs trapped significant quantities of fish. Fish species of the 
Tonle Sap are known to follow the expansion and retreat of flood waters. Just before the 
flood water recedes, the farmers stuff tree branches in the reservoirs to lure the fish to stay 
behind. At the end of the irrigation season, farmers harvest the fish from the reservoirs. 
Thus, starting from 2005, most of the retention reservoir owners tried to expand their profit 
by focusing on both dry season rice farming and fish harvesting. 
 Large increases in rice productivity, and the additional revenue from fish catch in 
the reservoir, attracted the attention of wealthy and powerful investors. Starting from 2006, 
high ranking government officials, from provincial governors to the head of the national 
military police, came with heavy machinery to clear flooded forest on a large scale. They 
then set up retention reservoirs for dry season farming and fish exploitation. Each project 
on average occupied an area of up to 500 hectares (Kemrith, 2010). The clearing 
represented a gross violation of the informal and formal boundaries which had been 
established between the floating rice area and the flooded forest. The result was 
widespread destruction of the flooded forest.  But due to the involvement of powerful 
interests in these activities, no known formal action was taken by either local state agents 
nor from MAFF, MOWRAM, FiA and MoE who all claimed responsibility for managing 
the Tonle Sap area.  
 The rise of the discourse of environmental destruction in the lake took place amid 
growing contestations amongst state agencies. The revenue extracted from fish catch and 
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dry season rice cultivation, led to wrangling between the different agencies as to who had 
the jurisdiction to manage these revenues. This led to tensions between MAFF (which FiA 
is a part of), and MOWRAM. MOWRAM is in charge of water extraction while fishery 
related matters fall under the responsibility of FiA. So the control of taxes and unofficial 
revenues from these activities caused deep rivalries. The revenue from fish extraction, 
where reservoir owners received licenses to operate from MOWRAM, was seen by FiA as 
a loss of revenue share. Meanwhile, fishery authorities were under pressure from fishing-
lot operators to do something about the large numbers of fish being caught in retention 
reservoirs. They alleged that the catching of fish in those reservoirs had resulted in a 
dramatic decrease in fish stocks in the Tonle Sap lake, which reduced their ability to 
harvest fish over the long term. But because of the powerful interests behind these 
reservoir fishing enterprises, no state agency took any action. 
 This concern over decreasing fish stocks in the lake, together with concerns over 
the destruction of the flooded forest, stirred up a national discourse of environmental crisis 
in Tonle Sap area, and prompted the Prime Minister to issue an executive order to 
demarcate the boundary line between the flooded forest and floating rice areas. The 
following section explains how the order was interpreted and implemented.   
The Prime Minister’s Order 
In response to the public outcry over depleted fish stocks and deforestation in the Tonle 
Sap areas, the PM intervened by way of issuing an executive order. In a series of public 
speeches (some of which went for up to three hours),  the PM called on all concerned state 
agencies to cooperate to clearly demarcate the boundary line between the flooded forest 
and the floating rice area in the Tonle Sap flood plain.  
 Analysis of the PM’s speeches, in which he gave the order to demarcate the Tonle 
Sap areas, suggests that the message was unclear, with an emphasis that oscillated between 
conservation and development. In the first wave of his televised speeches, a balance was 
struck between forest protection, and the needs of rice farmers: 
 
 … mark the boundary line clearly so that people know where is the farmland and 
 where is the forest area…This will make it easy for them [farmers] to carry out 
their farming activities.. .. But once there is a clear line, anybody, no matter how 
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big, still continuing to clear [beyond the line] will be in trouble with me. [Prime 
Ministers speech, 5February 2010] 
 
This suggests that although his main message was to protect the forest in the flood plain, 
there was an acknowledgement of the need for agricultural development, particularly for 
the rice growing communities in the area.  
 However, in the second wave of televised speeches, the PM’s position evolved, and 
his message placed more emphasis on conservation. In a later series of televised speeches, 
the PM no longer mentioned development, but only emphasised the need for forest 
protection to take the utmost priority:  
I cannot let Tonle Sap disappear under my leadership….Our ancestors have left it 
for us, so we have to take necessary action to preserve it… I don’t want to be 
condemned by history. .. Our fish depend on those forests and I warn you [those 
who clear flooded forest], even if you get [rice yield of] 50 tonnes per hectare, I 
will not let you grow dry season rice. Anybody affected [by the demarcation] had 
better stay away, if you are smart. [Prime Minister’s, speech, 6 April 2010] 
The PM’s emphasis on forest protection, and the forcefulness with which he spoke of the 
need to demarcate the boundary line between the flooded forest and the floating rice area, 
put land demarcation in the Tonle Sap as a national priority.  
Emerging Actors and Assignment of Responsibilities 
The new discourse of environmental crisis in the Tonle Sap lake solidified into a multi-
ministerial body which included ten government ministries in the governance of the Tonle 
Sap lake. However, in response to the PM’s order to demarcate the boundary line between 
flooded forest area and floating rice area, the Ministry of Water Resource and Meteorology 
(MOWRAM) positioned itself to become the main actor and implementer of the order. 
 Firstly, the introduction of the Water Law in 2005 effectively placed MOWRAM as 
the most important actor in terms of the governance of the Tonle Sap basin. The law has 
three important provisions: (1) all rivers, ponds and lakes within the Cambodia’s national 
boundary belongs to the state; and (2) MOWRAM is the one state agency that is entrusted 
with the  management of all water-related issues; and (3) all water extractions are subject 
to regulation by the state, i.e. MOWRAM. Individuals have to apply for water licenses to 
use water either for agricultural or industrial purposes. These provisions further legitimize 
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MOWRAM as an important actor in regulating floating rice cultivation and irrigation use. 
As the main area of floating rice is situated in the Tonle Sap flood plain, this area by law 
comes under the jurisdiction of MOWRAM.  
 Secondly, MOWRAM was personally assigned by the PM as the agency to 
implement his orders. Although ‘cooperation among all concerned agencies’ was 
mentioned during speeches, the PM would often specifically turn to the accompanying 
minister of MOWRAM during a speech, and command him to ‘go do it’. This was 
interpreted by many to mean that MOWRAM was the legitimate leading agency of all 
Tonle Sap related initiatives. All state officials interviewed during fieldwork saw 
MOWRAM as being the main agency that had been personally entrusted by the PM, to 
carry out all Tonle Sap related projects. Staff members of provincial departments described 
MOWRAM as being given a king’s sword - a Khmer idiomatic expression which means 
un-rivaled legitimate authority to act on a matter.  
 The minister of MOWRAM also acts as the chairman of another state body known 
as the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA), which is another notable actor. Being the 
successor of TSMO, TSBA was established in 2007 to specifically help ensure sustainable 
management of the Tonle Sap Basin by coordinating all development activities that take 
place in the basin. Its mission statement outlines that TSBA has the role and responsibility 
for facilitating development initiatives, coordinating planning, and monitoring 
development activities that take place in the Tonle Sap Basin. That is, it would serve as a 
forum where all stakeholders could come together to discuss, plan and coordinate their 
activities in the basin. But, TBSA claims in its mission statement that it does not hold any 
executive power.  
 However, the word authority in Khmer - Amnaight, connotes a sense of 
monopolistic power in a particular jurisdiction. The TSBA mutated itself to holding greater 
power than its former TSBMO. It added to its mission statement a broad but significant 
addition - TBSA is to ‘carry out tasks as assigned by the government’. The inclusion of 
this clause effectively displaces all previous statements concerning facilitation and 
coordination, and it serves to justify TBSA control of all activities. Meanwhile, there was a 
wave of staff reshuffling and purging where liberal-minded bureaucrats were replaced by 
those connected to, and submissive to the new chairman, who was the nephew of the 
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minister of MOWRAM. This created a strong patrimonial bond between TBSA and 
MOWRAM which extended from the PM, who had close personal relations with the 
minister of MOWRAM, down to the head of TSBA who was related to the minister. This 
is a strong example of the way in which government agencies seek to gain control over 
territories through patrimonial bonds, rather than through bureaucratically defined rules 
and functions. 
State’s Response to the Prime Minister’s Order 
Initially it was not clear how the demarcation was to be done. In all of the PM’s speeches 
concerning the demarcation, he only use the phrase ‘place the boundary pole’ (bos bangkol 
prom), but never elaborated on how the boundary line was to be drawn. The vagueness of 
the PM’s order left room for interpretations by lower level state implementers. Interviews 
suggest that MOWRAM and TSBA responded to the PM’s order in two ways. Firstly, 
MOWRAM and TSBA established a commission made up jointly of MOWRAM, MAFF 
and FiA, accompanied by police and military police. The joint commission was to oversee 
the demolition of illegal retention reservoirs built in flooded forest areas while also making 
technical assessments of the potential impact of retention reservoirs on fish migration. The 
commission would then report back to MOWRAM with a recommendation as to what to 
do about these reservoirs, which are mostly located in the provinces of Siem Reap and 
Kampong Thom. The establishment of the commission with its power to decide the fate of 
the retention reservoirs created potential rent seeking opportunities for MOWRAM and 
TSBA8
                                                     
8This is based on a private discussion with a retention reservoir owner in Kampong Thom province in 2010. 
The reservoir concerned was believed to be located in an area classified as a floating rice area, but the 
actual demarcation pole did not then exist on the ground, making the owner feel uncertain about the 
assessment decision of the commission. At the time of the discussion, the owner revealed that he had to, 
and he did, prepare to pay a bribe to secure the legal status of his reservoir. 
.  However, over time the joint commission was gradually replaced by MOWRAM 
and TSBA. At the national level, the working team of the commission consisted solely of 
staff from MOWRAM and TBSA, while other state agencies kept clear of what they were 
told was  MOWRAM’s and TBSA’s  ‘ technical matter’. Both agencies had full support 
from the PM, whose executive power rules above the state. Based on interviews with state 
officials, an agent’s proximity to the PM is one of the most important factors which define 
his influence. Thus, the fact that the Minister of MOWRAM is the PM’s close confidant 
serves as a powerful reminder to other state officials to stay clear of MOWRAM activities. 
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The idea was that MOWRAM was assigned as the PM’s special envoy on the matter, and 
for that it is endowed with power beyond its normal institutional jurisdiction.  
 MOWRAM and TSBA began to align all their actions with the speeches of the PM. 
They aggressively began to implement demarcation policies under the banner of ‘the wise 
leadership of Samdec9
                                                     
9Samdec is royal Khmer prefix which denotes royal power. 
 Hun Sen’. Typical of a neo-patrimonial state, the use of the leaders’ 
name is observed to be effective not only in protecting individuals from institutional 
entanglement, but landing them the legitimacy to impede into the institutional territory of 
other agencies. By August 2010, the act of demolishing illegal reservoirs was fully under 
way. MOWRAM and TSBA also responded to the PM’s order to demarcate the area by 
producing a new map of the protected area. 
 Second, MOWRAM and TSBA responded to the PM’s order with the creation of a 
new map of the Tonle Sap basin. At the national level, MOWRAM claimed that the new 
map was made with reference to satellite images of land use in the Tonle Sap flood plain 
taken in 2005, and was done in a participatory process, in which all actors concerned fully 
participated. However, the reality at the provincial and local levels was different from the 
impression TSBA and MORAM gave at the national level. Interviews showed that none of 
the potentially affected people, or the concerned state agencies at the provincial and local 
levels, was involved in the making of this new map. None of the staff members at the 
provincial departments interviewed knew what the map looked like, or who made it. Local 
farmers and local commune and villages chiefs were completely excluded from the process 
of making this new map. Local farmers and local authorities interviewed were aware of the 
new map only through rumor and guesswork. Some thought that the new map was based 
on the map of the Tonle Sap made during the French colonial period. Others claimed that it 
was based on aerial images of the lake taken in 2005. However, it was impossible to 
confirm these claims. Interviews also suggested that none of the officials at either 
provincial or local levels, nor local farmers, were aware of the impact of the new map on 
local floating rice growing areas.  
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Figure 11: New map of Tonle Sap areas
 
Prior to the PM’s order, a map that showed the different zones and land uses in the Tonle 
Sap flood plain had been in use among NGOs, donors such as the ADB, and government 
agencies including MOWRAM. 
Figure 12: The old map of Tonle Sap areas
 
 
In this map the water body of the lake is represented by the pale blue area in the middle. Flooded forest is represented by an light green 
shade with a more or less straight line separating it from floating rice and residential areas. This is a map of what was supposed to be the 
old boundary demarcation.  Posted on MOWRAM’s website up until 2008, this map recognised the old boundary line and the existence 
of floating rice areas in the study commune. The map was removed from the website in the wake of the new map. Meanwhile, the new 
map is not available to the public.  
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In the wake of the PM’s order, this map was removed from MOWRAMs website and 
ceased to be available to the public.  
 A number of factors can explain why the map was re-created at this particular time. 
Firstly, the character traits of the minister can go a long way in explaining events. With his 
particular brand of environmental idealism, coupled with an unstoppable confidence in his 
own abilities to rectify the problems of the Tonle Sap, a particular emphasis was placed on 
the rapid production of a demarcation map. Following the order of the PM to clearly 
demarcate the boundary line between the floating rice and flooded forest area, the minister 
of MOWRAM only spoke of the environmental and ecological significance of flooded 
forest, and without consultation or debate, he declared that 645,800 hectares10
Asian Development Bank (2005b
 of flooded 
forest had to be protected. According to the ), the area of 
flooded forest was 795,000 hectares in 1985, but by 1992 only 370,000 hectares remained 
due to a range of reasons including those described in Chapter IV. The desire of the 
minister of MOWRAM to protect 645,800 hectares of flooded forest failed to take into 
consideration what had already happened over the previous 15 years. 
 Another factor in the maps’ production has to do with the weak nature of state 
institutions. With the minister determining the size of the area to be protected at 645,800 
hectares, TSBA’s cartographers had to make a map to support these territorial claims. As 
mentioned earlier, in the two provinces of Siem Reap and Kampong Thom, powerful 
interests were involved in dry season rice farming which involved the conversion of 
flooded forest into agricultural land. The map makers also had to accommodate these 
interests. Thus in making a map of the area, the cartographers shifted the protected area 
southward, effectively representing large sections of the floating rice area in Pursat as 
protected forest.  
 The third important factor concerned the distance between the cartographers and 
local lived space. Interviews suggested that the map was made by central state agents in 
Phnom Penh who had no working knowledge of the locality. This is reflected in an 
interview with one of the former staff member of TSBA.  
                                                     
10This figure varies between 640,000 hectares and 645,800 hectares. For example, the Minister of 
MOWRAM was quoted by Kohsantepheap Daily on 8 June as saying 640,000 hectares, while in a press 
conference, the figure was given as 645,800 hectares. 
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For them [TSBA staff], the shifting of the map is nothing more than a slight shift in 
the green shade in relation to the country map, and on their computer screen in 
Phnom Penh the shift is so insignificant that it should not make much of a 
difference. They are so far removed from the local that they have no idea of how 
hurtful it could be to lose the farmland like that. To them it is just a piece of land. 
[Interview with a former TSBA staff, Phnom Penh, 24 March 2011]  
According to the new map, the area known by customary knowledge as floating rice 
effectively became a part of the protected area of the flooded forest of the Tonle Sap flood 
plain. For Pursat province, some 50 percent of its floating rice area was represented as 
flooded forest. At the commune level, the new map resulted in an estimated loss of 864 
meters in width of the commune’s floating rice area.  
Figure 13: New boundary line based on the new map  
 
Pole-Placing Phase I 
When it actually came to implementation of the PM’s directives, MOWRAM and TSBA 
hastily rolled out a demarcation project in all provinces surrounding the Tonle Sap lake, 
but which was done in accordance with their own political objectives. To show that they 
fully complied with the PM’s order, MOWRAM and TSBA pushed for the demarcation to 
be completed within an exceptionally short period of time. After the new map was made, 
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MOWRAM and TSBA assigned the task of field demarcation to a group of surveyors and 
local authorities.  It was their job to place physical boundary poles, using GPS navigational 
equipment, at the boundary points which had been marked on the map.  
 But on the ground, the demarcation team faced many barriers. The first barrier they 
faced was the weather. The PM’s order was televised at the beginning of the monsoon 
season. MOWRAM and TSBA, wasted no time and within weeks had assembled the field 
demarcation team and started deploying them. However, when the team arrived in the 
commune, the Tonle Sap flood waters had already reached the area to be demarcated, 
making it extremely difficult for the team to access the area. On 18 July 2010,  a 
demarcation team consisting of officials from MOWRAM, PDOWRAM, PDoE and FiA 
accompanied by two armed guards, in a hit-and-run manner, placed poles 43A and 43B at 
the end of the village road in the study commune, just at the beginning of the floating rice 
area. The positions of these two poles, was not based on an accurate translation of the 
MOWRAM map into on-the-ground boundaries, but simply involved placing boundary 
poles in the closest area to the identified map points that the team could easily reach during 
this period of flooding.  
The demarcation team drove their pick-up trucks as far as they could, got off and 
placed the two poles. But you can’t go far when the area is flooded like this! 
[Interview with a local farmer who witnessed the demarcation, Pursat, 10 
February 2011]    
The MOWRAM map already represented a 50 percent reduction of floating rice land in the 
commune, yet the actual demarcation process, resulted in an even greater loss. The 
positions of poles 43A and 43B saw an additional loss of 97 meters in width, making for a 
total loss of 971 meters in width of the floating rice area in the commune since 2008.  
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Figure 14: Map of pole 43A
 
 The manner in which poles 43A and 43B were placed deeply contrasted with the 
impression that MOWRAM and TSBA gave out during national seminars and speeches.  
They went to great lengths to emphasise that the project was seamlessly progressing 
according to the logic of a rational and bureaucratic mode of natural resource governance.  
They were also quick to boast of the high degree of cooperation between all levels of 
government, and the exceptional participation of local farmers. Interviews however 
suggested that there was no form of public consultation, or even announcement of the 
project. None of the local authorities was aware of the placing of the poles. Local 
authorities only knew of the presence of the boundary poles after they were placed. Field 
agents who were part of the demarcation team also took advantage of the fact that they 
were accompanied by armed military police. During Phase I of pole-placing, the 
demarcation team threatened to arrest any local farmers who tried to challenge the position 
of pole 43A and 43 b. One of the local farmers interviewed who was among a few present 
at the scene, had passively protested against the new position of the boundary poles. 
However, his protest was met with the threat of being handcuffed, arrested and jailed.    
 Such threats went beyond just local farmers where commune chiefs and village 
chiefs were also threatened with arrest if they did not give their utmost cooperation. The 
chief of the study commune, who had openly voiced his opposition to the placement of the 
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poles, was met with the threat of being handcuffed and jailed. At the same time, rumors 
were circulating in the villages that police were looking for, and ready to arrest those who 
tried to organise any form of protest. The threat of arrest, whether real or rumored, had 
created a general understanding amongst local farmers that they should not protect against 
the project.  
 In the aftermath of the pole placing, there was no apparent reaction or objection 
from local authorities. Form a technical point of view, the local government saw the 
demarcation project as an area of pure technical expertise that only MOWRAM and TSBA 
were capable of implementing. Politically, local authorities knew that they did not stand a 
chance of challenging the decisions of MOWRAM and TSBA, especially as the closeness 
between the minister of MOWRAM and the PM was well known. Local officials clearly 
understood that refusing to give way to MOWRAM and TSBA is not politically wise, as it 
could easily be interpreted as opposing or defying the orders of the PM. With MOWRAM 
and TSBA acting together in unison, without opposition from other ministries, they were 
largely unconstrained in their activities. The fact that the minister of MOWRAM had 
special access to the PM added to the perception that the demarcation was supported by 
powerful backers. This perception is captured in the quote below. 
 That guy [the minister of MOWRAM]…. is very dangerous. You have to be careful 
before you want to do anything. If he is happy, you may be ok. If he is not, he can 
just go straight to the Prime Minister, and who knows what he would say. Then just 
a phone call from the Prime Minister, I can be kicked out of my office. [Interview 
with the governor Pursat, Pursat, 20 March 2012] 
Local authorities such as the district, commune and village chiefs had intimate knowledge 
of the physical layout of their local jurisdictions, but had been denied access to information 
about the new map, nor had they been included in any part of the demarcation process.  
 As for local farmers, there were no significant public reactions. Despite talk of the 
need to demarcate the area, local farmers had never been a part of the map preparation 
process, nor did they ever see the new map, or have any knowledge of the demarcation 
project prior to its implementation. Farmers were not only denied information, but were 
also denied an opportunity to react to the position of the boundary poles as the demarcation 
team carried out their task of placing the concrete pole on the ground in a secretive manner. 
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Only a few villagers happened to be present at the time the poles were placed, and they 
were threatened with jail terms for displaying their objection to the placement of the poles.  
 Even when news of the new boundary poles began to spread in the villages, there 
was no substantial reaction from concerned farmers who were of the opinion that the 
presence of the new poles was not going to affect the status of their land, due to their long 
history of cultivating the area. ‘Nobody is going to take this land [floating rice land]. It has 
always been farmland, and besides what would they do with it?’ [Interview with a female 
farmer, Pursat, 20 February 2011]. In addition, the commune and village chiefs had been 
assuring local farmers that their land was going to be unaffected by the demarcation project 
regardless of where the new poles were placed. 
 Elsewhere in Cambodia, the placement of boundary poles within farming land had 
sparked a strong negative reaction from local farmers. For instance in Battambong 
province, floating rice farmers who were affected by the shifting boundary line organised a 
public gathering and demanded that the local governor returned their land to them. 
Repeated confrontations and antagonisms between farmers and local authorities were 
eventually picked up by the media. Although those in charge of the project at both 
provincial and national levels attempted to prevent these problematic aspects of the project 
from reaching their superiors – as is often the case within the hierarchical system of project 
implementation in Cambodia, news of these events eventually made its way to the PM. 
This sparked the second phase of the demarcation project.  
The Prime Minister’s Renewed Order 
In a televised speech on 12 August 2010, the PM expressed his disappointment over the 
news that the demarcation had enclosed local farmland. His disappointment can be 
captured by a phrase he employed during his speech, in which he said, ‘kom tveu oy…kom 
roch oy chav”. This is a common Khmer phrase meaning ‘you either do nothing as your 
supposed to, or you over do it and ruin everything’. In a speech that lasted almost an hour, 
the PM issued a new order which contained two main messages concerning the 
demarcation of the Tonle Sap flooded forest area. First, the PM called for immediate action 
to ensure the hasty completion of the demarcation in all six provinces around the Tonle 
Sap. He also called on all concerned state agencies to cooperate closely with one another in 
carrying out the task of demarcation. Secondly, the PM emphasised the need for 
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development within those communities that are located in the protected area. It is worth 
quoting him at length here: 
We need to preserve the forest, but we don’t do it to the point where the local 
farmers lose their land…Don’t place the poles in a way that results in the boundary 
line going through their [local farmers’] land . .. Draw the boundary line in 
accordance with the real condition of local land use… Draw the line around the 
existing farmland… Don’t place the pole in the middle of the farmers’ farmland.  
[Prime Minister’s, speech, Phnom Penh, 12 August 2010] 
The PM’s order to respect existing farmland had two implications. Firstly, MOWRAM and 
TSBA were no longer the sole agencies in charge of the demarcation matter -they now had 
to work with other state agencies particularly local authorities, who were familiar with the 
local landscape. Secondly, the order to respect existing farmland reduces the power of 
planners and technocrats to represent the space of the Tonle Sap basin however they 
wanted. Field officials were officially given some flexibility and discretionary power to 
adapt the position of the poles in accordance with the actual land uses and characteristics 
of the local landscape. 
 However, once again, the PM’s revised order came out when all of the Tonle Sap 
flood plain was fully submerged under flood waters. Thus, the demarcation project was 
postponed until after the flood waters had retreated. MOWRAM announced that the 
demarcation would resume in May of 2010. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described how floating rice cultivation in the case study commune has 
been embroiled in the messy politics of the post-war, neo-patrimonial, Cambodian state. In 
doing so, this chapter has showed the clashes in the ways the space of Tonle Sap is viewed 
by different groups. It reveals that despite its rich history of cultivation and prolonged 
experience and human existence, Tonle Sap space is viewed by the state, at large, as 
abstract space free of human existence. This view allows the state to represent Tonle Sap 
as homogeneous space of protected flooded forest. The chapter has showed that the state 
depends on its claim of legitimate authority in resource governance to dictate a certain 
environmental policy, whose implementation reflects an instance of territorial strategy. It 
has showed that such modern state institutional actors as MOWRAM, TSBA, PDoE and 
FiA materialised the power of the state and attempted to impose a new regime of control 
over the space of Tonle Sap through a process of territorialised resource governance. In 
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doing so, they depend on the power of maps to legitimise their territorial claims in ways 
that support Baudrillard’s (1997) point of maps preceding territories. 
 This chapter has also showed that the process in which the lived space of Tonle Sap 
gets displaced by the representational space as imagined by the state is subject of a 
complex web of power. It shows that hierarchical personalised networks have been the 
most important factor for determining which actors are involved in a particular state’s 
project, and with what authority they can act, rather than non-personalised rules and formal 
policies. Actors used these networks to shield their activities from public and state scrutiny 
which allowed them to continue unabated in benefit extraction from within their territories.  
Based on field work from within the case study commune, it was shown that the state not 
only lacked the institutional capacity to assist farmers with the adoption of new farming 
techniques, but also hindered rice cultivation practices in the flood plain of the Tonle Sap 
lake. This was mainly due to the problem of a failure to assign clear roles and 
responsibilities at the national level, which opened opportunities for rent seeking at the 
lower levels. The chapter also showed how the discourse of environmentalism was 
captured by patrimonial interests, which used the logic of bureaucratic natural resource 
governance to legitimise operations and activities which were primarily concerned with 
consolidating power. The chapter also showed how weak state institutions resulted in 
uneven agricultural development. Here, floating rice cultivation was heavily restricted in 
the politically unimportant case study commune, while expanding in the much more 
politically important areas of Kompong Thom and Siem Reap.      
 The resultant destruction of the flooded forest caused public concerns for the future 
of the Tonle Sap fishery, and created an opportunity for the PM to intervene by way of 
issuing an executive order which detailed a demarcation program. The PM dictated what 
was to be done and assigned the task to specific actors. In this particular case, the PM 
called on all concerned state agencies to cooperate in clearly demarcating the boundary line 
between the two contested zones. This chapter showed that state policies are not created 
through democratic means, nor do they go through democratic processes of consultation, 
debate and scrutiny. Rather state policies are created by the PM in an impromptu manner, 
resulting in broad policies with unclear plans. In the case of land demarcation, the PM 
strongly emphasised the need to demarcate the boundary line between floating rice land 
and flooded forest land. However, it was not clearly defined how the demarcation was to 
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be carried out. The problem of unclear state policy is coupled with the problem of neo-
patrimonialism where public duties are not defined purely by Weberian bureaucratic 
principles of employing state agents with technical qualifications, but through patron-client 
networks. Field research showed that the task of demarcating the boundary line was 
assigned by the PM directly to the minister of MOWRAM based on personal ties.    
 Finally, this chapter showed that within a neo-patrimonial state, the hierarchical 
manner in which state policies flow, and the manner in which responsibilities are assigned, 
leaves significant room for interpretation by implementing agents. Field agents represent a 
crucial link for understanding how state power is actualised. Policy outcomes are largely 
dependent on the way in which street level bureaucrats inject their own political and 
economic incentives into their day to day work. When that happens, there are no formal 
mechanisms which allow citizens to hold state agents accountable for their actions. 
Solutions to public problems tend to occur through informal mechanisms which are based 
on patron-client relations. For example, in the case of farmers in Battambong who 
protested against the loss of their floating rice land, it was ultimately the sympathy that the 
PM afforded them, rather than any formal mechanism, which rectified the situation.  But 
this does not necessarily mean that the PM is in full control of state affairs. The next 
chapter will look at how the PM’s original order, and his subsequent demand to respect 
farming land, was translated into action at the village level by state agents. 
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Chapter VI: Ground Level Implementation 
 
 
The previous chapter showed that the PM had dictated a state policy to demarcate the area 
of flooded forest and floating rice. In his order, the PM emphasised the need to protect 
flooded forest by drawing a clear line of demarcation between the forest area and the 
floating rice area. He also made clear the need to respect the exiting floating rice land, 
instructing agents in charge to make sure that the boundary line goes around, and not 
through local farmland.  
 This chapter looks at how on the ground implementation of the demarcation 
differed from the PM’s original intentions. During field research, the researcher had the 
rare opportunity to directly observe interactions between state agents and local farmers as 
they occurred in the case study commune. This chapter presents these observations and 
tries to give a picture of the way in which the central state is represented by the 
demarcation team.   
 To that aim, this chapter follows the process of policy implementation, and it pays 
particular attention to two events: the pre-demarcation meetings, and the actual 
demarcation. These two events shed light on the process of power distribution within the 
Cambodian state, and provide an understanding of what accounts for the difference 
between the central state’s policy intentions, and actual implementation at the local level.  
The Meeting 
Unlike pole-placing phase I, pole-placing phase II was preceded by a meeting at the 
provincial office. Based on field interviews with government agents, it appeared that the 
aim of the meeting was to ensure that mistakes made in the first phase of pole-placing 
would be avoided. This created an impression that pole-placing phase II would be a more 
inclusive process where local actors would be allowed to participate in the decision making 
process. Another aim of the meeting was to exchange information between the 
demarcation team and local authorities, who were familiar with the local landscape. These 
aims had widespread political support as they were seen as the corollary of the PM’s order 
to ensure ‘cooperation’ between all relevant actors.   
109 
 
 However, interviews with those who participated in the meeting revealed that 
MOWRAM and TSBA were more concerned about giving an impression of inclusiveness, 
rather than actually succeeding any decision making power to other actors. On the 25 
February 2011, the provincial governor and concerned line departments, including 
PDOWRAM, PDoE, PDAFF and FiA, were asked to attend a meeting in the provincial 
office of Pursat. Also present at the meeting were local authorities, which included 
commune chiefs from all concerned communes. In the meeting, the demarcation team 
leader gave instructions to the local government agents on how the demarcation was to be 
carried out in the province. According to the commune chief, the central state agents 
briefed the participants on the demarcation plan, which had already been prepared in 
advance.  
We were not asked about our local landscape. We were just told about how the 
demarcation would proceed. He [the demarcation team leader] told us that the team 
will contact us when the demarcation reaches our area and that on that day we need 
to help carry food for the demarcation team. [Interview with commune chief, Pursat, 
1 March 2011]    
Contrary to the expectation that local authorities would be asked for information on the 
physical characteristics of land within their communes for accurate map making, the 
meeting was a forum where central state agents simply gave out orders to line departments 
and local authorities. 
The Demarcation 
Late in the afternoon On 7 March 2011, the chief of Srie Sadok commune received a phone 
call from PDOWRAM staff informing him that the demarcation was set to take place in his 
commune the next day.  March 8th, however, is international women’s day and a public 
holiday. State officials are required to not come into work, and working on such a day 
could be interpreted as defying state policy. But in the case of the demarcation, the 
commune chief had no choice but to comply with the central agent’s schedule.  
 On the morning of 8 March, 2011, the demarcation team arrived in the commune in 
three pick-up trucks and one home-made truck. The team consisted of officials from 
PDOWRAM, PDoE, PDAFF, FiA and two armed personnel, and it was led by an official 
from MOWRAM. The home-made truck was hired for carrying the concrete boundary 
poles.  As the group approached the target area, the team members left their pickup trucks 
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and they all got in to the pole-carrying truck in preparation for their trek to the would-be 
position of the boundary poles.  
 The commune chief joined the group on his motorbike, and his job was to lead the 
team to where they needed to go. That is, to find the position of pole 22. For that purpose, 
a GPS expert accompanied the commune chief who led the team off the main village road 
toward the end of the wet season rice area. At around 9 am, the GPS indicated that the 
team was approaching their destination. The GPS expert got off his motorbike and walked 
into a rice field. Soon after the GPS operator found the location where the pole was 
supposed to be placed, the team leader arrived in the pole-carrying truck and requested the 
rest of the team members cross check the position indicated by the expert, by making sure 
the position correlated to the location on their own GPS devices. As soon as the team 
members confirmed the position, the leader gave the order to dig and plant pole 22.  
 The position of pole 22 was even closer to the village area then those poles placed 
during Phase I, indicating an even bigger loss of floating rice for the commune. A group of 
around 15 villagers whose land was located in the contentious area had gathered at the 
demarcation site to witness the demarcation, but no one said anything as the demarcation 
team was protected by two men dressed in police and military uniforms armed with two 
assaults riffles.  
 After pole 22 was planted in the ground, the demarcation team asked the commune 
and village chiefs to sign a witnesses document, which they were reluctant to do but 
eventually did so. More on this point will be discussed in the next section. But before the 
demarcation team left the area, the team leader asked the local farmers to join in and take a 
group photo. His words are worth quoting in full here.  
Since everyone is here, let us stand around the pole for a group photo as evidence 
of our working together. This is a rare opportunity to be a part of the historic 
moment in the history of Tonle Sap protection, and you should be proud to be a 
part of it. [The demarcation team leader, Pursat, 8 March 2011] 
After 20 minutes, the team finished placing pole 22 and packed up all their tools in the 
truck, and left the area as if nothing of the unusual had happen. However, viewed in line 
with the concept of power as discussed in chapter II, the encounter reveals high levels of 
power relations both within the state and between the state and society.  
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Central State Policy and Local Implementation 
The manner in which pole 22 was placed shows a significant gap between the central 
government policy, and the conduct of field agents representing the state. The PM had 
called for a clear line of demarcation between the floating rice area, and the protected 
forest area. The main objective, as he puts it, is to protect the flooded forest, but he also 
emphasised the need to respect existing floating rice land. However, the field agents 
representing the central state carried out this policy to a different effect, as the positions of 
the boundary poles spelled the loss of significant amounts of floating rice land. Two of the 
poles placed in phase I, pole 43A and pole 43B are located somewhere in the middle of the 
floating rice area, marking the loss of half the floating rice land in the commune. In 
accordance with the new order to respect existing farmland, these two poles should have 
been moved 971 meters north so that the boundary line does not cut through existing 
floating rice land. But instead of correcting the position of the two poles, the field agents 
placed pole 22 in a way that moved the boundary line even further into the floating rice 
area. Pole 22 was just at the beginning of the floating rice area, spelling the loss of an even 
bigger area of floating rice in the commune compared to the poles placed in phase I.  
Figure 15: Map of pole 43A, 22 and 23
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The position of pole 22 placed the entire area of floating rice almost entirely within the 
protected area. Instead of the commune having an area of floating rice three kilometers in 
width, it now has a small strip of less than 500 meters. An estimated 580 ha of floating rice 
in the commune had become part of the new flooded forest area. This raises an important 
question of what constitutes a state, and which layer or layers matter the most in terms of 
state-society relation. 
Explaining the Differences 
The difference between the central policy of conserving nature and accommodating 
development in the flood plain of Tonle Sap, and the local implementation that resulted in 
the enclosure of floating rice area could be explained by the fact that the central state 
policy was not clearly defined, leaving room for individual interpretation. Two main points 
of the central state policy are worth analyzing here: cooperation between central and local 
authorities, and respect for existing farmland.   
 Interpreting Cooperation 
At the national level, the guidelines for demarcation emphasised the need for cooperation 
and involvement from all concerned state agencies, both at the national level and at the 
local. The emphasis on cooperation among all actors was aimed at empowering local 
authorities to take a greater role in the process to ensure fair representation of local 
interests. Commune chiefs and village chiefs have traditionally be the ones who authorise 
local land transactions. The PM’s instruction to respect existing farmland meant that the 
commune chiefs should have played a significant role in the demarcation process. 
 But according to empirical evidence collected from Pursat province, the agents 
representing the central state used the term ‘cooperation’ to ensure compliance from the 
provincial and local government. The term cooperation in Khmer sahaka, has two different 
meanings depending on who is using it. When central agents or state officials of superior 
status speak of cooperating with provincial or local officials, they mean that they engage 
local officials as assistants to provide logistical support. For instance, the central agent in 
charge of the demarcation, used the term ‘cooperation’ with local authorities to refer to the 
fact that he expected local authorities to attend briefings and to be present during 
demarcation. A quote from an official from PDOWRAM seems to capture this point: 
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 Local authorities …fully participate in this [demarcation] process… they were at 
the briefings and they accompanied us [demarcation team] everywhere we went. 
[Interview with a staff member of PDOWRAM, Pursat, 20 March 2011] 
But where lower level officials cooperate with officials of higher status, what is meant is 
that they display unconditional compliance with the ideas and orders of their superiors. 
Consequently, if a low level official were to disagree with his superiors, or to oppose him, 
he is said to be uncooperative. 
 In the case of demarcation, the term ‘cooperation’ was used against local 
authorities in three ways that undermined their ability to represent local interests. Firstly, 
local authorities were expected to be present at briefings and pay full attention to the 
instructions of team leaders. Prior to the demarcation, all local authorities were asked to 
attend a meeting in which they were briefed on how the demarcation would take place, and 
what was expected of local authorities. Any questions or suggestions concerning how the 
boundary line should be drawn, would be seen as obstructing the progress of the meeting, 
and hence interpreted as a sign of being uncooperative. Secondly, when the demarcation 
team marked the position of pole 22, local authorities were not expected to voice any 
objection despite the fact that it impeded on existing farmland. Any objection would be 
seen as challenging the decisions of the senior officials. 
I was trying to ask him [the demarcation team leader] to reconsider the position of 
the pole [pole 22] too, but he pretended he didn’t hear me. I tried a few times to 
tell him of the existence of a floating rice field beyond the pole, but he didn’t 
look. I can’t say too much about this though. [Interview with commune chief, 
Pursat, 8 March 2011]  
 Thirdly, after the boundary pole was placed, local authorities were asked to sign a 
document. Their signature was to endorse the position of the pole as correct. Although the 
commune and village chief disagreed with the position of the pole, they were forced to 
sign. Not signing would be interpreted as defying the national policy that called on all 
concerned actors to ‘cooperate’. Local authorities perceived any sign of defiance or non-
cooperation on their part as a risk to their security, as commune chiefs elsewhere in Pursat 
had faced arrest for refusing to sign an acknowledgment of the pole positions. ‘I can’t 
refuse to sign. If I did, they [the demarcation team] could just handcuff me’ [Interview 
with commune chief, Pursat, 8 March 2011]. In this sense the term ‘cooperation’ more 
accurately signified accommodation. That is, officials at lower levels have to accommodate 
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officials from a higher level at all costs. Low level officials have to follow the ideology, 
ideas and actions of higher officials, keeping aside their doubt or disagreement and 
focusing on implementation. Higher level officials’ perception of cooperation is based on a 
vision of lower level officials unquestioningly carrying out tasks. 
 Interpreting Existing Farmland 
The other emphasis of the central government was respect for existing farmland. The PM, 
for example, had repeatedly emphasised the need to respect existing farmland by drawing 
boundary lines around rice fields. 
Don’t draw the boundary line in ways that cut through existing farmland… the 
need to protect the environment is one thing, but the need for development is 
another. If they [farmers] have been living there since the time of their ancestors, 
we cannot just ask them to move out. We have to let them stay there and provide 
assistance to them so as to increase agricultural productivity and reduce the need to 
clear forest for more farmland. [Prime Minister’s speech, 22 September 2010]  
Unlike the initial phase of demarcation, the PM’s emphasis on respecting existing farmland 
meant that the boundary line could not be pre-determined from a distance and simply 
implemented on the ground. The existence of local farmland needed to be taken into 
consideration.  
 However, the criteria for determining the status of existing farmland was not clear, 
and contradictions between representations of local space on state maps, and customary 
knowledge of local land use further complicated the matter. Prior to the emergence of the 
state demarcation project, there existed a zoning map of Cambodia with a particular focus 
on the different zones in the Tonle Sap flood plain. The map could be accessed from the 
MOWRAM website, and according to the map, the boundary point between the floating 
rice area and the flooded forest in the case study commune lay some 13 km from the shore 
of the Tonle in the dry season. The information on the map is consistent with customary 
knowledge. A local elder, known as Ta Sahan, witnessed an old boundary pole, believed to 
be placed during the Sihanouk’s regime. He testified that the pole was located near a local 
pond known as Beoung Andong, which also supports the information found in the map. 
Although the pole has disappeared and the floating rice area had been left uncultivated, 
private ownership of floating rice plots in the area were still fully respected.   
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 Meanwhile, local land use has evolved in complex ways. Across the Tonle Sap 
flood plain, a combination of historical changes in agricultural practices, and resource 
appropriation over the past four decades, has resulted in several different types of land use 
in the contested area. Some areas that were under floating rice cultivation in the late 1980s 
were currently covered with forest due to abandonment. Other sections of flooded forest 
had more recently been cleared, and were now under cultivation as either dry season, or 
floating rice. There are presently eight different customary land types which include: 
 Type 1: had always been used for floating rice, and was currently used for 
floating rice.  
 Type 2: had always been used for floating rice, and was currently used for 
dry season rice. 
 Type 3. known to belong to the floating rice area, was not cultivated, but 
was recently cleared for floating rice 
 Type 4: known to belong to the floating rice area, was not cultivated, but 
was recently cleared for dry season rice 
 Type 5: known to belong to the floating rice area, not presently cultivated, 
thus currently under flooded forest cover.  
 Type 6: known to belong to the flooded forest area, but recently cleared for 
floating rice. 
 Type 7: known to belong to the flooded forest area, but recently cleared for 
dry season rice.  
 Types 8: known to belong to the flooded forest area, never been cleared and 
still forested.  
The case study commune had an estimated 700 ha of floating rice. According to interviews 
with local farmers, all, except an estimated two percent11
                                                     
11There is no official data. This number is just a rough estimate based on the tabulation of local recollection 
and field data collected in 2010.   
 of these areas were left 
uncultivated after a big flood in 1996. But floating rice farmers gradually returned to their 
land and by the time of the demarcation in 2010 and 2011, an estimated thirty percent of 
this land was under floating rice cultivation again.  
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Figure 16: Sketch map of land use prior to the demarcation 
 
Meanwhile, some dry season rice cultivation could be observed in the commune, but at a 
small scale. An estimated two percent of the former floating rice farmers converted to dry 
season rice farming by extracting water from natural ponds. The rest of the floating rice 
land in the commune was still uncultivated and covered with shrubs.  
 Given the complexity, the establishment of what constitutes existing floating rice 
land rests in the hands of the implementing agents who were given the discretionary power 
to make a demarcation boundary. 
 Discretionary Power and Rent Seeking 
The emphasis on respecting existing farmland and the vagueness in the way it is defined 
gave implementing agents discretionary power to determine the actual boundary line 
between flooded forest and floating rice land. The aim was to let field officials break away 
from the constraints imposed by the centrally-made map, and allow them to meet the 
objective of respecting existing farmland. However, the empirical data showed that field 
officials used this power to advance their interests through rent seeking. This was achieved 
in a range of ways. First, information surrounding the demarcation process, especially 
where the boundary line would lie, was strictly kept private. As a result, nobody knew the 
future of their farmland, until the actual boundary pole was placed. Those in charge of 
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pole-placing have significant discretionary power to place the pole in any position that they 
claim is flooded forest.  
Second, the affected farmers consisted of both small land holders and medium-size 
farmers, and it was the latter group that the pole-placing team focused their rent-seeking 
interests on. Threats were used against this group in order to extract informal payments. 
The farmers were put in a situation of having to weigh up their option of losing their land, 
or paying to save it. The pole placing team expected12
The combined effect of unclear central state policy, and a high level of discretionary power 
afforded to field officials resulted in pole placing of phase II that saw an even larger 
proportion of the floating rice area in Pursat province being lost to the new area of 
protected forest. At the same time, land of type seven (flooded forest land that has recently 
been cleared for dry season rice), of which the majority belongs to powerful figures on the 
opposite side of Tonle Sap lake, became legally recognised and legitimised by the state. 
 that some of the larger land holders 
would approach them to seek sam rol, meaning a financial gift, in exchange for the favour 
of saving their land. Prior to the discovery of the new irrigation technique that allows for 
the conversion of floating rice land into dry season rice land, floating rice land in Kampong 
Thom and Siem Reap, like the rest of the provinces in the Tonle Sap flood plain, had a 
market value of as low as 25 US dollar per hectare. But by 2009 one hectare of land in 
Kampong Thom, for example, had a market value of up to 3000 US dollars. This suggests 
that the affected farmers in the study commune were willing to pay a significant amount of 
money in order to maintain their increasingly valuable land.  
 But when no rent was offered, the team had no incentive to demand sam rol, and 
their discretionary power was put in use to punish local farmers. The consequence was that 
more land was lost. This is reflected in a comment made by one high-ranking provincial 
official: 
…like I said, those people [pole-placing team] don’t have money and they were 
expecting some offer. But nobody gave anything to them. So they did it however 
they wanted to, and it seems purely technical. Who can say they are wrong? 
[Interview with the governor of Pursat, Pursat, 20 March 2012] 
                                                     
12 One may question the reliability of this statement as it concerns the ability of the researcher to predict 
the mind of others. While it is not possible to know what those officials had in their head, particularly on 
that topic at that time, interviews with other state agents, at a later date, clearly indicate that it was the 
case.    
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Central Agents Vs Sub-national Government 
Field research suggests that the demarcation project leader managed to pursue his rent-
seeking interests due to having the ability to dominate the sub-national government.  
 Central Vs Provincial Government 
Despite the rhetoric of close cooperation, relations between central agents and the 
provincial government can be categorised as extremely unequal. Central agents saw the 
provincial government as an actor who they needed to inform of the demarcation, but from 
whom no input was sought. Central agents informed the governor’s office of the 
demarcation project, and invited him to preside over the meeting, but they did not give him 
any opportunity to meaningfully participate in any of the activities.   
 Meanwhile, the governor saw the demarcation as a purely technical operation 
which was the domain of central state agencies, and kept a respectable distance from their 
work. Prior to the day of demarcation, the governor had told his staff that half of the 8000 
hectares of floating rice land in the province would be lost to the new flooded forest 
protected area. However, throughout the demarcation process, there were no noticeable 
form of objections from the governor. According to the commune chief, the governor, 
addressing the meeting prior to the demarcation process, spoke of the importance of the 
demarcation project and called on all provincial and local authorities to cooperate closely 
with central agents to ensure the highest possible level of success and accuracy.  
 The order to demarcate the protected area came from the PM, who is referred to as 
pres en. In Buddhism pres en is the chief of heaven, and he is in charge of all affairs of the 
universe. Likewise, the PM is treated with the same respect. Voicing objection of any sort 
could potentially be interpreted as going against the will of pres en, something all 
politicians in Cambodia know can result in an end of their political career. In the 
Cambodian political lexicon, the term ‘challenge’ tends to be negatively defined. If one 
does not totally agree with their superiors, one is said to ‘challenge’ their superior’s 
decisions. To mount a challenge is always interpreted as negative, and it often carries 
negative consequence for those who mount it.  
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 Central Vs Line Departments 
Relations between central and line department agents are not based on equality, but are 
highly differentiated. Line departments involved in the demarcation matter were PDAFF, 
PDOWRAM, PDoE and FiA. As discussed earlier, under the rubric of cooperation, those 
lines departments were only called on to assist central agents. Throughout the process of 
demarcation, the role of line department agents was limited to organizing meetings, and 
accompanying central agents to the sites of demarcation. They were not given the chance 
to participate in decision-making concerning the position of the boundary poles. However, 
most did not seem to see any problem in this. They are trained to see themselves as 
subordinates who are to provide assistance when asked, and never ask back. They 
repeatedly referred to the demarcation project as an ‘order from the top’. This phrase is 
used to convey a sense of urgency and necessity where low level officials have to accept 
and perform as asked to. They were proud to be allowed to join the team even when just 
acting as an entourage.  
 This demarcation project is the order from the head of state. Nobody should 
challenge it. We, the line departments, are Senatika who have to implement it. 
[Interview with a staff member from PDOWRAM, Pursat, 26 February 2011] 
The use of the term Senatika perfectly captures how officials in line departments feel about 
their position in relation to central state agents. In Khmer, the term Sena refers to the 
bodyguards who accompany the king or high ranking officials when they travel. Tika is a 
suffix, used to transform a verb into a noun. Senatika is a noun that means the act of 
accompanying. By describing themselves as Senatika of the central government, the line 
department agents see their role as being the Sena to accompany and to protect the central 
agents.  
 Central Vs Local Authorities 
The manner in which the demarcation project was implemented reflects the true 
dimensions of power between the central and local authorities. It is worth noting that the 
central state is represented on the ground by central agents in charge of the demarcation 
process.  
 Prior to the day of demarcation, the commune chief had been trying to inform the 
demarcation team leader of the layout of the commune area, especially the layout of the 
floating rice area in the commune. Realising his commune is located much closer to the 
120 
 
Tonle Sap waters, the commune chief feared that the central agents would draw a straight 
demarcation line through the middle of the floating rice fields. In the afternoon, just before 
the day of demarcation, the commune chief offered to take the team leader around the 
floating rice area in his commune, but the team leader turned down the offer. 
 On the morning of the demarcation, the commune chief made several other 
attempts to brief the central agents of the local landscape. While the central agents were 
approaching the demarcation site, the commune chief once again tried to explain to the 
team leader the general layout of the floating rice in the commune, but was once again 
ignored. Against the attempts of the commune chief to explain the local layout, the leader 
of the demarcation team decided to place pole 22 in a way that saw the loss of an estimated 
90 percent of the floating rice land in the commune. When the demarcation team requested 
the commune authority, which included the commune and village chief, to sign in 
recognition of the presence of the boundary pole, they felt obliged to sign it without 
protest. 
 The reaction of local authorities to the demarcation process may seem insufficient, 
but they had few avenues for recourse. The demarcation was perceived to be a central state 
project, and since it came from the order of the PM, it has to be treated with the highest 
priority and supremacy. Also, it was implemented by a technical branch of the state, where 
there was little or no room for input from lower level authorities. At the same time, a 
nation-wide discourse against local authorities was at its peak. Prior to the day of 
demarcation, commune authorities across the country had been accused of protecting 
wealthy farmers in exchange for ‘gifts’. In the period leading up to the demarcation, 
commune chiefs had been repeatedly warned about protecting farmland that belongs to 
middlemen - chamougn. On top of this, there was also a perceived threat that force would 
be used against any local authorities who protested the position of demarcation poles. 
Rumors were circulating among local government officials that a commune chief in the 
province was handcuffed while trying to challenge the position of a demarcation pole.  
Central Agent and Local Farmers 
In the case study commune, farmers can generally be divided into three strata. First, 
subsistence farmers are those who own less than one hectare of wet season paddy in the 
village, and one or two hectares of floating rice land. This group of farmers does not travel 
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much outside the village as they are preoccupied with farming and subsistence, or semi 
subsistence fishing in the Tonle Sap area. The second group of farmers consists of those 
who own between one and two hectares of wet season rice paddy, and four or five hectares 
of floating rice fields. This group of farmers does not travel much outside the village, but 
tend to spend most of their time fishing in the Tonle Sap area, and engaging in other small 
business ventures in the village. The third group of farmers consists of those who are 
engaged in other professions including civil servants, teachers and farmers from other 
communes. Farmers in this group own up to 20 hectares of floating rice land, and they tend 
to be well connected to outside networks, and were better informed about the demarcation 
process13
 Criminalisation of the Middle –Stratum Farmers 
.  
 Interactions between central agents in charge of the demarcation project, and local 
farmers, reveals significant power inequalities where central state agents dominated local 
farmers by ways of reducing the possibility of resistance. Central agents used identity 
politics, the discussion of which is as follows, to stratify the affected farmers, effectively 
preventing local unity, and then employed the tactic of controlling the flow of information 
and diverting confrontation.  
The term ‘middle stratum farmers’ is used here to refer to farmers of the upper stratum as 
described earlier. This group of farmers consists of those who own a sizeable amount of 
floating rice land, and are better connected with the social world outside of the farming 
village. They tend to be those who are well informed of government policies, and thus 
likely to challenge the results of demarcation. They are more informed of state policy as 
they tend to have more connections with people outside of their villages, especially friends 
and relatives who live and work in the provincial town, or in Phnom Penh. Those upper 
stratum farmers also have greater access to information both directly from broadcasting 
media, and to a lesser extent print media, and indirectly through their exposure to public 
discussions at local gathering places such as coffee shops. They also tend to be better 
connected to state bureaucrats and subsequently, to information (for instance on the matter 
of demarcation). Access to such information is essential for initiating any local movement 
of resistance against unjust state action.  
                                                     
13These data are based on local accounts collected during field work in 2010.  
122 
 
 However, any resistance actions of this group were preemptively blocked by the 
central agents in charge of demarcation. They reduced the possibility of resistance by 
displacing middle- stratum farmers who made up an essential component of social 
movements. In the process of demarcation, those upper stratum farmers were given a 
criminal status in national discourses as unscrupulous forest destroyers and greedy land 
speculators. First, in the period leading up to the actual day of demarcation, the Cambodian 
state, as represented by MOWRAM and TSBA with the assistance of the media, had been 
engaging a discourse against middle-class farmers. They were labeled as bad people, and 
their greed-propelled actions which resulted in the disruption and destruction of nature 
around the Tonle Sap lake. They were alleged to be behind the massive clearing of flooded 
forest to expand their area of dry-season rice farming. They were labeled as chamougn, 
which is literally translated as middlemen.  
Within in the Khmer language this term has predominantly negative connotations. 
It is increasingly used by media as well as politicians to refer to those who are 
unscrupulous in their pursuit of personal gains with no respect for nature. Over the past 
few years, there is a tendency in both the broadcast and print media to use this term to 
describe people who smuggle drugs, endangered wildlife or illegal timber. An article in 
Koh Santepheap Newspaper, reporting a high speed police chase involving a wood 
smuggling vehicle is a case in point. The chase ended in a collision in which the driver of 
the vehicle was killed at the scene. The article referred to the dead driver as ‘a chamougn 
engaged in illegal business, and tried, but failed to escape from law enforcement agencies’ 
(Koh Santepheap Newspaper, 2010). In the demarcation process, the chamougn were told 
to stay away from the demarcation team or they would face arrest. 
 The term chamougn, although commonly used in relation to the demarcation 
process, has never been clearly defined. In one of his follow-up speeches the PM, in a 
mocking manner, defined chamougn simply as those farmers who employ machinery in 
their farming practices as opposed to the traditional animal-pulled plough. As he put it ‘it is 
not hard to determine who is chamougn and who is not. Anybody who uses a tractor to 
farm is a chamougn’ [Prime Minister’s speech, 24 February 2011]. Field officials often 
have a different set of criteria for determining who is a chamougn where they emphasise 
the size of a land holding and the place of residence. For them, in order to be qualified as a 
local farmer, one must not own more than one or two hectares of rice land, and one has to 
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reside in the village in which the land plot is located. Anyone else is not considered as a 
local farmer, and labeled chamougn.  
 Through this criminalisation of chamougn, and their association with all middle-
class farmers, such farmers were prevented from taking part in any actions that challenged 
the decisions of field agents.  The labeling also rendered them a new legal status as 
criminals and vulnerable to prosecution from law enforcement agencies, namely FiA, 
PDoE, PDOWRAM and the police. The state agents warned that they should keep clear of 
the whole process, and their appearance and participation in any demarcation process 
would be met with arrest and a jail term. 
 Central Vs Local Farmers  
With the local government only playing a tokenistic role in the process, and the 
criminalisation of the middle-class, it was up to local farmers themselves to oppose the 
actions of state agents. This section describes the micro-politics of domination and control 
by the state as represented by MOWRAM and TSBA. 
 MOWRAM and TSBA strictly controlled all information available to the wider 
public, and particularly to the farmers concerned, which effectively pre-empted the 
possibility of local resistance. MOWRAM and TSBA consistently presented their actions 
as strictly in line with the policy vision of the PM which led to the impression that local 
farmers’ interests would be given the highest priority. The PM would often be quick to 
proudly assert himself as ‘the son of a farmer’. In addition, he is known for his rectangular 
strategies, yotasas chatokon, which strongly emphasises, among other things, the 
development of rice farming in Cambodia. He also portrays himself through televised 
speeches as someone intimately engaged with rice farming. During his election campaign, 
he visited local farmers within the study commune, engaging in their activities of 
examining rice plants, transplanting, and harvesting.  
 In the wake of the PM’s reaction to the first phase of demarcation, MOWRAM and 
TSBA went into damage control. In an interview in September of 2010, the minister of 
MOWRAM assured the public that the purpose of the boundary demarcation was to set a 
clear line between farmland, more specifically the floating rice area, and the flooded forest 
around Tonle Sap, so as to ‘prevent further clearing of the flooded forest’. He added later 
in the interview which was aired on the national TV, that the marking of the boundary will 
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not affect farmland. ‘In fact, we will leave a bigger area for people to farm’ [Minister of 
MOWRAM, press conference, Phnom Penh, 29 September 2010]. 
 Meanwhile, PDOWRAM claimed that  
The placing of the first-phrase was a trial. It was designed to just locate the rough 
location of the poles and to see how local famers would react to it. In doing so, 
people will have a chance to react if the poles enclose their land. Then a team from 
Phnom Penh will assess the situation on the ground and make recommendation for 
how the map could be adjusted. [Interview with a PDOWRAM staff member, 
Pursat, 4 October 2010] 
These statements had two positive effects for MOWRAM and TSBA. On the one hand, it 
gave the public an impression that MOWRAM and TSBA would do nothing less than 
provide the best service. Their past mistake was now interpreted not as a mistake as the 
farmers had accused, but as a necessary step to ensure accuracy during map making. With 
the explanation that local farmers were to be included in the adjustment process, attempts 
were made to convince the public that the entire process was going to be done with the 
utmost regard for democratic principles and effectiveness.  
  On another level, their statements were a pre-emptive strike against any resistance 
which farmers were likely to offer. MOWRAM and TSBA described the presence of poles 
placed during phase I as not having any real impact on the status of farming land. The 
poles were said to be merely a part of the trial and error phase of the project, and were 
placed to give field officials an idea of how much to adjust the positions of poles in Phase 
II. Moreover, local farmers had been assured by the commune chief and line department 
staff that poles were only placed for the sake of marking, and it would not be enforced to 
the detriment of floating rice land.  
Second, MOWRAM and TSBA strictly inhibited information flow to the would-be 
affected farmers, leaving them to operate in a state of uncertainty. The process of pole 
placing was scheduled to start in the first week of March, but neither the local authorities 
nor, concerned personnel of provincial departments such as PDOWRAM, had seen the 
map on which the pole placing was based:  
 Who knows where the pole is going to be? We don’t know on what basis they [the 
 demarcation team] determine what is floating rice and what is flooded forest.
 [Interview with village chief, Pursat,  5 March 2011] 
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All they were told was that the demarcation would start from the southern tip of the 
province, and push northward as fast as possible to reach the northern border. When 
exactly the team would reach a certain point in the province was not known.   
 When the team did arrive at the study commune and began to place the boundary 
poles, the field officers told local farmers and local authorities that the pole positions were 
not yet final. This further gave a sense of flexibility hence farmers reduced their anxieties 
over the pole position. They were told that a further round of corrections would occur, 
where local farmers would have the opportunity to tell authorities where they think the 
poles should go. It is worth quoting at length the team leader as he spoke to the farmers: 
Please! Don’t look at the pole and become disappointed. Disappointment is a 
negative force. This pole is placed here only to serve as the basis for us to consider. 
If your land is on that side [what is now flooded forest], please don’t be 
disappointed. You can communicate with your village chief, commune chief and 
district chief so that they can send your complaint to the provincial governor who 
can forward the information to us. Our committee will come to assess the issue and 
decide what to do. [The demarcation team leader, instruction to local farmers, 
Pursat, 8 March] 
Through these words the team leader effectively reduced the likelihood of local resistance. 
At the moment of pole placement, the local farmers who had previously expressed grave 
concern about their livelihoods, stood passively and watched the pole being placed in 
silence. No remarks were made, and no one showed any sign of objection to the location of 
the pole. It created an impression that there was no real objection amongst the local 
farmers. However, this impression does not represent the reality. The local sentiment, 
particularly of those present at the site of pole placing, consisted of feelings of anger over 
the fact that they just lost their ownership over their floating rice land. As the group was 
dispersing to go to their own home in the village, some local farmers were talking of 
secretly coming back at night to remove the boundary pole. But this talk of resistance by 
way of counter-territorial strategy did not materialise, given the prevailing context of threat 
of jail terms. 
  There was also a public perception that the demarcation was only perfunctory. 
That is, nobody was going to take it seriously. The presence of the pole was not going to 
change anything. Prior to the pole placing day, an official for PDOWRAM assured farmers 
that the boundary line was only there to serve as an indication of where the forest is, and to 
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prevent further clearance of the forest. He assured them that the entire process would not 
affect farmland. Farmers would still be able to go into their farmland regardless of whether 
it was in Zone II or Zone III. These assurances that farmland would not be affected 
significantly reduced the prospects of farmers protesting during the actual demarcation 
process. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter showed how maps are not simple and inert representations of geographical 
conditions, but tools of geographical imagination advanced by those in power. It showed 
that the new map of protected flooded forest does not represent the actual ecological and 
human landscapes, but represents Tonle Sap space on the basis of political power and 
personal interests of the state agents in charge. Along this line, this chapter provided in-
depth insights into how power works its way down through patron networks, within a neo-
patrimonial state. By focusing on two events, the pre-demarcation meeting and actual 
demarcation implementation, this chapter has shown how power flows downwards from 
the central state through line. It showed that agents representing the central state took 
advantage of the concept of cooperation in order to exercise dominance over the provincial 
and local governments. It showed that the concept of cooperation, as used in Cambodian 
state agencies, does not empower local government to represent local interests. Rather, it is 
used by the central agents to ensure compliance from the provincial and local governments. 
 This chapter also showed that discretionary power not only gives implementing 
agents autonomy and flexibility in carrying out their tasks, it also provides them with rent-
seeking opportunities. As this case of demarcation shows, the discretionary power of the 
implementing agents, instead of helping to achieve the central state’s dual objectives of 
conservation and rice expansion, actually resulted in enclosure of the floating rice land.  
 This chapter also showed the lines of accountability of different state offices, 
especially the provincial and local governments. However, when talking about provincial 
government, a careful distinction should be made between the governor‘s office and the 
line departments, such as PDoE, PDOWRAM and FiA. The governor was more concerned 
about protecting his own position than representing the interests of his constituency. He 
looked at the demarcation project as a top-down project which was the sole responsibility 
of technical agents. He feared that his intervention would offend high ranking agents, 
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which could potentially bring an end to his governorship. The provincial line departments 
were more accountable to the central agents than to the people in their province. Despite 
decades of decentralisation and deconcentration, the line departments do not see 
themselves as equal counterparts working side-by-side with the central agencies to ensure 
effectiveness in the demarcation project. Rather they see their main duty is to act as 
helping hands. This attitude is captured by the choice of words they used to describe 
themselves- senatika.  
 This chapter also showed that local government or local authorities are more likely 
to act in the interest of local farmers. Many commune and village chiefs attempted, 
although without success, to protect the existing floating rice land in their localities. Their 
ability to represent the local farmers was compromised by the wider politics of framing the 
entire issue where local authorities are accused of corrupt practices. 
 This chapter also showed that central agents representing the state dominate local 
farmers. They first exploited the concept of chamougn to displace the upper stratum 
farmers, who are well-informed and well-connected, and who are likely to challenge their 
work. They then used their ability to control information concerning the demarcation to 
ensure an atmosphere of compliance from the rest of the farmers. 
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Chapter VII: The Appeal 
 
 
The location of pole 22 placed on 8 March 2011, affected 121 farmer households in four 
villages. A total of 580 hectares of former floating rice area in the commune was lost. The 
manner in which pole 22 was placed left local farmers no room to react, yet they were told 
of a possibility for appeal. This chapter looks at the processes and difficulties that local 
citizens have to go through to demand accountability from the state.  
 This chapter looks at two appeal mechanisms, one formal and one informal. By 
way of ethnographic description, this chapter describes the responsiveness, capacity and 
accountability of the local government in relation to appeal processes. The chapter also 
describes the role of local leaders and the manner in which they actively seek solutions to 
local problems. This chapter will also describe the possibilities and limitations of political 
party-based solutions to local problems.  Finally, it also describes the potential role that the 
media can play in solving local solutions in the neo-patrimonial state system. 
Formal Mechanism of Appeal  
This section of the findings details the process through which local actors formally 
appealed the placement of boundary poles. The information in this section is based on 
ethnographic field data, as the researcher was permitted to go along with local group 
leaders as they made their official appeals. The researcher was allowed to be present at all 
local discussions, as well as at meetings between village and commune chiefs. Thus the 
researcher gained significant insights into the process as it unfolded. 
 The Complaint Letter Version I 
After their land was marked as a part of the protected forest, local floating rice farmers 
were told by the central agent in charge of the demarcation that they could go through a 
bureaucratic appeal process, in which local farmers were required to contact their village 
chief, commune chief and district chief to prepare a formal document requesting the 
examination of the position of the pole: 
Contact your village chief and bring eka sa trum trov. The village chief will 
forward it to the commune chief, then district chief, and the governor who will 
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forward it to our committee who will access the case. [Demarcation team leader, 
instruction to local farmers, Pursat, 8 March 2011] 
 The term eka sa means document. Trum trov can literally be translated as correct, right or 
appropriate. Eka sa trem troy is a term most frequently used within the Cambodian 
bureaucracy, and all requests for state intervention must have it. However, what exactly 
constitutes eka sa trum trov is not universally defined.  For instance, the central agent in 
charge of the demarcation process, although telling farmers that any appeal was contingent 
upon them bringing  eka sa trum trov to their local authorities, was not specified what 
should be contained within such a document. Nor was it automatically obvious to farmers 
which particular ‘correct document’ they should bring. 
 To add to the uncertainty of what constitutes the appropriate document, there was 
also a restriction on who could take part in the appeal process. State agents had stressed 
that only those who were directly affected by the demarcation could participate in the 
appeal process. That is, only those who owned farmland in the contested area were allowed 
take part in the appeal. The restriction prevented the majority of local farmers or villagers 
who disagree with the displacement of the floating rice, but who do not own any farmland 
in that particular contested site, from being a part of a local collective action to challenge 
the state. Moreover, the central agents placed further restrictions on which group of 
affected farmers could appeal ‘… chamougn are not allowed to appeal… and I have to 
warn you that you cannot lend your name to chamougn…’ [Demarcation team leader, 
Pursat, 8 March 2011]. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the term chamougn refers to those farmers who use 
modern farming machinery. At the time of the appeal, the term came to be defined as those 
who own more than 2 or 3 hectares of cultivated land, and who live outside of the 
contested area. With these definitions, the exclusion of chamougn meant that the number 
of local farmers eligible to take part in the appeal process was reduced to only those who 
own less than 2 or 3 hectares of contested land and those who live in the contested area.  
 Such restrictions have strategic implications. First, appealing against the state is 
perceived as a high risk, and affected farmers were not willing to take such a risk for small 
parcels of unprofitable land. ‘I’d rather lose the land. I don’t want to go to jail’ [Interview 
with local farmer, Pursat, 9 March 2011]. 
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The second implication concerns eka sa trum trov. Field interviews suggest that 
none of the farmers in the eligible group had knowledge or skills required to fill out official 
paperwork as part of the appeal process, nor did they have any connections to outsiders for 
opinions or assistance.    
The situation was made worse by the fact that farmers were asked to submit their 
identification papers. Having to submit a copy of photo identification in order to officially 
appeal the demarcation is not only a bureaucratic hurdle but a means to incite fear of being 
seen to officially oppose the state. Villagers were afraid to protest against the state because 
they had the perception that the state can track them down. In the appeal period, there was 
a rumor going around the commune that the central government had dispatched plain 
clothed police officers to the commune to keep an eye on irregular local action. The rumor 
could never be confirmed, but the villagers seemed to believe that the presence of plain 
clothed policemen was real, and that officers were capable of tracking down and arresting 
those who were active in opposing the state. 
 On top of this, local farmers were under pressure to produce the appeal documents 
within the small time frame allocated. The pole placing team leader stated that if by the 
time the team finished their demarcation in the province without official objection, it 
would be accepted as correct and become formal and enforceable by law.  Although he did 
not specifically mention how much time the local farmers had to appeal, it was understood 
from media reports that a formal meeting was going to be held at the provincial office as 
soon as the team finished boundary demarcation. If by the time of the meeting, there was 
no objection, then the governor would be asked to officially endorse the placement of the 
poles. That effectively meant that local farmers had five days to come up with the required 
appeal documents.  
 After three days of the poles being placed, no formal complaints had been given by 
the villagers. Affected farmers were told to contact their village chief, but few villages had 
the confidence to involve their village chief in the matter. Typically, information is spread 
in the opposite direction. The commune chiefs are the ones who contact villagers to spread 
information or to give instructions about a certain matter. In the case of an appeal 
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document, almost all of those who had lost land wanted to appeal, but all of them were of 
the attitude that they should wait for others to appeal first. 
 At the national level, there was growing public support for the project as the media 
had been echoing the PM’s directive as well as continually reminding the public of the 
urgent need to save the Tonle Sap flood plain and prevent ecological destruction. It was 
alleged that flooded forest has been cleared on a large scale, and the media has been 
making strong links to farmers as the perpetrators. Media reports were often accompanied 
by local testimonies from farmers and fisherman about the depleted fish stock in the lake 
backed by stories of how they could catch less and less fish. Meanwhile, MOWRAM and 
TSBA continued to propagate images of the projects successes, showing photos of smiling 
local farmers standing around the boundary poles.  
 At that stage, local farmer leaders began to emerge. Due to the need to protect their 
identities, the name of each local leader is represented by a letter. Three of these leaders,  
Mr O, Mr N, and Mr B, within the commune are detailed here:  
  Mr. O who owns five hectares of land in the contested area. He acquired the plots 
through purchase in 2005, and had been cultivating floating rice since then. However, he 
lives in a village outside the contested area. Both the size of his land holdings, and his 
place of residence gave him the title chamougn according to the criteria of the demarcation 
team. Mr. N, on the other hand, lived within the contested area. He owned eight hectares of 
floating rice land, three of which he inherited, and the rest of which he acquired through a 
purchase in 2004. By place of residence, Mr. N was eligible to take part in the appeal, but 
by land holdings, he was a chamougn thus not allowed to appeal. In addition, his land was 
never cultivated.  
Mr. B also lives in the contest area, and he owns 5 hectares of land, two of which 
he inherited from his family while the rest was purchased in 2006. Prior to the 
demarcation, two hectares of his land had been dedicated to water melon cultivation, and 
the rest was left uncultivated. He too had a complicated status within the appeal process. 
He was only considered eligible by place of residence, but by the size of his land holdings, 
he was a chamougn.  
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 Mr. O was more exposed to networks outside his village, thus he was more 
informed of the demarcation process. After a lengthy discussion, the three agreed that they 
needed to mobilise more people to take part in filling out complaints. They went about 
inconspicuously encouraging people to fill out complaint forms. Each of them went to the 
houses of those known to be affected, and asked if they wanted to appeal. Most affected 
farmers however, believed that it was the duty of village chiefs to collect family books and 
identity cards in order to submit an appeal document. Out of all of the four village chiefs 
concerned, only one witnessed the pole placing process and directly heard details of the 
appeal procedure. When the leaders approached the one village chief who was present, 
they found that he was not at his home. Other residents told them that he was busy herding 
cattle and farming. 
 The two local leaders went to the next village chief. But the village chief refused to 
take up the matter until he received instructions to do so from the commune chief. 
Although the country has implemented the process of D&D,14
 Among local authorities, the commune chief had been the most active in defending 
the floating rice area. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he had made efforts to brief 
the central agents of the local landscapes. On the day of demarcation, he also spoke up 
against the position of the pole. However, the commune chief was of the opinion that 
initiating the appeal process could be interpreted as an anti-government action. The 
government had recently been labeling local protestors as opposition party-members. 
Interviews with the commune and village chiefs suggested that local authorities were 
 which in principle 
emphasises local initiatives and ownership over the development process, the actual 
practice of development remains highly hierarchical. ‘I have heard of the need to appeal, 
but I have to talk to the commune chief first. If he lets me go ahead with it, I will’ [Village 
chief, speaking to local leaders, Pursat, 10 March 2011] 
Village chief’s acting on their own without permission from superiors is uncommon. 
Statements from the different village chiefs suggested that the key to getting the appeal 
process started lay with the commune chief.  
                                                     
14As seen in Chapter III, the D &D reform program, officially launched in Cambodia in 2001, aims to promote 
local accountability, representation and responsiveness through local participation in development 
planning. 
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cautious of MOWRAM and TSBA accusing them of being opposition party members – 
something that would quickly destroy their political careers.  
 For legal advice, Mr. O had asked for the assistance from one of his cousins in 
Phnom Penh, Mr. S. But Mr. S was not eligible to be a part of the appeal. He lived in 
Phnom Penh, and did not own any plot of land in the troubled area. By the criteria of the 
pole-placing team leader, Mr. S was a pure outsider. In addition, the demarcation team 
leader had warned that any outsider intervention would be investigated with severe 
consequences for those found to be provocateurs. Thus, like the local leaders, Mr. S did not 
dare to openly involve himself in the process.  
 For his long standing experience as one of the labour union leaders in Phnom Penh, 
Mr. S was familiar with the workings of the Cambodian government, especially formal 
bureaucratic processes of appeal. Thus, Mr. S suggested that the formal appeal document 
be comprised of (1) a cover letter that stated the objective of the appeal, and (2) thumb 
prints of all of the affected farmers.  Mr. S then assisted with the drafting of the letter.   
 However, local leaders encountered a major setback when trying to collect 
thumbprints. The villagers would not act without involvement from village chiefs, who 
were also waiting for permission from the commune chief. But the commune chief had 
recently been told by the district chief not to act on the matter, thus he refused to take any 
action. The commune chief was understood to be in a difficult situation and his decision to 
back out was unsurprising. He had seen the arrest of a fellow commune chief for 
challenging the demarcation process and was rightfully afraid of the same thing happening 
to him. He had also been warned at various times not to side with the chamougn in their 
appeals.  
 There was also little chance of the district chief supporting those who appealed the 
demarcation. The district chief is known to belong to a social group consisting of the 
district police chief, a district policeman and one person who identifies himself as a three-
star general of the PM’s body guard unit15
                                                     
15In public opinion the PM’s body guard unit is even more powerful that the state’s ministry of national 
defense.  
. In the previous year, the general had produced 
a map of agricultural land in the area which he planned to sell to investors. The map 
covered an area of 5000 hectares and included much of the farming land in question. 
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Moreover, Mr. O was told by the district policeman not to engage in the appeal process. 
According to Mr. O, the policeman said the following:  
Don’t appeal. You can’t expect to win in this case because this is a state project. 
Once the poles are placed, the new boundary line becomes established. The land on 
this side is farmland, but the land on the other side of the line is state land. No 
farmers are allowed to work there. But my group can seek a special arrangement 
with the state and we can later sell that land, then we can give you some money 
back. But if you tried to appeal, and you lose, they [his group] will not give you any 
money’. [Interview with Mr. O quoting the words of the District officer, Pursat, 12 
March 2011] 
The policeman’s remark suggested that the district chief and his group had a hidden agenda 
in regards to the land. Driven by the suspicion, Mr. O requested to meet with the commune 
chief.  
 At the commune chief’s house, a few men were gathering around an outdoor bed 
with a carton of beer. During Mr O’s meeting with the commune chief, two men arrived at 
the house, but were quickly ushered away around the back of the house. The commune 
chief repeated his earlier message to Mr. O, and his words are worth quoting in whole here: 
 Yes, the district chief just called this morning to tell me not to do anything on this 
matter. The district authority is now taking charge of the matter… the district was a 
more appropriate level of authority to facilitate the people’s complaint. 
[Conversation between the commune chief and Mr. O and Mr. S, Pursat, 13 March 
2011] 
At that time, the tone of the commune chief seemed to suggest that he was relieved to be 
free from the matter. However, Mr. O and Mr. S tried to convince the commune chief to 
pursue the matter. Trapped between, on the one hand, wanting to do something for his 
people and, on the other, his superior’s order, the commune chief strategically made up a 
story that the villagers had been gathering at the commune office, as well as his home, to 
demand an intervention. The story of a public gathering seemed to get the attention of the 
district chief. In addition, with the commune council election scheduled for the following 
year, the mention of a popular movement was taken seriously 
Ok, if they are there [commune office and commune chief’s home] already, you can 
welcome them. But don’t make any promises. We cannot do anything to change 
these poles. It has already been decided. [Conversation between the commune chief 
and the district chief, Pursat, 13 March 2011]   
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With these words from the district chief, the commune chief felt that he could act on the 
appeal process without being seen as disobeying instruction from his superior.  
 After two hours, the meeting between the commune chief and the two village 
leaders concluded with a general agreement that the villagers could go ahead with their 
appeal to the governor. The problem they now faced however was that they had only that 
afternoon to collect thumb prints in order to meet the demands of the district authorities. 
This was doubly made difficult by the fact that they had to do this on a Sunday afternoon.  
The commune chief told the village leaders that he and his councilors would be able to 
complete all these tasks by themselves. Though, it was not clear how soon the commune 
chief and his councilors would act on the matter. The commune chief was known to be a 
regular drinker who often met with colleagues in his free time at the local bar. On that 
particular afternoon, he was just about to start his drinking ritual, when he had been 
interrupted by the meeting with the two village leaders. Mr. O and Mr. S felt that they 
should still stay engaged in the process as they were worried the commune chief would get 
distracted in his task. 
 After the meeting at the commune chief’s house, the two traveled to meet the other 
two local farmer leaders, Mr. N and Mr. B. They divided the task of collecting thumb-
prints between them. But no one knew exactly how to go about the task. The pole-placing 
team leader had instructed them to contact their village chief and take with them their 
family book and national ID cards. But that was all the information they had been given. 
The local farmers were left wondering whether they were required to only give their ID 
papers to the village chief, or whether they were supposed to thumbprint a particular form. 
It should be noted here that the appeal letter is ultimately destined for the minister of 
MOWRAM. Based on an interview with a former TSBA staff member, the minister is 
known within government circles to be very particular about formalities of documents 
addressed to him. He is very particular about the format, character, font size and wording 
of documents addressed to him. ‘He [the minister of MOWRAM] would not read your 
letter if it does not follow the style he wants’ [Interview with a former TSBA staff 
member, Phnom Penh, 28 March 2011]. 
In the commune, the local leaders and affected farmers were not aware of his strict 
requirements. They struggled to figure out what to include in the appeal document. Mr. S 
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suggested that the group buy a big notebook, and columns be made for people to state their 
name, age, gender, land holding, thumb print and ID number. Mr. B was willing to go 
around in his village to collect the thumb prints of the affected farmers, and he estimated 
that there were at least 60 households in his area.  
 The village chief had collected thumb prints of all of his villagers whose land was 
affected. Mr. O and the Mr. S then proceeded to look for the chief of the other village, 
which is one of the four villages in the commune which had lost land during the 
demarcation. It was estimated that some 50 households were altogether affected by the new 
boundary line in that village. Unfortunately, the village chief was away and was not 
scheduled to return for three days. The chief’s wife had also heard of the demarcation, and 
was strongly opposed to it. She then suggested that the deputy village chief take charge of 
the matter of thumb-print collection. Then she went off and quickly returned later with the 
deputy chief. The two then explained the situation again to the deputy chief who agreed to 
help. Mr. S showed him the sheets and drew the columns for him the same way they did 
for other villages in the hope of maintaining some sort of unity. To give the deputy chief a 
sense of urgency, the two told the deputy chief that the peoples thumb prints from all 
villages had to be collected and then combined together that afternoon so that the 
commune chief could have the appeal form with him at the meeting in the provincial office 
on the morning of the next day. 
 It is a custom that some financial payment is given if citizens seek any service from 
state officials. On the basis of that reality, Mr. S gave him 10000 riel (around 2.5 US 
dollars). Mr. O and Mr. S returned to the villages again at around 4 pm to collect the thumb 
prints that each of the other local leaders had collected. Mr. N managed to gather 15 names 
and thumb prints, while the village chief collected 30. Mr. B managed to collect 50 thumb 
prints, but there was a problem with one of the columns. Instead of recording the ID 
number, the leader had got confused and asked the villagers to write their date of birth. The 
Cambodian bureaucracy is known to be strict, or unnecessarily bureaucratic with heavy 
emphasis on forms and procedures, i.e. right form, right format and under a particular time 
frame. If submitted that way, the appeal letter would be labeled as incorrect, and rejected. 
But due to the time of day, it would have been unrealistic to ask villagers to fill out the 
form again. So the group decided to take it as it was. 
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 As Mr. O and Mr. S were leaving the village chief’s house, the commune chief and 
his councilor arrived. The commune chief asked about the number of villagers concerned. 
At that stage, it was not clear yet how many farmer households were affected, and that 
would not be known until figures from all villages could be obtained. The commune chief 
expressed his reservations about the appeal process. His mood suggested that he was still 
worried and unsure about the entire process. He queried who was to take the appeal letter 
to the governor the next day. Mr. O and Mr. S were of the opinion that the commune chief 
was the most suitable person to hand in the appeal letter. But the commune chief was not 
convinced. For most of Cambodia’s contemporary history, persons of higher position are 
the ones who give orders and issue directives, and the lower level authorities are expected 
to carry them out. At that movement, the idea that the commune chief would carry the 
appeal letter to the governor, hence skipping his superiors, seemed to deeply go against the 
norms of hierarchy. In addition, the commune chief was not comfortable with the idea of 
having direct contact with the governor, as the distance in status was seen as too far apart. 
Although the commune chief is locally elected, he could lose his position if he loses his 
party membership, for he is nominated by his political party to run for election. The 
nomination is made by the party office at the district level, for which the district chief is 
often the head. Thus, offending the district chief would entail some long-term, if not 
immediate, consequences. Typically, it would be the district chief who is the most 
appropriate to communicate with the governor. From the chiefs stand point, taking up this 
challenge could mean a lot of unpredictable but potentially harmful threats to not just his 
political life, but also his every day livelihood. His job as a commune chief had been his 
livelihood for all of his life. If the consequence of delivering the letter was to be expelled 
from his job, he would lose not only his livelihood, but also respect, something that most 
politicians in Cambodia are not willing to lose. But both Mr. O and Mr. S tried to assure 
the chief that nobody would get into any trouble: 
We are doing this just to respond to the instruction of the pole placing officials. 
They told us that we need to contact the local authorities to let them know that our 
land is affected, otherwise this new boundary line will be accepted as correct and it 
will become permanently endorsed by the sub decree. [Mr. O, speaking to the 
commune chief, Pursat, 13 March 2011] 
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As you see, we have carefully written the letter in a way to make it look like it is 
from the local people directly to the governor and you are just being asked to relay 
the message. If something happens, you can say that you don’t know. You just act 
as requested by your people and you don’t have a choice. [Mr. S, speaking to the 
commune chief, Pursat, 13 March 2011] 
The two quotes here suggest that local farmer leaders played an active role in pushing the 
commune chief to act on the matter. In the end, the commune chief agreed to take the letter 
to the governor. After the conversation, the Mr. O and Mr. S headed to the next village to 
collect the last batch of villagers’ names and thumb prints. There the work of the second 
village was slowed down by the fact that most of the villagers concerned were not at home. 
Thus he had to wait for them and did not manage collect all the names until after 6 pm. The 
group managed to collect a total of 121 thumb prints. The sun had already set by then, and 
Mr. O and Mr. S were still out in the middle of this remote village some 25 kilometers 
away from the provincial town where they would be able to find a place to photocopy the 
documents. It would take them 45 minutes to get to town, which would mean that by the 
time they get there, it would be almost 7 pm. Pursat town, beings a small provincial town, 
closes up most of its shops at around 6pm. But Mr. S, for his familiarity with the 
Cambodian bureaucracy, insisted that copies of the appeal document be made, and local 
leaders keep the original for future reference.   
If you submit the original document to them, you are finished. If they want … they 
can just throw your document away and pretend you never submitted it. So we have 
to submit the photocopied one and keep the original. If they throw it away, we have 
proof. [Mr. S, conversation with Mr. O, Pursat, 13 March 2011] 
On that consideration, the two debated whether to submit the original appeal form, but Mr. 
S insisted that a few copies of it be made and only the copied one be submitted while the 
original should be kept for future reference. The two rushed to the photocopy shop in town. 
Five copies of the form were made, one of which was to be taken to the commune chief at 
dawn of the next day so that he could take it to the meeting at 8 am. 
 The Finalising Meeting 
In accordance with the project procedure, the demarcation occurred in three stages; the pre-
demarcation meeting, the demarcation, and the finalising meeting. The finalising meeting 
was designed to allow all concerned stake holders to meet and report on progress to date, 
achievements, or to raise any objections. It was also for the demarcation team to report to 
the provincial government, in the presence of the local authorities, and to give records of 
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the boundary pole positions. The governor then needed to sign to endorse the position of 
the poles, so that he could conclude the project.   
 On Monday 14 March 2011, six days after the placing of pole 22, the meeting was 
scheduled to take place at the provincial office. The meeting was attended by the provincial 
governor, key officials from the provincial line departments, and local authorities (except 
the village chiefs). To the pole placing team, the meeting was a chance for them to declare 
the completion of the project. It was an opportunity to report to their superiors, the minister 
of MOWRAM and TSBA, the date of their completion. The team was to be awarded for 
their timely completion of a difficult project. Many in the team, who were from distant 
provinces, were also eager to go complete the project so they could return home. Since the 
start of the demarcation project, the team had been in the province for almost two weeks, 
and had been working seven days a week, through weekends and public holiday. It was 
implied by their superiors that they could not go home to Phnom Penh until they had 
completed all field activities. To the provincial authorities, the meeting signified the 
transfer of the matter into their jurisdiction. The pole placing team had finished their job of 
marking the boundary line, so the role of the provincial authorities was to enforce it. 
 But the meeting failed to conclude the process of demarcation. Armed with the 
local letter of complaint and thumb prints, the commune chief managed to gather enough 
confidence to inform the governor, prior to the meeting, of the local people’s intention to 
protest against the new boundary line. According to the commune chief, the governor said 
the following at the meeting:   
I think the pole placed at Toul Cha is not correct. I remember that when I was 
young I used to herd my animals in the area, and from the current pole position to 
the edge of the farmland, you have to spend almost a whole morning walking. 
[Interview with the commune chief, 15 March 2011] 
The governors objection, however passive it might appear, effectively prevented the 
meeting from recognizing the legality of the new line, and it was decided in the meeting 
that reassessments of the pole positions were needed before it could be formally recognised 
as correct. 
 However, the farmers’ complaint letter was not formally accepted. The governor 
told the commune chief not to submit it as the appeal document was not qualified as eka 
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satrum trov. It did not follow the correct format used in the Cambodian administrative 
system. It had to be re-made using the right format.  
 The Complaint Letter Version II 
In the days that followed, the process of making the second letter began in earnest. All 
village chiefs had to pick up a form from the commune clerk. It was a busy scene at the 
commune office on that particular day. All of the concerned village chiefs were waiting for 
the clerk to give them forms. Some of the farmers whose land had been affected were also 
at the commune office waiting to sign their name. 
 But since, the commune authority had no prior experience in dealing with matters 
of that nature, there was no official form. Thus, the clerk had to make an ad-hoc form to be 
used by all the villages. By noon, one day after the meeting, the village chiefs had recorded 
all of the names of those present at the commune office. However, many farmers were also 
unaware of what was happening in the commune office on that day. They were at home or 
in the field. The pole-placing team leader had warned that only farmers whose names were 
on the list could be given their land back. Thus the village chiefs had to go around to the 
villagers concerned to collect their names and thumb prints. At the end of the day, the 
whole name and thumb print re-collection procedure had just managed to be completed.  
 At this point, the role of the local leaders had been taken over by the commune 
clerk. But the commune clerk had been complaining about having to do the job at his own 
expense. Thus, Mr. O gave the clerk 50,000 Riel (12.5 US dollars) to help cover the 
gasoline and photocopying costs. Copies of the document had to be made and sent to the 
governor the next day. 
 By noon of the next day, Tuesday 15 March 2011, the commune clerk reported to 
the commune chief that the second complaint letter had been completed to comply with the 
prescribed format, and that it had been submitted to the governor’s office. However, on 17 
March 2011, the leader of the demarcation team refused to accept it, telling the commune 
chief that the form (the second one) was also incorrect. The reason for the rejection was 
that the appeal letter contained some names of chamougn. According to the team leader it 
also incorrectly included other farmers who do not live in the villages in which the 
farmland was located. The out- village farmers are those with larger land holdings, up to 
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twenty hectares in some cases. So according to the team leader Mr. O could no longer be 
eligible to be a part of the appeal process.  
 At that time the commune chief became aware of the strategy that the higher 
authorities were using. If he started preparing the third version of the complaint letter, he 
would have to go around asking villagers to re-sign for the third time, an onerous task for 
himself and all those involved. Local villagers are never fond of paper work, and signing 
for the first time was already hard, not mention the second and now third times. Thus, the 
third version of the complaint letter was never made.  
Nevertheless, the second complaint letter seemed to work, at least partially. The 
announcement of the official recognition of the new boundary line in the province was 
delayed, and news emerged that the pole placing team had gone back to the area to re-
evaluate the local landscape. Once again, the commune chief’s level of confidence was 
raised. However, the modification of the pole position was still beyond the control of either 
the commune chief or the local villagers. Two weeks after  making the second complaint 
letter, the commune chief was informed by the pole-placing group that they would go to re-
assess the area, and that there was a possibility of people being able to reclaim their land. 
The commune chief was asked to hire a truck to pick up one boundary pole from 
PDOWRAM in the provincial town. On Tuesday 29 March 2013, the truck picked up the 
poles and went to the commune office to await further instruction from the pole-placing 
group. The commune chief had understood that the pole position reassessment would 
happen on the afternoon of that Tuesday, thus both the truck operator and the commune 
chief waited at the commune office. But the pole-placing group never turned up on that 
day.  
 On Saturday 2 April 2011, four days after the original date, the group turned up to 
finish adjusting the boundary line. However, none of the farmers, whose land was affected 
and whose names were listed in the appeal document, had been summoned to the site of 
demarcation. Nor was there any rigorous procedure to incorporate local land claims. Only 
the commune chief was asked to accompany the pole-placing group leader.   
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On arrival the team leader ordered another pole be placed near a huge straw pile16. 
The decision to place the pole near the straw pile, on one level represented the demarcation 
agent’s ability to ignore the order of the PM. The straw pile was one of the many left 
behind by local farmers after the harvest, but it was the only one that survived the seasonal 
wild fire17
 
.The presence of the straw pile on the ground serves as an indication that the 
land had been under rice cultivation, which under the PM’s order should be respected. On 
another level, it shows the demarcation team’s ability to discredit local knowledge of lived 
space.  
The pole is located around 400 meters away from pole 22. It was estimated that 
only 5 of the 121 affected farmer households got their land back from the re-assessment. 
Figure 17: Map of pole 43A, 22, 23 and the adjustment pole 
 
                                                     
16 Most Cambodian farmers do not harvest by combined harvesters which, after threshing, only keeps the 
gains while dumping the straws in the field. By tradition, farmers harvest by hand first and tie the harvest in 
bundles which are then collected for threshing. The threshing can be done by ox walking on it, or by 
threshing machine. The straw is often piled up and stored for animal feed in the wet season.   
17 The local referred to it as wild fire, but in fact it is mostly man-made. The area is a floating rice area which 
has cluster of natural pounds. When Tonle Sap Lake water retreats at the beginning of the dry season, local 
villagers often come into the area for fishing. They make fire to cook their meals which at time cause wild 
fire. Because the area is an open area fire often spread in the whole area consuming what is in its path 
including the straw piles and even in some year harvest.  
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Figure 18: Picture of the adjustment pole  
 
Researcher’s Own photo of the adjustment pole. According to customary knowledge, the floating rice area 
stretches until the edge of the flooded forest in the horizon which, as seen in this photo, is around 2 
kilometers away from this pole. But as this pole dictates, the area up to the pole is floating rice area and the 
area beyond this pole is the flooded forest.  
The appeal document stated the nature of the enclosure, detailing who was affected and 
how much land was involved. It also contained a detailed proposal for how the boundary 
line should be adjusted in accordance with local customary knowledge of the landscape. 
However, the manner in which the central agents in charge of the demarcation responded 
to the local appeal demonstrated how little impact the letter had on their conduct. 
Regardless of the amount of effort and trouble that had gone into to procedure, the 
appropriate appeal document was not even used as a factor in the reassessment process. 
Informal Mechanism of Appeal 
Local farmer leaders explored other informal mechanisms which would more directly 
bring their complaints to those in power. Based on participant observation of the appeal 
process, this section describes two neo-patrimonial appeal mechanisms, and their limitation 
in solving local problems. 
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 The Party Solution 
The CPP party (the party in power) is known across Cambodia for its aggressive election 
campaigning strategy, which involves long-term engagement with local people. This is 
contrary to typical party campaigning which involves only a brief period of intensive pre-
election propaganda. CPP party membership is divided into two main categories- the core 
team, and the regular party members. The core team consists of those holding key state 
positions. In addition to their state duty, those people are assigned a particular locality with 
a mission to rally electoral support for the CPP. In Cambodian political terms, these people 
are called ‘the political working group’ or the ‘CPP working party’. These groups 
constantly engage people within their electorates to persuade them to support the CPP 
party through the provision of material and financial gifts. They also take up the concerns 
and requests of the electorate, that the local state government has failed to act upon. News 
of how the demarcation affected the local floating rice area reached the CPP working party.  
 With the commune election scheduled for the following year, there was a sense of 
optimism that the CPP working group would seriously take up the matter. However, there 
were major barriers preventing the working group from engaging with the issue. First, 
although it was the working groups aim to engage with local concerns, the political 
working group does not communicate directly with the local villagers. As in the case of the 
demarcation project, the working group relies on reports from key local officials, 
especially the commune chief.   
  On the enclosure issue, the leader of the CPP working party was scheduled to visit 
all commune chiefs involved. Unfortunately, the commune chief was outside the province 
at a relative’s wedding. The commune chief thus assigned his deputy chief to represent him 
at the meeting. The deputy commune chief had not been seriously involved in the 
demarcation process. Local farmers were unsure of his stance in the matter, as he had been 
overheard expressing a strong personal view in support of the enclosure.  
 Second, there was a conflict within the working group itself concerning the head of 
MOWRAM and the head of MIME. The demarcation project was implemented by 
MOWRAM and TSBA. MIME does not have any formal involvement in the demarcation, 
but its minister serves as the head of the CPP working group for Pursat province. For that, 
he was expected represent his constituents’ interest. According to interviews with 
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MOWRAM personnel, there had been lingering tensions between the ministers over the 
issue of sand extraction. In the period of a construction boom in the country, MOWRAM 
and MIME were at odds over who should collect revenue from sand extraction. 
MOWRAM, which is in charge of the demarcation project, for its official duty to manage 
state water resources, including rivers, lakes and swamps, claimed that it is in charge of 
managing sand in the rivers. Meanwhile, sand is considered an essential raw material for 
the construction industry. Thus, the Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy claimed that 
it should be under its management.  Although the tension never surfaced publicly, it still 
persists, making it unlikely that the leader of the CPP’s working group could secure a deal 
with MOWRAM. Moreover, MOWRAM has established itself as not only the expert 
ministry for the job of demarcation, but also as the sole institution to be given the power of 
the PM’s order to demarcate the area. It could selectively accuse anyone interfering with its 
job of defying the PM. 
 As a result, there had been no significant action by the working party on the matter 
of enclosure. In the appeal period, the head of the working party for Pursat province only 
told the commune chief to contact the pole placing leader on his own, and submit the 
required document.  
 Direct Appeal to the Top 
Two months after the placing of the poles, a group of farmers in Kampong Thom province 
managed to get their land back as a result of a direct intervention by the PM, who even 
granted local farmers an additional ten percent of their existing land holdings (Rasmei 
Kampuchea Daily Newspaper, 2011). But the space between the citizens and the PM is 
vast, meaning that most citizens are unable to gain access to the PM. This section describes 
two options the local farmers explored, and shows why they failed.  
 Option 1 involved local attempts to seek help from high ranking officials who had 
access to the PM and who had the political will to pass information regarding situation of 
the farmers onto the upper CPP officials. One likely candidate for the job was a member of 
the CCP working party18
                                                     
18The working party is a unique arrangement by the CPP. It is a political group assigned to a particular 
locality to maintain local electoral support for the party. 
 based in Pursat. The assistant to the deputy head of the CPP 
working party, had heard about the case, and made a verbal promise to pass it onto the PM. 
146 
 
But for weeks, nothing had happened. From past experience, the CPP working party has 
the executive power to intervene in any issue, and is much more responsive and effective 
in bringing about solutions than state offices. The working party can report directly to high 
officials in Phnom Penh who have political leverage over various local state institutions, 
and in the context of a lack of horizontal coordination between different line departments 
those officials are in a position of perceived authority to call for samrol19
 The second option involved local attempts to publicise the issue through the media. 
As discussed earlier, the Cambodian government employs every possible strategy to 
prevent its public image being harmed. It especially takes great care to avoid being 
portrayed as neglecting poor farmers. It would undermine its electoral campaign which 
heavily relies on vote-buying-through-gift- and-donation tactics. The idea was for local 
farmers to have their voice heard by powerful political figures including the PM, who, 
. When this 
happens, line departments no more operate like state institutions, but assume an upward 
political accountability to central officials. This overrides their differences, and united 
under one party, they come to have a common goal of solving public problems in the name 
of the party. But the issue of demarcation was of a different nature. It involved a conflict 
between the state that has established itself as the over-arching provider of social and 
environmental order, and the citizens that have been described as the destroyers of the 
environment. Moreover, it was not just an ordinary agency of the state, but a branch of 
state, MOWRAM, that has strong neo-patrimonial connections. Interviews with state 
officials suggested that none of the Cambodian bureaucrats, or politicians knew how to 
approach the matter in the interest of the locals, without being seen to challenge 
MOWRAM. This is reflected in the quote below: 
 This time MOWRAM is wrong, but next time you can be wrong. If you screw them 
 this time, you would be in trouble when you make a mistake in the  future  for they    
will get revenge. [Interview with CPP official,Phnom Penh, 20 March 2012] 
By refraining from pointing out other’s mistakes, party officials prioritise harmonious 
relations with each other, rather than dealing with outside interests. Party officials are more 
accountable to their own political and economic interests, which are secured under the 
watchful eyes of the PM, than to the distant interests of local constituencies. 
                                                     
19 In the Cambodia governance practice, Samrol is a term used to refer to an act of softening one’s 
bureaucratic position or allowing or making possible what would not be permitted by law if it were to be 
enforced strictly, and in exchange for a gift or financial reward. 
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according to past experience, the farmers hoped would issue an executive order that could 
override existing arrangements, and overturn the decisions of the demarcation team. 
Besides, the PM had made clear that his teams were to respect existing farmland. News of 
the enclosure would indicate to him that his officials had failed to follow his instruction, 
something that past experience showed, would often prompt a quick reaction. 
 There are many news entities in the country, ranging from the fearless, opposition 
newspaper, to the cautious , but most read papers such as, Dam Ampil20, Kos Santipap21, 
Kampuchea Thamey22 and Rasmey Kampuchea23
 Dam Ampil presented itself a good option for the case. It is not associated with the 
opposition party, which is one of the most important criteria. In addition, the chief of the 
newspaper had won the heart of pres en who even announced his appreciation of the paper 
in a televised speech
.  Choosing the right media outlet is 
crucial, not only in terms of reaching an audience, but also in securing a positive response 
from the head of state. For this particular case, Mr. S had advised the local farmer leaders 
not to approach the opposition newspaper as it had a limited readership, and a bad relation 
with the government which would not positively reflect the farmers interests.  
24
 But the newspaper’s reputation was only temporary. His challenges against big 
officials did not win him many friends, and in a patrimonial political system, his political 
clout faded when his enemies started to unite. In addition, he had been recently summoned 
to appear in a court on a defamation charge due to comments made alleging that a powerful 
 which sent out a strong message to the public that this person has 
the PM’s patronage, thus he has a high level of political privilege. With his newly obtained 
backing from the PM, the chief of the newspaper had been flexing his political muscle and 
been trying to build a reputation of presenting the interests of the poor, even if he has to 
take on big government officials. For a while, his paper was perceived as a new branch of 
the CPP, with a mission of searching and providing justice for the poor and powerless. The 
public perception was that he is the person they could access, in order to seek help fighting 
against powerful officials.  
                                                     
20Translated as Tamarind Tree. It is not clear why the Papers is named after the Tamarind tree. 
21 Translated as Island of Peace 
22 Translated as New Cambodia 
23 Translated as Light of Cambodia 
24 In Cambodia, it is observed that what the Prime Minister said in his televised speech is taken more 
seriously than the state law, and it is often implemented instantly. 
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tycoon was involved in miss-conduct. Thus there was a dilemma for the farmers as to 
whether they should approach him or not. There was the potential that following such an 
avenue would result in a strongly negative reaction from local officials. The farmer leaders 
did not want to risk reducing the likelihood of getting the land back.  
 The pressure was mounting for the farmer group leaders. There were words of 
TSBA and MOWRAM trying to push through the sub-decree to formalise and legalise the 
new map. There was another suggestion that the farmer leaders approach Kampuchea 
Thamey newspaper, which is also owned by the PM’s daughter. With the help of a friend 
who works in Phnom Penh, local farmer leaders found the contact number for the news 
desk, which then referred them to the local reporter for Pursat province. The local farmer 
leaders then called the reporter and expressed an intention to seek his help in covering the 
news. 
 Mr. O managed to convince the reporter that the local reality of the whole issue was 
different from the prevailing public perception that presented local farmers as forest 
destroyers. Thus the reporter agreed in principle to look into the matter. Mr. O sent the 
documents which included the letter to the governor and a copy of the 121 thumb prints to 
the reporter together with 100,000 Riel (25 US dollars) of his own money to help cover the 
cost of petrol for the reporter to travel to the village. The provision of money to the local 
reporter is a common practice due to an acknowledgment that reporters receive a low 
salary. Besides, it is understood that without providing money, the chance of them going 
out of their way to investigate the matter in the village is very limited. 
 A few days had passed, but nothing happened. Although the reporter had learned 
about the nature of the problem, he dared not report on the issue unless there was physical 
evidence of the farmers’ disagreement with the new map. The reporter told local leaders 
that they should organise some form of public appearance in which he could take 
photographs as hard evidence of the problem. But protesting is unprecedented in the 
history of the commune. Back in the village, everything remained calm as if nothing had 
happened. There emerged no form of public action. Three of the farmer leaders, with the 
word from the newspaper report, spent two days trying to encourage the villagers to rally at 
the commune office so that the reporter could take photographic evidence of movement. 
But the effort failed. The villagers refused to go to the commune office for fear of physical 
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violence. ‘We lose the land, and that is bad enough, so we don’t want to go to jail’ 
[Interview with one female farmer, Pursat, 17 March 2011]. Her position reflected those of 
the majority of the villager’s. But without the farmers coming to rally, the reporter refused 
to cover the story, and thus nothing happened. 
 At that point, local farmer leaders seemed to have depleted all possible options. The 
formal letter submitted through the administrative line did not get far, not even to the 
governor of the province. The hope of organizing a public rally faded away as farmers 
refused to come together to protest at the commune office. No official of any rank had been 
willing to take the matter to the PM as it could create tension with the minister of 
MOWRAM and the director of TSBA. The news reporter refused to cover the story unless 
there was hard physical evidence of the public disagreement, something which had never 
happened in the commune. Thus, that was the end of it. The local farmers had already 
accepted the fact that they would lose their land.  
The Emerging Possibility 
 Based on the analysis of public documents, TV and newspaper reports in the period that 
followed the demarcation, this section describes how affected farmers elsewhere managed 
to exploit the populist politics of the government. Based on follow-up telephone interviews 
with the local leaders, this section shows how this option failed in the study commune.  
 On 10 May 2011, the PM was seen on the news in Kampong Thom province 
intervening in the conflict between local farmers and the pole-placing working group. As 
Hughes (2002) argues, public protests can serve as a forum for individuals or groups to 
represent their interest or demand accountability from the government in Cambodia. 
Somehow, the farmers in that province managed to have their case heard.25
                                                     
25 This area is out of the scope of the study, thus the researcher could not verify the information himself, 
but rumor had it that the farmers in this particular area were hostile to the pole-placing team. They 
employed violence resistance where they brought axes and long knives to confront the group. The pole-
placing group responded by arresting and jailing some of the local farmers, thus information about the 
incident spread widely among members of the public and eventually the Prime Minister. 
The PM 
responded in his conventional style by flying to the site of conflict and assessing the 
situation himself. He announced in his televised speech that he had decided to give the 
farmland back to the farmers because he deemed the contested land to actually be 
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farmland. In addition, in a gesture of apology26
Svay, 2011
, the farmers were given an extra ten 
percent of their original land holding. The news of the PM’s intervention in Kampong 
Thom province was followed, two days later, by news reports from Rasmei Kampuchea 
Daily Newspaper that the PM had issued an order to MOWRAM and TSA to adjust the 
boundary line for a group of farmers in Bantey Meanchey province. On 31 May 2011, 200 
farmers representing 301 families in Banteay Meanchey province appealed to the 
provincial governor who then forwarded the case to the PM. The PM ordered MOWRAM 
and TSBA to re-assess the demarcation line in the area. The intervention of the PM 
resulted in a decision to readjust the location of the poles back to what the local farmers 
claimed to be the original positions. As a result, some 72164 hectares of floating rice land 
was given back to local farmers on 3June 2011( ).   
 In an interview aired on Bayon TV channel, the farmers were asked about how they 
got their land back. Those farmers had faced a very similar problem to those within the 
case study commune in Pursat. They organised themselves into groups of farmers - one 
representing each affected village. The farmer representative was in charge of collecting 
ideas, putting them down on paper and submitting appeal letters to the provincial governor. 
According to the farmers’ account, the governor passed the appeal letter to the central 
ministries, and possibly the PM, who by means of his executive short-cut, decided to grant 
the farmers their land back. 
 The development provided the local farmers in Pursat with a fresh and more 
positive way of looking at their problems. The local farmer leaders, upon hearing of the 
news, spread it among their group who became convinced that they might be able to seek a 
solution similar to that of the Banteay Meanchey farmers. The idea was to choose four 
farmer representatives - one from each of the villages. The representative would have to 
work with local farmers to draft a new appeal letter, and then submit it to the village chief 
who would have to sign for authentication purposes, and pass it on to the commune chief. 
It was expected that the new appeal letter would reach the governor, who would pass it on 
to the central ministry, thus a response could be expected to follow.  
                                                     
26 It should be noted here that the time of intervention was very close to the time of the upcoming election 
for the commune council, thus the gesture of apology could very much be interpreted as a part of the 
political calculation as captured by a political science term, the debt of gratitude. 
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 But even then, the message from the PM was not clear. In the televised speech from 
his intervention in the Kompong Thom case, he had stated that ‘problems in every other 
province such as Battambong and Kompong Channang, have been resolved’[Prime 
Minister’s speech, 10May 2011]. The phrase ‘every other province’ could be interpreted by 
officials to mean that the case has now been entirely resolved, and is thus closed. If new 
appeals surfaced in provinces other than Kompongg Thom, it would contradict the PM’s 
words, suggesting that he had been miss-informed. But the PM is known among officials 
as being careful in what he says, always checking details before he speaks in public. Thus 
any contradiction in this case would cause him to inquire into it. Thus it is in the best 
interest of the pole-placing team to block any new appeal from surfacing.  
 Back in the village, there was a new scandal involving a number of village chiefs 
and the commune chief. A group of local individuals who identified themselves as part of 
the commune authority had approached the farmers whose land was affected, and asked for 
30,000riel ($7.5US dollars) in what they called ‘a contribution fee’, if they wanted their 
land back. With that money they claimed that they would seek a solution that would result 
in the farmers getting their land back. Two weeks prior to this, the commune chief and 
some of his village chiefs in the affected commune of Pursat, were summoned by the 
governor for questions of alleged corruption concerning the money collection. It should 
also be noted here that the contemporary political climate has evolved in an interesting 
way. Officials in Cambodia were afraid of being accused of corruption due to the recent 
creation of a powerful state body known as the Anti-Corruption unit. This unit was led by 
close associates of the PM. What is significant about this is that since its establishment, the 
unit has acted decisively against a number of officials charged with corruption. The head 
of the unit is the close associate of, and has the blessing of, the PM. In a recent incident, 
the anti-corruption unit, prosecuted the Pursat provincial court director, and jailed him for 
35 years.  
 The prospect of success of a new appeal from local farmers depended heavily on 
how the commune chief saw the matter. However, in light of the anti-corruption activities, 
supporting the local farmer’s movement could be interpreted as supporting corrupt 
activities. Prior to the demarcation project, national TV and Radio stations actively accused 
local authorities of colluding with land speculators to forge documents to support their 
other-wise illegal ownership over land. Thus it is not likely that the commune would want 
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to be involved in the farmers’ case. The commune chief’s earlier summons by the governor 
re-enforced that feeling. But without the commune chief’s permission, the village chiefs 
would not be willing to let farmers organise themselves. Thus there was little possibility of 
the appeal happening. The only way forward was for the commune chief to gain approval 
from the governor to allow farmers to appeal again in the wake of the PM’s speech.  As the 
head of the province, the governor was expected to make the phone call, but he did not. 
Without that phone call, it was still not clear if the governor would welcome, thus facilitate 
the farmers new appeal process, or whether he would be more inclined to block it, should 
the farmers decide to go ahead with their new appeal.  
 Meanwhile, it was in the best interest of the pole-placing group, MOWRAM and 
TSBA, to block any attempts at appeal in any province where the PM had stated that all 
problems had been dealt with. Otherwise, MOWRAM and TSBA would be in danger of 
being seen to lie to the PM. Without delay, the pole-placing group swiftly pushed for the 
governor of those provinces, including Pursat, to sign in recognition of the closing of the 
pole placing phase. The signature of the governor was needed for the sub-decree to be 
passed. On 13 June 2011, the governor of Pursat signed the document which was part of 
the sub-decree, and that signifies the end of the farmers hope for appeal, formalising the 
loss of their long-held farm land.  
 On Monday, 27August 2011, the PM signed the sub-decree that fully endorsed the 
status of the newly demarcated area of protected flooded forest. The governor who knew of 
the enclosure of farmers’ land welcomed the sub-decree in a manner that gave no 
impression of all the contestations that had so far occurred.  
It is very necessary to demarcate flooded forest and protect it… I’ve already had to 
order local authorities and watch dogs to protect [flooded forests] against offenses 
in my area. [Governor of Pursat, quoted in Phnom Penh Post, 31 August 2011] 
In the end, the farmers of Pursat lost their farmland. The state, as represented by 
MOWRAM and TSBA, with the assistance of an un-critical media, labeled local citizens 
as criminals for the crime of cultivating their own land. These farmers earned a reputation 
as those whose ‘…harmful activities damaged the Tonle Sap and its buffer zone [flooded 
forest], with no thought of national and common interests’ (Yem, 2010). On Monday, 
9April 2012, Dam Ampil Newspaper published an article, under the title TSBA interdicts 4 
tractors while ploughing flooded forest in Pursat. The article reported that TSBA 
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confiscated four tractors that were used to encroach the protected flooded forest in Pursat. 
The article concluded that the four illegal tractors were impounded at the commune office 
and the law-breaking owners were ordered to promise not to repeat the offense (Eng, 
2012). However, the accompanying photo in the article featured an old tractor ploughing 
an open field of old farmland. There are no signs of trees, not to mention forest. This 
confirms Camilleri’s and Falk’s (1992:30) understanding of power as  ‘…the capacity of 
institutions to manage and manipulate information’. However this case shows that 
institutions in a neo-patrimonial state consist of only a few personally connected 
individuals who hold power.  
Figure 19: Picture of enforcement activities 
 
Source: Dam Ampil Newspaper. This tractor is being seized by PDOWRAM in collaboration with the police 
force on charges of illegal ploughing activities in the area marked as flooded forest. However, as evident in 
the photo itself, the field has the characteristic of a typical floating rice land with old straw left over from the 
cultivation of the previous year. The little bush under which a man and his dog are taking refuge from the sun 
is used by the arresting authority as evidence of remaining forest, but based on field observation, it is a 
typical make-shift shelter constructed to provide protection from the sun.  
154 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has given an account of how knowledge of the environment is transferred 
from the state in an un-reciprocal manner to the society. In doing so, this chapter showed 
that within the Cambodian neo-patrimonial state, formal mechanisms for appeal are 
dominated by central state agents. It has shown how citizens are subjected to complex 
layers of bureaucratic red tape, with an emphasis on strict adherence to formal procedures, 
which often has the intention of inhibiting local appeals. The likelihood of the emergence 
of a local movement was further minimised by the actions of local government. Despite the 
rhetoric of decentralisation and deconcentration, the conduct of local government is strictly 
hierarchical. Village authorities cannot act on a local matter without approval from the 
commune authority, which also needs approval from the district authorities, and so on. 
Meanwhile, citizens have not realised their democratic rights, and still operate in fear.  
 This chapter also showed that the local government consists of so many layers at 
different levels that we cannot speak of a single coherent local government. This suggests 
that within the neo-patrimonial state, local government is not simply comprised of local 
authorities that reflect the interests of citizens back to higher level authorities as D&D 
would aim for. The superficial appearance of a functioning local government gives the 
impression of a clear distinction between village, commune and district authorities. Yet 
what the case of the appeal process has shown is that at local levels there is a strong 
upward line of accountability where the village and commune chiefs are more accountable 
to informal hierarchical networks than the local people. Only one of four village chiefs 
concerned, showed an initiative in the appeal process. The commune authority can be 
classified as more active in representing local interests, but it operates in a framework of 
strict upward accountability. Thus, the extent to which the commune authority can actually 
represent local interest is determined by superiors, notably the district chief. The district 
authorities, as the experience from the demarcation shows, do not identify with local 
interests. They not only failed to act on behalf of local interests, but also have a vested 
interest in hampering local efforts to appeal state decisions. The district authority does not 
see enclosure of local farmland as a negative outcome of central government activities, but 
as an opportunity for it to pick up the mess and use it to its own interests.  
 This chapter also showed the potential problems of using party mechanisms to 
represent local interests. Its ability to represent local concerns is compromised by the 
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manner in which party officials gather local information, and by personal rifts within the 
party.  
 This section also showed how local leaders outside of the state system could 
contribute to local protest and appeal. They are an important source of information, vision, 
initiative and resources. Their actions may be motivated by their own personal interests, 
but they nonetheless play an important role in pushing local interests. They are also 
progressive, and persistent in exploring all potential means for solving the local problems.  
 This chapter also showed the role of the media and its limitations in representing 
the concerns of local interests. The media, as the findings suggest, could bring local 
problems such as the enclosure, to the attention of leaders. Yet its failure to follow any 
interests other than its own erodes its legitimacy. Its practice of relaying, instead of 
seeking, news turns it into a tool of state propaganda. In addition, its existence within the 
neo-patrimonial politics of Cambodia means that the media is severely restricted, where 
they are required to exercise a great deal of caution and self-censorship. 
 Overall, this chapter is about how neo-patrimonialism manifests itself in practice. It 
showed the nature of personal power, institutional instability, the effect of informal 
networks on the formal operation of the state, and the unpredictability inherent within the 
governance system. These points will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
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Chapter VIII: Discussion 
 
 
The case study material gained from the Tone Sap demarcation project is useful for giving 
insights into the manner in which territorial strategies are employed by state agencies 
within a neo-patrimonial system. This chapter brings together the material presented in 
Chapter V, VI and VII. It then discusses the significance of this material from two 
theoretical standpoints- territorial strategies, and neo-patrimonialism.  
Lessons from the Case Study 
From the outset, the demarcation of Tonle Sap gave an impression that the demarcation of 
Tonle Sap is carried out in the interest of the ecology and the nation at large, by protecting 
the flooded forest and the species in the Tonle Sap area and protecting the nation’s fish 
resources. However, a closer examination, as given in Chapter V and VI, revealed that the 
demarcation of Tonle Sap is an act of state internal territorialization, in which the state 
actively engages territorial strategies to extend its control over the society. Those strategies 
include a changing rationale of Tonle Sap governance, mapping demarcation and 
enforcement. 
 The case study material presented in Chapters V suggests that the state capitalises 
on the international discourse of environmental protection. The state interventions colonise 
the language of environmental protection, sustainable resource governance, and rational 
land use planning in order to claim legitimacy in its actions of managing resource-rich 
areas such as the Tonle Sap. The use of this language and its role in resource governance 
lends legitimacy to state interventions, which allows the state to engage in its territorial 
strategies to expand its jurisdiction to the realm of resource governance. This has meant 
gaining control over important territories by claiming that modernist state institutions are 
not only the best placed, but the only possible legitimate actor, to sustainably manage 
vulnerable ecosystems. Chapter V also showed the problematic nature of map making. It 
showed that map of the protected areas of Tonle Sap is not an accurate representation of 
the Tonle Sap space, but it is a tool those in power use to project their geographical 
imagination.  
 Chapter VI and VII investigated the territorial strategies and they reveal the 
pervasive nature of personal power in the neo-patrimonial state. Here, power is based on 
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persons holding office rather than on state institutions per se. The material presented in 
Chapter V, VI and VII shows two broad levels of personal power that underpin state’s 
territorial strategies. At the policy level, the PM personally initiated the national policy on 
Tonle Sap demarcation. His wish, expressed through televised speeches, rapidly became 
the national policy on Tonle Sap demarcation, which was quickly acted upon by state 
agents. At the level of implementation, as shown in chapter VI, the agents representing the 
central state exercise state power vested in them to carry out the demarcation project as if it 
were their personal property. They took the assigned task of Tonle Sap demarcation as 
power given to them personally by the PM and came up with a course of action that more 
suited their personal circumstances than serving the interest of the nation at large. This 
course of actions, although in the name of Tonle Sap protection, included the assessment 
and demolition of private reservoirs in Kampong Thom, the drawing of the new map of 
Tonle Sap protected area whose shifting of the green shade representing flooded forest area 
to the south side of Tonle Sap reflects political considerations over ecological protection, 
and the placing of the demarcation pole in ways that reclassify floating rice land of the 
local farmers as forest land. With these personalised powers, the logic of rational resource 
governance is replaced by the agents’ own street level logics, and pursuit of rent-seeking 
interests.  
 The way Tonle Sap space is represented in the demarcation project affects human 
relations with the places in Tonle Sap areas in important ways. First, it serves to erase the 
history of human existence and the experience of floating rice farming in the area. Second, 
it rearranges the local property regime in ways that displace customary rights arrangements 
which have served to govern access to land and resources in the Tonle Sap area. The 
representation of Tonle Sap space also alters the sense of place the locals had. In the 
aftermath of the delineation of the new boundary line, the locals no longer referred to the 
area by their customary knowledge of a certain natural pond, local tree or somebody else’s 
farmland but by position of the poles which serve as a point of a clear separation between 
what is legal farmland and what is protected area of simple homogeneity.  
 The case study material presented in Chapters V and VI capture state internal 
territorialization, where the state actively attempts to exert control over the space within its 
national sovereignty. The account of the internal state territorial strategies reveals an 
important role of maps which were made not on the basis of ecological considerations or 
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local landscapes, but to serve the specific political and economic interests of modernist 
state agents.  
The personalised nature of power that flows within the neo-patrimonial state results in the 
problem of national policies which are unclearly defined. This allows implementing state 
agents to distort policy, which imposes a significant cost on society. The case study also 
shows that when such an imposition occurs, the less powerful actors in a neo-patrimonial 
state cannot demand accountability from the state. Chapter VII shows how personal power 
in the neo-patrimonial political system allows central state agents to dominate society. The 
personalised networks of power pervade formal state institutions, and prevent social actors 
from expressing any interests which go against the state. 
 While providing answers to the question of how the state, through territorial 
resource governance, exercises power over society, the case study material also offers 
some important contributions to the literature of territoriality and neo-patrimonialism, 
which will be discussed in the sections that follow.  
Territorial Strategies in a Neo-patrimonialist State 
The case study material presented in Chapter V, VI and VII contributes to Sack’s (1986) 
notion of territorialisation. His framework is centred on five key processes: resource 
governance, mapping, communication, demarcation and law enforcement. This framework 
has been useful in analyzing the territorial strategies of states. However, the case study 
material suggests that within different contexts of different political regimes, territorial 
strategies take on different forms.  
 From the experience of the Tonle Sap demarcation project where territorial 
strategies unfolded in the context of the neo-patrimonial state of Cambodia, such strategies 
are pursued and implemented in unique ways.  
 The need to change the logic of resource governance is replaced by the command 
of the PM. As seen in chapter V, the PM, concerned with environmental protection, 
decided that the Tonle Sap needed to be governed in a new manner. So he enacted a new 
national policy on Tonle Sap governance and ordered for a clear physical boundary line to 
be demarcated. His order replaced any attempts to debate the logic of Tonle Sap resource 
governance. Thus, there were no formal processes of consultation with state experts, nor 
rigorous debates. 
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 Formal map making in this context was done according to the prejudices and 
particular circumstances of MOWRAM staff and their political clients. The case study 
material suggested that the logic underpinning the production of the new map of Tonle Sap 
was primarily due to the minister’s desire to keep a certain amount of flooded forest area 
protected. This kind of mapping was not done with the prime interest of representing the 
lived space of farmers, but done in order to realise the vision that those in power had of 
space within the basin. Map makers were able to successfully convert the vision of the 
minister of MOWRAM, with all the attached values and prejudices, into a map. However, 
for those cartographers, map making is determined by political concerns rather than 
geographical or ecological. As seen in Chapter V, the map of the Tonle Sap protected area 
represented a significant shift in farmland from the north side of the lake to the south side. 
This reflected the interests of powerful figures within the north compared to the politically 
marginalised farmers in the south. 
 The need to communicate the intention to control the new territory was replaced by 
a system of personal assignment. The case material showed that the PM personally 
assigned MOWRAM to take charge of the demarcation project, effectively handing over 
power to control the new territory. The case study material showed that the personal 
assignment not only gave MOWRAM the responsibility to control the newly constructed 
space, but also political protection from other state agencies. Insights from interviews and 
observations from state agents at national, provincial and local levels confirmed that most 
perceived the Tonle Sap project as belonging to MOWRAM. This was also reflected 
clearly within the actual demarcation process. 
 The demarcation process was conducted as an exclusive territorial project by a 
certain group of state agents with close personal and political connection to the PM. The 
case study showed that the demarcation of the Tonle Sap area was in effect performed by 
agents representing MOWRAM and TSBA. There was no evidence of the use of local 
maps. No effort to survey the landscape was made, and there was no room for local 
participation. Demarcation was carried out on the basis of street level logic and personal 
interests in rent seeking. 
 The case study suggests that the territorial strategies of the neo-patrimonial political 
system are a powerful tool for the state to extend its control over society. What makes it 
dangerous is that in a neo-patrimonial state such as that of Cambodia, the local population 
could not demand accountability from the state. But having said this, it is not to suggest 
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that the notion of the state itself is un-problematic. This will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Cambodian Neo-patrimonialism Reconsidered   
The Cambodian state may have the appearance of a modern state, with legislative, 
executive and judiciary branches, but the insights from the case study suggest that it does 
not function as a bureaucratic and corporatist state, but instead as a neo-patrimonial one.   
 Observations of the Tonle Sap demarcation project revealed important features of 
the Cambodian political system. The case study showed that political power in Cambodia 
is derived from personal connections, and relations of loyalty and dependence. The power 
of MOWRAM, perceived or real, was based mainly on its proximity - political and 
personal, to the PM. The minister of MOWRAM was seen as a senior member of the ruling 
party and was believed to be a close ally of the PM. This was supported by constant public 
appearances where he stood next to the PM and also by the fact that he was directly 
assigned by the PM to take charge of the demarcation project. It was further confirmed by 
the remark of the provincial governor, quoted earlier in the chapter as saying: 
 
 That guy [the minister]…. is very dangerous. You have to be careful before you 
want to do anything. If he is happy you may be ok. If he is not, he can just go 
straight to the  PM, and who know what he would say. Then just a phone call from 
the PM, and I can be kicked out of my office.  
 
This quote gives a strong indication that Cambodia is far from the model of a legal-rational 
bureaucracy, and that the Weberian perspective of an ideal state as consisting of layers of 
institutions with dedicated personnel, is distant from Cambodian realities. The Cambodian 
state is a neo-patrimonial political system where one’s power is based not on his or her 
publicly-defined position, but on political and personal connections to the PM. 
 The case study also showed that political power in Cambodia is based on 
individuals and not the office, as observed to be the case elsewhere (Medard, 1982; 
Theobold, 1982). Two points are worth noting here. The first concerns the power and 
effectiveness of the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization (TSBMO) in managing 
the Tonle Sap basin. As its name suggests, TSBMO was created as a state organization to 
manage the Tonle Sap basin. However, it failed in its tasks due to a lack of coordination 
and cooperation from concerned agencies.  When the organization became the Tonle Sap 
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Basin Authority (TSBA), it came to be respected as a powerful authority even though it has 
the same institutional mission. The only difference was that the new director of the TSBA 
was the nephew of the Minister of MOWRAM. This shows that power is based on personal 
connections, where the individual is more important than the office.  
 The second important observation concerns the local government’s ability to 
represent its own constituency. In the aftermath of the demarcation project, floating rice 
farmers in all of the six provinces around the Tonle Sap were affected. However, not every 
province managed to appeal the process due to different state institutional arrangements 
and the personal characteristics of key power brokers. The person in charge of demarcation 
for the provinces of Kampong Chhnang and Bantey Meanchey were more in touch with 
local needs, and allowed for more input from the local state. The person in charge of the 
demarcation in Pursat is known to have connections to the PM, and he did not have any 
meaningful dialogue with local actors. The governor of Pursat was afraid of MOWRAM’s 
close proximity to the PM, and thus refused to intervene on the side of local farmers. These 
observations confirm the neo-patrimonial features of the Cambodia state, where power is 
based on the person not the office.     
 Drawing on the experience of African countries, Bratton and Walle (1994) argue 
that officials within a neo-patrimonial state do not see formal connections between their 
bureaucratic life, and the interests of wider society. In a neo-patrimonial state, public office 
is not a place where public interests are served, but a place where state officials pursue 
their own private interests. Empirical evidence from the demarcation project showed that 
officials in Cambodia use public office for personal wealth accumulation. The behaviour of 
the demarcation project leader serves as a case in point. As seen in the case study material, 
the PM’s order to demarcate flooded forest was carried out by central state agents in ways 
that displaced local lived space. After initial complaints however, the demarcation project 
leader was given discretionary power in his pole placing duties in order to ensure that 
flooded forest was protected while farmland would remain unaffected. However, the 
project leader exploited his position, and used his power to seek rent from those he was 
supposed to serve with his discretionary power.  
 The behaviour of the district chief serves as another good example of using public 
office to pursue personal interests.  As part of the local government, the district chief was 
in a position to challenge the decisions of central agents in their pole placing activities. 
However, the district authorities did not react to the position of poles, even where 
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significant amounts of farmland were under threat of enclosure. This shows that officials 
were more interested in protecting their position than fulfilling their official duties. 
Moreover, the district authority was not only deaf to local appeals, but saw a benefit in 
blocking them. The enclosure of the floating rice land facilitated the transfer of those lands 
to state property, which could then be leased to private investors by the district authorities. 
Regardless of whether such plans would materialise, local perceptions that district 
authorities had private interests in the land, were a strong deterrent from following through 
formal district level appeal processes. As seen in the case study chapter, the district chief 
acted to block local attempts at protest. This shows that the district chief did not see 
himself as having a duty to resolve the local crisis, but rather saw an opportunity to make 
personal gain. However, the behaviour of the district chief was not unconstrained. The  
case study suggest that in advancing his personal interests, the district chief had actively 
assessed the opportunity for profit against the local ability to amount pressure on him. 
Only when it appeared politically unviable to block appeal attempts, did the district chief 
stop pursuing his land interests 
 As the case study of the demarcation showed, the Cambodian bureaucracy operates 
with a high degree of unpredictability. Evidence showed that officials, particularly at the 
provincial and local levels, operate according to a host of factors which originate at higher 
levels. The governor, for example, knew about the displacement of local farmland in his 
constituency, to which he objected. However, he did not dare to openly air disagreement 
for fear that that he may be displaced from his position. This fear is not just based on 
irrational thought, but is legitimate in the context of Cambodian politics. As Un (2011) 
argues, political power is concentrated in the executive branch of the government, 
especially within the inner circle of the PM. Past experience shows that he can readily 
remove any of his officials from office. In the case of the demarcation, MOWRAM had 
been directly assigned to carry out the demarcation. Thus the provincial governor felt 
unable to fulfill his duty, and challenge the work of MOWRAM. This suggests that 
officials actively access their political environment when they are confronted with local 
problems, and the case study suggests that the political power of agents is defined by their 
relative proximity to the PM. Those who have access to the PM are considered to have 
significant political power, and tend to dominate those state agents below them. 
 The bureaucrats at the provincial line departments also operate in an atmosphere of 
fear of losing their office. Apart from their sense of identity as sena, which has 
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connotations with giving unconditional obedience to superiors, some of those bureaucrats, 
who are familiar with the space of floating rice in the province, also disagreed with the 
demarcation line. But they were not willing to open dialogues, or give suggestions in the 
interest of protecting such land. Instead, they saw their own positions at risk from acting in 
any way that would offend their superiors. Throughout the period of data collection, the 
phrase ‘order from the top’ was frequently cited by low level bureaucrats when asked by 
the researcher about their indifference to the local enclosure. 
  At the local level, a sense of instability was also evident. The commune chief and 
one of the village chiefs were the most active in trying to challenge the demarcation line. 
But in doing so, they were fully aware of the associated risks. They were afraid of being 
accused of being non-cooperative, and instead of mounting an open challenge to the 
demarcation project leader, the commune chief offered to take the project leader on a tour 
around the local area to ‘show him the local layout’. When it became clear that the 
demarcation line was going to enclose local land, the commune chief and the village chief 
showed disagreement only by way of expressing concern over the impact of the enclosure 
on local livelihoods. The sense of instability can also be seen in the appeal process. Local 
authorities, particularly the commune chief, were afraid of being accused of leading a local 
protest against the state, which could have serious consequences for them. As Hughes 
(2002) observes, movements and protests are often seen as the work of opposition parties. 
A quote in the case study chapter captures the essence of the commune chief’s fear: ‘I can’t 
just go around and tell people to enlist their name in the appeal document, for I can be 
accused of leading a local movement against the state’. 
 The case study also showed that the behaviour of state agents and institutions in 
Cambodia is highly unpredictable. As Erdmann and Engel (2006) note, such 
unpredictability is the result of a combination of formal and informal logics which inform 
the actions of state agents. First, on the issue of institutional unpredictability, the case 
study showed that the Tonle Sap area has had an existing demarcation regime which 
separates between two contested areas. Although the line has never been officially 
recognised, at the national level it is endorsed by the maps used by state agencies, 
including MOWRAM itself, NGOs and donors. At the local level, the line was marked by 
old concrete boundary poles that remained in place until the late 1980s. In the absence of 
those poles, the boundary line continues to be endorsed by local customary knowledge, as 
seen in the previous chapter. If institutions were to provide predictability and stability, as 
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Peters (2005)argues, the call for a clear demarcation line should result in the reinstitution 
of this line. But instead, a new map was made which both replaced the old one, and 
displaced the value of local knowledge. This shows the manner in which a certain 
institutional logic at one point in time can be easily replaced by another later in time.   
 In terms of the behaviour of state agents, the demarcation project showed a high 
degree of unpredictability. The behaviour of the demarcation project leader is worth 
analyzing here. The case study suggests that the behaviour and the course of action of the 
demarcation project leader were highly unpredictable. The demarcation was a state project 
that arose out of the need for conservation and development of the Tonle Sap areas by 
clearly demarcating the boundary line between the floating rice and flooded forest area. 
The two objectives are a reflection of the institutional mission of TSBA for effective 
management of Tonle Sap basin. Thus the agent leading the demarcation project was 
expected to achieve these goals. From a neo-patrimonial point of view, the demarcation 
project leader was expected to follow the PM’s order of protecting the flooded forest and 
respecting existing rice area. However, the case study showed that the actual behaviour of 
the agents leading the demarcation project was determined by personal interests and rent 
seeking. As Lipsky (1980)argues, the central state can put in place any law and policy 
guidelines, but the bureaucrats at the street level choose to behave in ways that are suitable 
to their everyday routines. The demarcation team for instance placed pole 43A in an area 
they could easily gain access to, rather than in an area based on a careful consideration of 
farmland. In the second round of implementation, the project leader’s behaviour was 
driven by his rent-seeking interests. Thus, the actual position of boundary poles defies the 
formal programmatic logic of the demarcation.  
 In addition, the case study suggests that what made the behaviour of state agents 
highly unpredictable was that it was not just based on their street level logics and rent-
seeking agendas, but also on the particular space which they occupied within the neo-
patrimonial hierarchy. State agents actively assessed their own power in relation to other 
agents who may not approve of their rent-seeking behaviours, and the local people from 
whom they wish to extract rents. Although there was no data from other areas to allow for 
a cross-commune comparison, the data available to the researcher suggested that the 
behaviour of the state agents during the demarcation project differed greatly in different 
localities. In Kampong Chhnang province for example, the demarcation project leader 
allowed the line departments and local authorities to participate in decision making 
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processes that resulted in a respect for exiting cultivated land. In Battambong, farmer 
protests against the position of the poles resulted in a revised demarcation policy. In Pursat 
however, farmers were unable to mobilise in opposition to the pole positions due to the 
inhibitory actions of local authorities.    
 Another example of the unpredictability of the state agent’s behaviour can be seen 
through the district chief’s actions. As seen in the empirical chapter, the demarcation 
project leader told the affected farmers to contact their village chiefs, who needed to 
contact the district chief, in order to file a formal appeal document. Superficially, this 
process appears to be a straight forward, genuinely bottom-up process. However, the case 
study showed that the appeal process had to be initiated by the district chief. The farmers 
would not act without permission from the village chiefs, who felt they had to receive 
approval from the commune chief first. In the same manner, the commune chief, was not 
willing to take any action unless the district chief allowed him to, placing the likelihood of 
the local appeal in the hands of the district chief. From a legal-rational political point of 
view, the district chief was in a position to represent local interests. According to this logic 
he should be expected to support the local appeal process. But the case study showed that 
the district chief did not act in ways that protected local interests, nor did he support local 
efforts at appeal. The set of decisions and courses of action that the district chief chose 
could not be predicted, nor could they be understood from his formal bureaucratic position. 
The case study showed that the set of decisions and courses of action that the district chief 
took, were chiefly explained by his personal interests in the matter. Without insights into 
his personal hidden agendas in the contested land, one would not be able to reason why the 
chief behaved the way he did. 
 The most interesting example of a state agent’s unpredictable behaviour can be 
seen in the commune chief. As shown in this study, the commune chief was the one most 
active in protecting the interests of the floating rice farmers. He was actively seeking ways 
to influence the decisions of the project leader in order to save the floating rice area in his 
commune; he was also most enthusiastic about local efforts at appeal, and he went out of 
his way to get the district chief to agree to the local appeal. But as evidence from the Tonle 
Sap demarcation showed, when the opportunity came, the commune chief also sought rent 
in conducting his public duties, by charging a service fee from those affected farmers. To 
the local farmers the effect of this kind of behaviour is more than a mere financial loss, but 
a reduction in the possibility, and hope of a local action against state decisions. The chief’s 
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rent seeking behaviour resulted in him being called into question by the governor. Being 
implicated in what could potentially be a corruption charge, which as Darden (2001) points 
out can be a serious case for officials in a neo-patrimonial state, the commune chief saw 
the appeal as potentially dangerous, and came to distance himself from it. Without his 
involvement, the possibility of local appeal became even more remote. This strongly 
reflects the instability and unpredictability of the behaviour of state agents.  
 All of evidence from the Tonle Sap demarcation project suggested that Cambodia 
has a neo-patrimonial political system which is categorised by office holders who retain 
power based on personal connections and relations of loyalty and dependence. Political 
power in Cambodia is personal and it is based on the person not the office, and public 
offices are not primarily created in order to serve the public interest, but for acquiring 
personal wealth. This point confirms Un’s and So’s (2009:134) argument in which they 
state that the CPP’s ultimate focus is on the ‘accumulation of wealth’. The case study also 
showed that state agents in Cambodia could not be expected to perform their public duty 
when they are faced with the constant fear of losing their position. At the same time, the 
case study suggests that the structure of the state is not to blame alone. The behaviour of 
state agents themselves is unpredictable when they combine rational–bureaucratic logics 
with informal neo-patrimonial logics. The case study material showed that those agents 
would typically choose to advance their personal interests with little or no consideration 
for the cost it imposes on the wider society. This resulted in the divergence between the 
original intentions of the PM’s speech and what actually happened on the ground. This 
suggests the need for an analysis of the structure of power in neo-patrimonial states, which 
comes in the following section. 
Structure of Power in Neo-patrimonialism Reconsidered 
The data from the demarcation of the Tonle Sap challenge the notion of the top leader 
within a neo-patrimonial state having ultimate power. The literature of neo-patrimonialism 
suggests that the top man occupies the highest position of power (Bratton & Walle, 1997; 
Sandbrook, 1985; Soest, 2006). The top man exercises this power as personal property 
(Clapham, 1985; Medard, 1982), through personal networks (Pitcher et al., 2009).  In 
addition, the top man employs a range of measures to ensure compliance and prevent the 
possibility of resistance from his officials. Those measures include short-term tenure 
(Soest, 2006), rotation of public figures (Snyder & Mahoney, 1999) and close surveillance 
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(Darden, 2001, 2003). This leads Laruelle (2012) to argue that everyone in the neo-
patrimonial system is directly subordinate to the ultimate leader. Thus, the exercise of 
power as personal property, short-term tenure, and the continued compliance-ensuring 
operations of surveillance, lead to the concentration of power in the hands of the top 
leaders. In other words, the top man, to use Allen’s (1999) language, is the source and the 
centre of power, and this power is transmitted intact to the receiving end. 
 The Tonle Sap demarcation project suggested that the Cambodian state consists of 
three main actors: the PM, the minister of MOWRAM and the implementing agents. The 
PM issued an order which was translated into state policy. The minister of MOWRAM 
took ownership of the order, and together with TSBA, translated the policy into a suite of 
actions to be carried out by the demarcation team. This created a system of strong upwards 
accountability, where implementing agents were directly accountable to the minister and 
the PM. However, the case study suggests that the state functions in a complicated manner 
which involves more than just the PM and a small group of his personally connected 
agents. The structure of power in this kind of state does not follow a linear line in which 
power flows from the top person of the state to the population. 
 The case study suggested that the PM may be the source and the centre of power, 
but that his power is not necessarily transmitted intact to the receiving end. In the case of 
the Tonle Sap demarcation project, the PM is responsible for initiating state policy, with 
the intention to both protect the environment and maintain floating rice land. The final 
outcome of his policy however was the displacement of floating rice farming. The case 
study showed that the PM has the power to initiate state policies, but the final effect of his 
power is modified or even distorted as it is transferred through different state organs. Of 
particular importance is the space between the PM and the receiving end of power, and this 
space is where most attention should be given when analyzing power within a neo-
patrimonial state. 
 The case study suggested that after the state’s demarcation project was initiated, 
power was transferred from the PM to the minister of MOWRAM, who came up with the 
idea of a new map of the Tonle Sap. Without permitting consultations with the public, or 
other state agencies, MOWRAM made the map to suite its ambition of protecting 645,800 
hectares of forest, a size, MOWRAM argues, that was necessary to sustain Tonle Sap 
biodiversity. However, this size reflects the state of the flooded forest in the early 1980s, 
and the decision to use this figure as the basis of demarcation in 2010 and 2011 means 
168 
 
ignoring, or ever undoing, local development over the last 30 years. In the context of 
Cambodia as a post-conflict and developing country, agricultural expansion has taken 
place rapidly, and as seen in Chapter III and Chapter V, there had been substantial 
agricultural development within the Tonle Sap flood plain. But to suit MOWRAM’s 
particular environmental idealism, the map represents a 50 percent loss of the floating rice 
land, which contradicts the intention of the PM to both conserve and develop the flood 
plain.  
 Moreover, the case study showed that the effect of power changed as authority to 
conduct the demarcation was transferred from MOWRAM to field agents, particularly the 
demarcation project leader. The case study showed that this group of officials did not 
operate in strict compliance with MOWRAM, but rather in accordance with their street 
level logic to advance their rent-seeking interests. As the case study material showed, the 
final effect of the demarcation project saw a loss of an estimated 70 percent of the floating 
rice area in the study commune.  
 Based on Weber’s (1978:1111[1922]) definition of power as ‘the capacity of an 
individual to realise his will even against the opposition of others’, the case of the 
demarcation project suggests that the PM of a neo-patrimonial political system does not 
hold the ultimate power. Rather, the power of the leader can be mitigated or amplified by 
those who occupy the space between the leader and the population, and this space, as the 
demarcation project showed, is occupied by a few men who are personally connected to 
the PM (i.e. the minister of MOWRAM and the demarcation project leader). Based on the 
same definition of power, the Tonle Sap demarcation project suggests that what matters for 
society is not necessarily the direct orders of the PM, but what emanates from those under 
him. Within this mid-space, different sub-groups compete to show their loyalty and 
political worthiness to the PM in exchange for his trust and patronage. Such trust serves to 
secure the position of well-connected elites and allows them to further their own personal 
interests.  
 The case study material showed that power is exercised not only over society, but 
also over low level state agents including the provincial government and local authorities. 
To explain this, I shall use Lukes’s concept of power as discussed in Chapter II. Lukes 
(1974) argues that there are three concepts of power, power to, power over, and power as 
dominance. The case study suggested that all three concepts of power were employed by 
the central agents leading up to the demarcation project, in order to seek compliance from 
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state officials at provincial and local levels. The evidence showed that the concept of 
power being used against the governor is based on the concept of ‘power over’. The 
governor did not agree with the demarcation in his province, but he could not resist it.  
 At the same time, the line department experienced a third dimension of power –
‘power as dominant’. Despite their being treated as assistants, instead of participants in the 
demarcation process, most local officials did not even realise that they were being 
subjected to unfair treatment. They have been trained to think that it is normal to be 
subordinate to central agents. At the local level of the bureaucracy a slightly different form 
of power was mobilised. The first two concepts of power were observed to be in use. The 
central agents in charge of the demarcation used the threat of force to ensure compliance 
from commune and village chiefs who intended to challenge the position of demarcation 
poles. Central agents also depended on the concept of power as ‘power over’. The 
commune chief and the village chief were aware that the demarcation process represented 
an act of injustice for their constituency, but there was nothing they could do to resist the 
power of the central agents.   
 This leads us to another important concept of governance, accountability. Scheldler 
(1999) defines accountability as answerability or being able to account for one’s own 
action. This concept connotes genuine respect or care for the cause of an action. Eng and 
Craig (2009) argue that in Cambodia, officials are more accountable to their superiors than 
their constituencies. For example, accountability to the PM means conducting activities in 
a manner which places the orders of the PM at the forefront of all decisions. However, 
findings also suggest that the term accountability has different meanings within the neo-
patrimonial political system.  Here it means giving the impression of full compliance. 
During the course of the Tonle Sap demarcation project, the minister of MOWRAM spoke 
of his full support for the PMs concept of Tonle Sap governance, stating that the 
demarcation project emerged from the ‘wise leadership’ of the PM. MOWRAM also 
showed its swift response to the orders of the PM through its commitment to achieve them 
within a short time frame.  
 However, the case study suggests that officials in a neo-patrimonial state do not 
always strictly comply with the wish of their superiors. Under the impression of full 
compliance, officials seek to advance their personal interests as long as they can hide them 
from their superiors. This suggests that accountability in a neo-patrimonial state is not 
based on respect, but fear of superiors. Decisions surrounding the location of the boundary 
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poles serve as a good case in point. The location of boundary pole 22 stands as a stark 
contrast to the intentions of the PM as it encloses large tracts of local farmland. It was 
placed on the basis of the demarcation project leader’s hidden agenda of rent-seeking. The 
PM however does not directly receive details of the demarcation, as information is filtered 
by mid-level agents in order to ensure that their actions are reflected in a positive light. 
Speediness of implementation is also used as a strategy to mitigate against complexities 
and failures of implementation. This suggests that in neo-patrimonial state, accountability 
means presenting or giving the impression of total obedience. Agents only real fear comes 
from superiors clearly knowing what they are doing. The space between the PM and the 
citizens is occupied by isolated line ministries which are made of key individuals with 
connections to the PM. The PM leases this space to them in a reciprocal arrangement 
where they have to conduct the affairs of the state as he dictates, in exchange for their 
position. State offices are sub-divided under the pretext of bureaucratic specialisation, but 
are more actively influenced by neo-patrimonial connections with the PM. 
 The relations between the PM and his officials are reciprocal relations evolving 
around the exchanges of favours and gifts. In neo-patrimonial Cambodia, the concept of 
the gift is distinct in that state officials have to be accountable to the PM not for direct 
material and financial gifts, but for the privilege of keeping state positions, which is not an 
end in itself, but a means to achieving compliance while simultaneously pursuing their 
rent-seeking activities. The difference between direct gifts and privilege of position 
explains the difference between upward accountability and the inability of the PM to 
strictly control all policy outcomes.  
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Figure 20: Diagram of how Cambodian state operates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Accountability Mechanisms in a Neo-patrimonialist State 
The case study suggests that there are three different forms of mechanisms that people can 
employ to demand state accountability. These are: formal mechanisms, party-based 
mechanisms, and direct appeals to the elite. The results of the fieldwork suggest that these 
mechanisms are weak, un-reliable and highly un-predictable.   
 First, the case study material showed that formal mechanisms are extremely 
ineffective. Evidence suggested that local accountability mechanism are scarce, and at 
worse, absent. As seen in Chapter VII, in the aftermath of the demarcation project, local 
farmers who were affected could not depend on local authorities to oppose the central state. 
The experiences of appeal suggest that village authorities do not have the capacity to 
represent the interests of local farmers. Five out of the six chiefs of the affected villages 
did not know about the enclosure until after boundary poles had been physically placed on 
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the ground. It should also be noted here that the effectiveness of the village authorities to 
act on local issues is also reduced due to a lack of resources and minimal salaries which 
cannot realistically allow them to do their day to day duties. During the period of appeal, 
the researcher had great difficulty in accessing village chiefs as they were often outside of 
their villages herding animals.  The data also suggests that the village authority’s inability 
to represent local interests was partly due to the fact that their roles are not clearly defined 
within demarcation and appeal processes. In addition, the village authorities were still 
operating under a political culture where they were expected to await for permission from 
superiors, to conduct even basic activities. This is captured by the fact that the village chief 
refused to initiate the process of appeal until he received approval from the commune 
chief. This shows a system of strict upwards accountability, and the absence of formal 
accountability mechanisms which citizens have access to. 
 Second, evidence surrounding local efforts to find solutions to the demarcation 
problem demonstrates a strong presence for political party mechanisms to solve 
contestations. However it also showed that party based resolution mechanisms are 
unreliable due to a host of problems. One of the problems observed was that whether or not 
local problems were taken up depended on connections to mediators. The head of the party 
working group for instance did not gather information on the local problem of the 
enclosure directly from his political constituents, but through local officials. Hence 
whether or not a local problem is taken on by a party official is highly dependent on local 
officials. The risk inherent in this type of arrangement is that local official’s personal 
views, attitudes and interests can greatly shape how party official view a problem and its 
solutions. 
 Another problem of the party mechanism concerns internal rivalries between 
different patrimonial networks. Although these networks are directly connected to the PM, 
the case study showed that they do not always cooperate in the name of a common party. 
The case of local appeal suggests that the personal values and relations between different 
party officials are crucial determining factors of the success of party mechanisms. In the 
case of the demarcation project, the Cambodian People Party (CPP) could not solve land 
issues of floating rice farmers in Pursat, as the head of the CPP working group for Pursat 
had a personal conflict with the minister in charge of demarcation. They are both senior 
members of the CPP, and they are both close confidants of the PM. But they each have 
different personal and political interests. One sees the solution to the floating rice land in 
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Pursat as a way of enhancing the reputation of the CPP among local farmers, while 
simultaneously winning the favour of the PM.  The other sees it as making a contribution 
to his enemy’s success.  
 The third mechanism for solving local problems is informal attempts to reach 
directly to the PM. As Adler et al. (2006) argue, protest movements in Cambodia often try 
to directly appeal to officials in the central government for assistance in solving local 
problems. The case of the demarcation showed that in the absence of a formal bureaucratic 
mechanism, affected local farmers made attempts to directly access the PM as they believe 
he has the power to overturn state action in their favour. This strategy was successfully 
employed by farmers in Kampong Thom and Bantey Meanchey provinces. However, the 
evidence showed that this mechanism is highly unpredictable, as it is heavily dependent on 
obvious manifestations of local discontent and demonstration. The case study revealed a 
range of limitations to local demonstrations or public rallies. For one thing, protest is 
highly politicised. If not approached properly, protest could be labeled as supporting 
opposition parties, and could provoke a negative reaction from the ruling party which 
dominates the state. The other limitation has to do with local citizens themselves. In a 
country with few historical occurrences of local protest movements, but a long history of 
state control over civic life, local people often feel unable to mobilise and organise to 
represent themselves. They are still trapped in traditional practices of waiting for initiatives 
from the state. Affected farmers could not initiate the process of appeal unless their village 
chief initiated, and actively lead the process.  
 The likelihood of a local movement is strictly under the control of central state 
agents. The demarcation experience showed that central state agents control the discourse 
that disables local movement. As Painter and Jefferey (2009) argue, social movements take 
place under appropriate discursive and material resource conditions. Discourse consists of 
the various narratives by which individual or collective experiences may be organised. As 
Tew (2002:69) argues, narratives contain ‘persuasive politics of meaning which are 
nuanced, with the potential to be empowering or oppressing’. The experience of 
demarcation showed that local communities such as those in the case study commune do 
not have a rich discourse of local heroism, but rather a discourse focused around themes of 
insecurity (i.e. imprisonment that prevents the possibility of a collective social movement).  
 In addition, central agents strategically block possible attempts at appeal or protest 
by those who have available resources. As Painter and Jefferey (2009) argue, social 
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movements arise out of the objective and subjective experiences of oppression. But the 
case study showed that the state only permits those directly related to the demarcation to 
take part in the appeal.  As Ebihara (1968) argues, Cambodians are already atomised, and 
any such state restrictions greatly reduce the number of potential social movement 
participants. The data show that not all of the affected farmers were allowed to participate 
in the local appeal process. The central state agent furthermore eliminated the middle-
stratum farmers from participating in any protest actions. The evidence from the 
demarcation suggested that this group of farmers is more informed of state issues as they 
tend to travel outside of their villages and have better connections to political elites, than 
average farmers. But the experience from the demarcation also showed that these groups of 
farmers do not stand a chance of representing themselves against the state agents when 
labeled as unscrupulous, greedy and unreasonable social deviants whose actions threaten 
the environment. As Herbert (2008) argues, this kind of labeling can justify state action 
against citizens for they are defined as ‘deviant, as beyond the pale of normal society’.  
 This challenges Ojendal’s and Kim’s (2006) sense of optimism of the improved 
relations between state and society in Cambodia. Ojendal and Kim (2006) argue that the 
political culture at the local government level is changing. In their study of the social and 
political changes in Cambodia after the implementation of decentralisation and 
deconcentration (D&D) reforms, they argue that the Cambodian social and political system 
is changing from being a top-down, traditional authoritarianism, or mono-structural 
patronage system, to a more participatory democracy. Looking at local perceptions toward 
commune authorities, they note a change in local attitudes toward local authority from 
‘fear’ to ‘admiration’. In another study that asks if democracy is deepening in Cambodia, 
Ojendal and Kim (2011) argue that in general democracy is beginning in Cambodia, and 
the political space has opened up in ways that improve the relations between civil society 
and the local state. The commune councilors believe that the governance system arising as 
a result of the D&D is different from the old one in that fear and anger are replaced by 
respect and trust, and the exercise of power is no longer raw. According to them the public 
are of the perception that the commune authority had more respect for ordinary citizens in 
2009, compared to the pre-decentralisation period style of government of fear and distance.  
Local state legitimacy is derived from its ability to deliver development, and at the same 
time, commune councilors feel they are primarily accountable to the people. The public 
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believe that they can hold the commune authority accountable for their actions by the 
democratic mechanism of elections.  
  First, the experience of the local appeal process suggested that the perception of 
improved accountability on the part of the local authorities, to local citizens, is not 
commonly observed in practice. Perceptions and feelings of accountability on the part of 
those local authorities are one thing, but how they actually behave is quite another. The 
experience of local efforts to approach local authorities in their appeal process showed that 
in practice, local officials’ accountability greatly varies from individual to individual. For 
example, the district chief’s behaviour did not exhibit any signs of accountability to local 
people, while the commune chief acted in a more accountable manner. The case study 
material also showed that even where there are signs of local accountability, it is highly 
unstable, and the neo-patrimonial nature of personal gain through rent-seeking can easily 
subordinate the sense of a general public duty as reflected in the behaviour of the 
commune chief. 
 Second, evidence showed that despite some signs of improvement in terms of local 
accountability, the central state still maintains its ability to intervene in ways that bypass 
all exiting local arrangements. In high-stake affairs such as the demarcation of the Tonle 
Sap, the bureaucratic mechanism of local accountability is taken over by an ad hoc 
working arrangement typical which reflects the particularistic nature of the neo-patrimonial 
state in Cambodia. As seen in Chapter VII, central agents set the conditions of the appeal 
process in a manner that allowed them to control the likelihood of success. Thus, the case 
study material suggested that the local formal bureaucratic mechanism of accountability is 
highly unreliable in terms of producing accountability from the state.   
 The findings also challenge Un (2011) who argues that Cambodia is becoming a 
stable hegemonic party system. For Un (2011) the Cambodian political system is moving 
away from a democracy to being a party state, where party affairs dominate state functions. 
The term stable also implies that this system has an internal structural integrity that allows 
the system to operate as a unified party. But evidence from the Tonle Sap demarcation 
project shows hegemony on the part of the party system, but not stability. The case study 
material suggested that different elite groups only gave the impression that they are 
working under a unified party system under the watch of the PM. But behind him, those 
groups are not working together under the image of a single party, but are competing 
against one another for their own group interests, be it financial or political. In this 
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instance, therefore, state affairs are beginning to move away from party affairs to personal 
territorial control. Their battles and rivalries determine the outcome of state action, and the 
ability of the party to intervene in ways that affect citizens of the state. This suggests that 
neo-patrimonial Cambodia is becoming more than just a party state, but is becoming the 
personal territory of key state officials.   
 But amid the absence of formal state-society relations, and the weakening of 
informal party mechanisms, the case study suggested that there is an important role for 
local leaders in the appeal process. This group of leaders emerges from among local 
farmers, but those who are more educated, more connected, and more financially equipped 
to act in ways that could potentially challenge the actions of central state agents. Although 
they failed to achieve any significant results, the case study suggests that this group was 
crucial in initiating local appeal processes. They served as opinion leaders who rely and 
interpret the message of the central state on the demarcation matter, and they mobilised 
local farmers, reinforcing the idea of appeal.  
 The evidence also showed that those local leaders fostered communication between 
commune chiefs and village chiefs. They also worked closely with local officials to devise 
strategies to effectively challenge their superior’s decisions. Their collaboration with the 
commune chief in negotiating with the district chief was a case in point. Initially, the 
district chief did not allow the local authority to be involved in any local appeal processes, 
which as discussed earlier effectively meant that the local movement had no chance of 
taking place. The commune chief was not willing to challenge the decisions of the district 
chief, but the local leaders’ analysis of the motives of the district chief, and the revelation 
of his plan to grab the land in question, helped the commune chief to gather enough 
confidence to lie about the local protest.  
Chapter Summary 
The empirical findings of this thesis make a significant contribution to understandings of 
territoriality and neo-patrimonialism. This thesis has shown that territoriality as a human 
strategy to influence or control others is dangerous when applied in a neo-patrimonial 
system. Here it becomes the strategy of key individuals who occupy position of power to 
advance their personal interests at a high cost for the society at large.   
 The case study material also contributed to an understanding of the operation of 
power in a neo-patrimonial system. It showed that in a neo-patrimonial system, state power 
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may be initiated by the top leader, but it is not transmitted intact to the receiving end. The 
case study showed that the power of the top leader is actually transferred through the 
different layers of state, where the effect of it gets influenced or modified by the values and 
personal interests of key state agents. It suggests that in a neo-patrimonial state, the biggest 
threat to society is not necessarily the top man, but those who occupy the space between 
him and society.    
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis concludes that the nature of state power over society as expressed through 
territorialised resource governance is not based on laws and regulations, but on personal 
power exercised in an outwardly rationalistic framework of conservation, resource 
regulations and state modernization. From the outset, state power may be viewed as 
legitimate as it is harboured in the image of good governance under the rhetoric of 
accountability, representation and responsiveness, but material from the case study 
suggests that power is carried in the manner of a neo-patrimonial system characterised by, 
among other things, personal networks in combination with the power derived from 
territorial strategies. Exactly how the state engages territorial strategies is a matter of 
complex interaction and combination of influences, the understanding of which depends on 
the knowledge of political history, governance reforms and the resulting neo-
patrimonialism. 
 As far as neo-patrimonialism is concerned, the state depends on the logic of the 
modernist state of division of control based on scientific expertise, as in MOWRAM, 
TSBA, MOE, MAFF and FiA, to legitimise its course of action, for instance the Tonle Sap 
demarcation. An aspect of power, knowledge as proposed by Foucault (1980) can be 
observed here. The societal groups are instilled with a value and belief system that accepts 
the state as the sole legitimate body to manage the societal and environmental affairs. This 
kind of power, as Lukes (1974) suggests, is radical in that it is exercised on the societal 
groups without them realising that they are being subjected to it.  
 With the pre-existing acceptance of the role of the state in the management of the 
human community and the accompanying natural resource pools, power relations between 
the state and the society are already unequal, and all the more so if the state concerned is 
non-democratic. In this framework, Sack’s (1986) notion of territorial strategies is 
materialised in a unique way. Territorial strategies in neo-patrimonialism consist of the 
orders of the PM as implemented through his personally assigned agents who could exploit 
all of the power exercising features of resource reclassification, map making and territorial 
enforcement to their own personal benefits. 
 As Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) suggest, territorial strategies are powerful tools 
the state employs to control society.  The case study shows that territorial strategies are 
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dangerous in neo-patrimonial states where the logic of rational resource governance such 
as conservation, protection and resource regulation, through rational planning  can be used 
to advance personal interests through rent-seeking and land-grabbing. Central state agents 
are the ones who make decisions on every matter, from designing a new map, to 
overseeing the pole-placing process. But what makes territorial strategy dangerous in the 
context of a neo-patrimonial state is that the power-exercising features embedded in the 
territorial strategy is not companied by the stake-holder verification and consultation 
processes assumed to exist. In a neo-patrimonial state such as Cambodia, territorial 
demarcation is done by the state, without any involvement from concerned communities. 
The state, as the case study shows, is comprised of the PM and a group of personally and 
politically connected individuals. The PM gave an order to demarcate the Tonle Sap 
protected area, and he assigned responsibility to carry out the demarcation to his closely 
connected political clients. Those men have the political power to implement the 
demarcation project in ways that bypass all existing state institutional arrangements, 
making the demarcation project their political space. In addition, they serve as evaluators 
of their own work and report back to the PM of their progress. Local knowledge of 
officials and affected farmers alike has been ignored; their role in the process, as concerned 
individuals or as one of the main actors, has effectively been displaced, and their voices 
have been effectively silenced by the processes of intimidation.  
 This thesis has also reflected on the question of what state is. The Cambodia state 
features the PM who is at the centre of power. Between the PM and citizens exist three 
elements of power- the personal networks of the PM, the CPP political working groups and 
state bureaucrats. These elements are not necessarily mutually exclusive, which make up 
the body of the Cambodian state. 
 The personal networks of the PM are the most important elements of the state that 
bring power of the PM to bear on citizens. This consists of two layers of agents, those the 
PM personally assigns, and those who are personally connected to the first layer, and who 
play a role as implementers. The first layers take direct orders from the PM and the second 
layer takes on orders to actualise policy. Agents of both layers are selected from the pool 
of state bureaucrats whose positions are formally defined (such as the minister of 
MOWRAM or staff members of Tonle Sap Basin Authority). The direct and personal 
assignments as given by the PM provide them with political power which cuts through 
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existing state institutional arrangements, making them effectively the sole actors for the 
matter in question.   
 The CPP political working group consists of those who are personally and 
politically closely connected with the PM. For the purpose of voter relations, this group 
exists and operates in parallel to the formal state structure, but the central purpose of this 
group is to respond to political crises.  
 State officials occupy formal positions that exist as part of state institutions, as 
defined through legislation. Yet in reality, as was shown through the demarcation process, 
this group has no real ability to represent citizens. This group consists of officials at 
provincial and local levels of government, often with little or no personal and political 
connections to the PM.  
 The three elements of state, although organised around the PM, do not always work 
in conjunction. Often they find themselves in conflict with one another, but this thesis has 
emphasised that such conflicts arise not out of attempts to fulfill public duties, but 
competition for personal benefit either in the form of a patron’s favoritism or financial and 
material gains. What this thesis has tried to draw out is that in the process of state 
territorialisation, the state does not operate as a single entity in exercising its power over 
society. In achieving its dominance over society, the state first dominates its own agents at 
the central and provincial levels, before exercising power over the society.  
 When power is unjustly exercised over the society, there is often no reliable 
mechanism for the society to demand accountability from the state. The experience of the 
demarcation shows that the formal mechanism to demand accountability from the state is, 
at best, weak. Despite the D&D reform that aims at improving local accountability, 
representation and responsiveness, societal groups, as this instance suggests, cannot 
depend on the local state authorities such as the village and commune chiefs to represent 
their interests, for those local authorities view themselves as largely inferior and thus at the 
mercy of the central state agents who possess the power of the PM. Those central agents, 
also managed to position themselves in strategic control of the appeal mechanism by 
setting the conditions under which the appeal can take place. But often those conditions 
consist of a time frame and material demands so unrealistic that the locals cannot meet 
them given the prevailing political and bureaucratic red tape in the country. 
 This leaves the option and likelihood of accountability to the informal mechanisms 
of patron-client networks. But this is proven unreliable as a lot depends on the Party 
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officials, their patrimonial interests and the wider political sentiment of the time. 
Meanwhile, the likelihood of a radical democratic solution such as through public protest is 
absent. The locals, by oppression manifested through the threat of violence or by self 
reservation, cannot organise themselves to publicly protest against the state action. The 
state takes advantage of the absence of a strong social fabric, perhaps due to prolonged 
history of violence, centralism and state surveillance.  
 
 Finally, this thesis concludes from the experience of the Tonle Sap Demarcation 
project that the power of the state over the society originates in the logic of the modernist 
state that positions itself as the sole legitimate actor and manager of natural resources. 
With this justification, the power to implement its modernist project such as resource 
demarcation is exercised as a personal prerogative of the PM who serves as the source and 
centre of power. However, the final and actual effects of the state’s power over society in 
Cambodia is shaped by the implementing agents, who carry out the PM’s order in 
accordance with their circumstances and personal interests, and, on the basic of a weak 
local formal accountability mechanism, do what they possibly can to block the locals from 
demanding accountability from the state. 
Significance 
In the opinion of the researcher, this thesis has made two significant contributions. First, 
this thesis serves to remind environmental NGOs and donors funding conservation 
projects, that their objectives of creating sustainable local livelihoods through rational 
resource governance and conservation cannot be un-problematically realised on the 
ground. Such objectives are often colonised by host governments and used as a tool to 
affect those the projects originally set out to benefit. Conservation NGOs and donors need 
to understand that leaders, or some leaders, in some countries are what Liddle (1992:798) 
would call ‘political animals’. They would do what they can to benefit themselves 
regardless of the social cost.  
 This directly concerns the current model of donors’ and NGOs’ engagement. 
Donors mostly engage with the initial stages of a conservation project, writing the rationale 
and objective of a project, while leaving the implementation to host governments. But it is 
not the writing of rationales and objectives which is the most important. It is the 
implementation. The Tonle Sap demarcation project bears an important testimony of the 
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flaw in this arrangement. It shows that the state feeds on the rationale given by donor(s) 
and implements projects to the detriment of local people, and when that happens, social 
actors have no one to turn to. Once the project has expired; the mandate of donors has 
ended.   
  Second, from a methodological point of view, the work of this thesis is significant 
in that it is not just a study of the impacts of an event, but a study of an event in a particular 
place and time. For this thesis, the researcher followed the demarcation of the Tonle Sap 
project from its inception at the national level to the implementation of it at the local level. 
This allowed the researcher to follow the event as it unfolded and observe social 
interactions in real time. The addition of the time dimension made qualitative data on 
power relations more complete and more accurate. It also reduced, if not eliminated, the 
problem of researcher dependency on participants’ ability to recall historical data, which is 
a major challenge to the collection of accurate data. 
 This raises an important question concerning the role of an in-depth ethnographic 
approach and how useful it is as a research methodology for the examination of zoning 
policies, the politics of mapping, and the grounded implications of demarcating 
environmental resource and conservation zones. The experience of this thesis’s field work 
suggests that resource governance is highly political, and resource arrangements and 
allocation are governed by power relations, which make its discussion highly sensitive. As 
it concerns powerful interests, people do not generally talk about it. However, for its 
important role in their everyday livelihood, people constantly think about it and act with 
reference to it. A broad implication of this is that the data on resource governance such as 
those of Tonle Sap demarcation and the struggle over it need not come solely from 
people’s words. Their actions, which have to be understood with reference to a specific 
time with specific historical events and political consideration, can also serve as a rich 
source of data. As Foucault suggests, a statement is beyond the words themselves, and 
attempts need to be made to ‘rediscover the silent murmuring, the inexhaustible speech that 
animates from within the voice that one hears, re-establish the tiny, invisible text that runs 
between and sometimes collides with them’(Foucault 1972;27). Only an in-depth 
ethnographic approach can do this, for it could capture the discursive aspect of power 
study (discourse) which emphasises the importance of the existing wider patterns of 
statement, symbols and understanding. 
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Limitations 
There are some important limitations that are worth mentioning here. The first limitation of 
this thesis concerns the generalisability of the findings. The conclusion of this thesis is 
drawn mainly from data collected from one commune. Thus, the finding of this thesis 
should only serve to reveal some aspects of state power, not as a generalisation or 
theorization of how the state works in Cambodia.  
 The second limitation concerns issues of data reliability. The main focus of this 
thesis has been on processes of policy making, process of decision making, and social 
interaction. Important data sets for these units of analysis come from interviews, direct 
observations and participant observation. During the course of data collection, the 
researcher did not have access to many key government officials for interviews. This 
prevented the researcher from accessing first-hand information which may be important for 
understanding state agent action and behaviour. Instead, the researcher depended on 
information collected from other sources. Despite the researcher’s effort to ensure that the 
information best reflected reality, the researcher cannot claim to know how the mind of 
others works.  
Suggestions for Further Research 
A few interesting observations arise as a result of this thesis, and some of these 
observations could be, and should be taken for further investigation. First, the findings 
suggest that state power primarily emanates from mid-level agents rather than the central 
political elites. It suggests that this problem is mainly due to the missing link between 
citizens and the political elite in the central government. This leads to the question of what 
mechanism allows for dialogue between top government officials and regular citizens in a 
neo-patrimonial state. How would this kind of mechanism help citizens represent their 
interests, in the absence of strong state institutions? This question may sound obvious but it 
remains a crucial question in relation to Cambodia as it continues to experience problems 
of land related conflicts. This situation takes on a particular priority due to the poor 
continually finding themselves in a subordinate position to those in power. 
 Second, during the course of field data collection, the researcher noted the 
emerging role of local leadership that did not necessarily depend on connections to the 
political elite. Experience from the demarcation project suggests that local farmer leaders 
play an important role in initiating and sustaining local movements. They serve as opinion 
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leaders, sponsors, and as an active force behind appeals. Further research should be 
conducted to understand these local leaders, and their potential, and limitations in 
promoting local democratic action.   
 Third, and more specific to Cambodia, is the observation that the political party 
system, especially the CPP working group, is unable to represent local citizens. This 
observation, in a sense, contradicts Un’s (2011: 555) argument that Cambodia is a 
‘hegemonic stable party system’ (current author’s emphasis). These thesis’s findings 
suggest that Cambodia may be a hegemonic party system, but its stability is far from 
enduring. Further research is needed to investigate whether the internal dynamic of the 
CPP is changing and in what direction. More important is the question of how the changing 
dynamic of the CPP is shaping political operations in Cambodia, and what will be their 
impacts on the country’s democratic reforms.  
 Finally, the study sets certain directions for research into zoning practices and other 
manifestations of territorialised resource governance. There should be further studies in 
these directions, looking as such questions as how zoning and community recourse 
planning empower local communities or whether it facilitates a process of wealth 
transformation between different social groups; then which groups benefit or who lose and 
how. 
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